WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXXI, Number 4 July 1979

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSN 0043-8871

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

CYRIL E. BLACK — JANET KELLY
HEDLEY BULL — STEPHEN D. KRASNER
LOWELL DITTMER — ERNEST R. MAY
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE — JAMES N. ROSENAU
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN — KENNETH N. WALTZ

Editors: CYRIL E. BLACK, GERALD GARVEY
HENRY S. BIENEN (*Review Articles*)
Associate Editors: WILLEM H. BUITER (Spring Term), STEPHEN F. COHEN, JAMES D. DENARDO, LEON GORDENKER, JEFFREY A. HART, CHARLES ISSAWI, PAUL E. SIGMUND, ROBERT L. TIGNOR (Fall Term), LYNN T. WHITE, III
Executive Editor: ELSBETH G. LEWIN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Manuscripts should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate, together with an abstract of approximately 150 words. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, typed double-spaced, and placed at the end of the manuscript.

Authors may expect to be notified of the editors' decision within three months from date of submission. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of editors' and readers' reports. Editorial policy does not provide for informing authors of readers' evaluations or suggestions for improvement of rejected manuscripts.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers. WORLD POLITICS does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere (even in somewhat different form), or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material from WORLD POLITICS should be sought from Permissions Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

U.S. and Canada—Individual subscribers: $10.00 per year; $17.50 for two years; $25.00 for three years. Institutional subscribers: $20.00 per year; $37.00 for two years; $49.00 for three years. Back issues: $5.25.

Foreign—Individual subscribers: $12.50 per year; $22.00 for two years; $31.25 for three years. Institutional subscribers: $25.00 per year; $46.25 for two years; $61.25 for three years. (Please add $2.00 additional per year for foreign postage and handling.) Back issues: $6.50.

Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from Johnson Associates, P.O. Box 1017, Greenwich, Conn. 06830. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI*, *Book Review Index*, *Combined Retrospective Index Sets* (CRIS), *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Index*, and *Monthly Periodical Index*; it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents*. Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest*, *Historical Abstracts*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

Copyright © 1979 by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. July 1979. Vol. XXXI, No. 4. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

Vol. XXXI · July 1979 · No. 4

CONTENTS

Economic Coercion in World Politics:
With a Focus on North-South Relations *Richard Stuart Olson* 471

Soviet Perceptions of U.S. "Positions-of-Strength" Diplomacy
in the 1970s *William B. Husband* 495

The Concorde SST and Change in the
British Polity *Joseph M. Grieco* 518

Soviet Computing and Technology Transfer:
An Overview *Seymour E. Goodman* 539

Patrimonialism and Military Rule
in Indonesia *Harold Crouch* 571

REVIEW ARTICLES

Recapturing the Just War for
Political Theory *Hedley Bull* 588

National Priorities and the Physical Habitat: *Harold Sprout and*
Focus of Continuing Controversy *Margaret Sprout* 600

Index to Volume XXXI 623

The Contributors ii

Abstracts iii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

RICHARD STUART OLSON is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the International Relations Program at the University of Redlands. He is currently preparing a book on the theory and practice of international and transnational economic coercion.

WILIAM HUSBAND is a candidate for the Ph.D. in the Department of History at Princeton University.

JOSEPH M. GRIECO is a John Parker Compton Fellow at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, and a Ph.D. candidate in Government at Cornell University. His dissertation examines the outcomes of bargaining between the government of India and three multinational computer firms.

SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN is Associate Professor of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science at the University of Virginia. His current work is concerned with technological development and technology transfer.

HAROLD CROUCH is Lecturer in Political Science at the National University of Malaysia. He is the author of *Trade Unions and Politics in India* (1966) and *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (1978). He is at present studying political change in Southeast Asia.

HEDLEY BULL is Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University and Fellow of Balliol College. His most recent book is *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1977).

HAROLD and MARGARET SPROUT are Research Associates at the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, where Harold Sprout is also Professor of International Relations, Emeritus. They are the authors of *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth* (1971) and *The Context of Environmental Politics: Unfinished Business for America's Third Century* (1978).

The appearance of the code at the bottom of the first page of an article in this journal (serial) indicates the copyright owner's consent that copies of the article may be made for personal or internal use, or for the personal or internal use of specific clients. This consent is given on the condition, however, that the copier pay the stated per-copy fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., P. O. Box 765, Schenectady, N.Y. 12301, for copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law. This consent does not extend to other kinds of copying, such as copying for general distribution, for advertising or promotional purposes, for creating new collective works, or for resale.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSTRACTS

Economic Coercion in World Politics: With a Focus on North-South Relations

By R. S. OLSON

Earlier studies of economic sanctions underestimated the role and importance of more subtle forms of coercion because they concentrated attention on highly public, formally legislated attempts at economic coercion in world politics, such as the cases of Italy in the 1930s and Rhodesia since 1965. The author agrees with Galtung, Knorr, and others that in highly public cases. sanctions will often fail in their avowed political purpose because they actually stimulate nationalism and thus resistance in the target-state; he argues that in an increasingly (but unequally) interdependent world, relatively subtle sanctions can be politically effective—with only moderately purely economic effects—by exploiting the LDC's typically fragmented interest-group and class structure. In order to describe and explain how such economic coercion works, it is necessary to bridge several "islands" of literature: on economic sanctions, on the structure of dependency, and on the causes of political instability.

Soviet Perceptions of U.S. "Positions-of-Strength" Diplomacy in the 1970s

By W. B. HUSBAND

Soviet political scholars have argued that, since 1970, it has become impossible for the United States to pursue a "positions-of-strength" foreign policy effectively. These analysts feel that in the past, the U.S. has relied heavily on projecting its military strength in diplomatic affairs, and that changes in the international political and economic order now prevent the continuation of this policy. A study of the positions-of-strength issue in Soviet scholarly journals reveals that Soviet scholars do not agree on how the United States will react to this development. While the majority contends that the U.S. will try to regain its ability to pursue positions-of-strength diplomacy, a significant minority believes that the time is right for a deepening of Soviet-American cooperation. Although the prospects for cooperation appear less promising at present than they did during 1972-1975, the study shows a general softening on the subject of cooperation since 1970.

The Concorde SST and Change in the British Polity

By J. M. GRIECO

Britain's experience with the Concorde Project was characterized by changes in the objectives of governmental policy for which the Concorde was to be an instrument. Early in the project, the British state used the Concorde to rationalize Britain's aircraft industry and to enter the E.E.C. Later, the international objective became less salient; the domestic objective, instead of encouragement of efficiency, became maintenance of the industry's employment levels in order to promote political stability. The shift in the purposes of policy can be linked to changes in the power relations beween Britain's society and state. The changes in power relations raise issues about recent characterizations of the British polity and other advanced industrialized societies.

Soviet Computing and Technology Transfer: An Overview

By S. E. GOODMAN

For a long time, the Soviet pattern of development and use of computing differed from the West in terms of time-scale, philosophy, institutional arrangements, capital decisions, and applications. Starting in the late 1950s, a major political, military, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic reassessment of the value of computing took place; during the next dozen years, the overall Soviet view moved much closer to that of the rest of the developed world. This new perception has been backed by large political and economic commitments. Apparently the Soviet leadership is hoping that computer technology will make the existing economic system more efficient and effective, and will thus help to avoid fundamental reforms that are politically unacceptable. A massive transfer of foreign technology over the last decade has made the Soviet computer industry less isolated than during the 1960s, but its interfaces with the outside world are still narrowly defined. Serious difficulties remain in trying to transplant a sophisticated and pervasive technology into a systemic environment very different from that in which it originated and thrived.

Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia

By H. CROUCH

Political scientists have recently turned to the Weberian concept of patrimonialism to explain political stability in some Third-World states. Indonesia during the Guided Democracy period is an example of a regime with strong patrimonial characteristics, although its collapse canot be explained in patrimonial terms. The New Order regime has sought to consolidate its power in patrimonial style. Efforts have been made to de-politicize the masses while confining political competition to non-ideological jockeying for power within the elite. However, the New Order's dependence on economic development to obtain support from key groups outside the military elite has tended to push the regime toward increasing regularization and bureaucratization and growing conflict within the military elite. Moreover, the depoliticization drive may not be effective in the long run. In these circumstances, the patrimonial distribution of the spoils of office as a means of maintaining political stability is likely to be increasingly supported by direct repression.

Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory

By H. BULL

Michael Walzer's *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* is a fine work which is right to defend the "moral reality" of war and to dismiss relativist approaches. But he does not provide a defense of his position against beliefs (for example, in absolute pacificism, in revolutionary war, or in collectivist approaches) fundamentally at loggerheads with his own. If the discussion of just war is to be more than an exchange of opinions, there must be attention to ethical foundations.

National Priorities and the Physical Habitat: Focus of Continuing Controversy

By H. and M. SPROUT

Ever since arresting the progressive deterioration of the physical habitat emerged as a live political issue in the United States in the early 1960s, it has been a subject of continuing disputation—both as to the urgency of repair and protection, and as to who should bear responsibility for deciding what and how much to undertake or to leave undone. Since all societies, especially industrial societies, are exposed to proliferating damage and hazards from diverse sources, environmental programs compete for support with a multiplicity of other claims on disposable resources. Since nearly everything that is done to maintain a decently livable physical habitat affects to some extent the distribution of income within and among nations, public authority has become increasingly the focus of environmental repair and protection, and the budgetary decisions of government the core of that focus—claims of some economists and other specialists to the contrary notwithstanding. The four books compared in this article consider these and related issues from various perspectives, both domestic and international.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CAMBRIDGE

PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL EQUALITY

A Seven Nation Comparison

SIDNEY VERBA, NORMAN H. NIE and JAE-ON KIM

"Thoroughly researched and documented, rigorously organized, and clearly presented, this methodologically sophisticated work is an important contribution to the comparative study of political participation." —*Library Journal*. "Most impressive is the quality of thought displayed throughout. . . . The book could be recommended as a tour de force of the intellect, quite apart from the subject matter it treats." —*Dr. David Abernathy, Department of Political Science, Stanford University*.

Hardcover $19.95 Paper $8.95

THE GERMAN PROBLEM RECONSIDERED

Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present

DAVID CALLEO

Calleo examines the concept of Germany's uniqueness and illuminates the question of why Germany, since the era of Bismarck, has been so often at war with her neighbors. Also emphasized is the position of Germany in the international system since 1945. "A skillful and intelligent questioning of current interpretations of the development of modern Germany. . . . A book that seeks controversy—and succeeds."—*Foreign Affairs* $11.95

WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY IN THE FACE OF THE FUTURE

JOHN DUNN

Dunn questions the universal acceptance of such political values as freedom, justice, democracy, and loyalty toward fellow citizens, examines how these values have come to be accepted, and shows that the major traditions of thought from which they have emerged are incoherent or flawed in crucial respects. *Themes in the Social Sciences*

Hardcover $17.95 Paper $4.95

Cambridge University Press

32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES
Nikolai V. Sivachev
Nikolai N. Yakovlev

Translated by Olga Adler Titelbaum

The United States in the World; Foreign Perspectives series, edited by Akira Iriye

Cloth 320 pages $12.95

THE CREATION OF A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY, 1928–1936
Kristi Andersen

Cloth 176 pages $13.00

LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY
Volume 3: The Political Order of a Free People
F. A. Hayek

Cloth 224 pages $14.00

MUSLIM NATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE SOVIET UNION
A Revolutionary Strategy for the Colonial World
Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush

Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, edited by Richard L. Chambers

Cloth 296 pages Illus. $20.00

F.D.R. AND THE PRESS
Graham J. White

Cloth 290 pages $13.95

DEFENSE POLITICS
A Budgetary Perspective
Arnold Kanter

Cloth 168 pages $12.50

HONG KONG
A Study in Economic Freedom
Alvin Rabushka

Cloth 144 pages $10.00

NEWSMAKING
Bernard Roshco

Paper 170 pages $3.95

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
Chicago 60637

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ECONOMIC COERCION IN WORLD POLITICS

With a Focus on North-South Relations

By RICHARD STUART OLSON*

I. Introduction

SEVERAL years ago, Donald Puchala and Stuart Fagan surveyed the probable course of international politics in the 1970s, and argued that the issues of welfare, development, and standard of living had joined the more traditional concerns of nation-states for security, and that the world's political problems would increasingly revolve around trade, aid, and monetary affairs.[1] Stimulated in part by the accuracy of this observation, I will attempt to explore an area in which welfare and security are especially intertwined: economic coercion in world politics; my focus will be on North-South relations. The present study represents an effort to organize and synthesize some suggested implications of a recently completed series of case studies on disputes over expropriation; these are of special relevance to the study of economic coercion in North-South relations because they almost invariably involve the principal actors in today's world political economy—multinational corporations, international financial institutions, national governments—and because they often serve as a specific focus for disagreement between North and South over the form and functioning of the world's political economy.[2]

I approach the topic with some trepidation, however, for it is something of an academic minefield. Objectivity is difficult to attain or even

* The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the University of Redlands Faculty Research Program.

[1] Puchala and Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970's: The Search for a Perspective," *International Organization*, XXVII (Spring 1974), 249, and esp. 262-63.

[2] See R. S. Olson, "Economic Coercion in International Disputes: The United States and Peru in the IPC Expropriation Dispute of 1968–71," *Journal of Developing Areas*, IX (April 1975), 395-414; "Expropriation and International Economic Coercion: Ceylon and the 'West' 1961–65," *Journal of Developing Areas*, XI (January 1977), 205-26; and "Expropriation, Economic Coercion, and Revolution: A Retrospective Look at Brazil in the 1960's," *Journal of Developing Areas*, XIII (April 1979). Also interested in compliance, but approaching it in a different manner, are Neil R. Richardson, "Political Compliance and U.S. Trade Dominance," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70 (December 1976), 1089-1109, and Eugene R. Wittkopf, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (September 1973), 868-88.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/040471-24$01.20/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at times to recognize; concepts such as neo-imperialism and exploitation are widely used but generally ill defined; or, what is worse, they are sometimes defined differently by different authors for different purposes. The disturbing result is that scholars often find themselves in serious disagreement even when examining what appears to be the same material or case. Appreciating the honest intellectual divisions in the field, I will place some works in what their authors might consider "odd company," and suggest possible relationships, rather than draw conclusions. I hope thereby to generate criticism and stimulate research; in that sense I explicitly offer this article as a target. I plan, first, to review and criticize the existing literature on international economic sanctions in the hope of refining and improving the major theoretical insights—especially, but not exclusively, those of Johan Galtung. Second, I will suggest some general propositions about how economic sanctions may interact with the domestic political economy of a less developed country (LDC) to affect the policies or tenure of authorities or the entire configuration of the regime. I will explore two other bodies of literature, on dependency theory and on political instability, for relevant contributions. For reasons of consistent metaphor, each body of literature will be considered as an "island."

II. Island One: Economic Sanctions

A relatively small number of scholars dominates the study of economic sanctions. Johan Galtung and Margaret Doxey come first to mind, especially with regard to collective international sanctions, but others have also contributed significantly: MacDonald, Hoffman, Wallensteen, Grieve, Losman, and Baer, for example.[3] With regard to economic coercion and foreign policy, Anna Schreiber, Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, and Klaus Knorr stand out.[4] The problem with most of this

[3] See Johan Galtung, "On The Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," *World Politics*, XIX (April 1967), 378-416. The best pieces by Doxey are *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement* (London: Oxford University Press 1971); "The Rhodesian Sanctions Experiment," *Year Book of World Affairs*, XXV (1971), 140-59; and "International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with Special Reference to the UN and Southern Africa," *International Organization*, XXVI (Summer 1972), 527-50. See also R. St. J. MacDonald, "Economic Sanctions in the International System," *Canadian Yearbook of International Law*, VII (1969), 61-91; Frederick Hoffman, "The Function of Economic Sanctions: A Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Peace Research*, II (1967), 140-59; Peter Wallensteen, "Characteristics of Economic Sanctions," *Journal of Peace Research*, III (1968), 248-67; Muriel J. Grieve, "Economic Sanctions, Theory and Practice," *International Relations*, III (October 1968), 431-43; Donald Losman, "International Boycotts: An Appraisal," *Politico*, XXXVII (December 1972), 648-71; George W. Baer, "Sanctions and Security: The League of Nations and the Italian-Ethiopian War, 1935–1936," *International Organization*, XXVII (Spring 1973), 165-79.

[4] See Schreiber, "Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: U.S. Eco-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

literature is, however, that its focus is too narrow. With the exception of Knorr, all of the authors evince varying degrees of concern for "world order," and concentrate on attempts at sanctions by the League of Nations or the United Nations; or they focus on other internationally legislated, highly public attempts at economic coercion. It is worth noting at the outset that there is a consensus in this literature that economic sanctions are largely ineffective. For example,

> Galtung: "In this article the conclusion about the probable effectiveness of economic sanctions is, generally, negative."[5]
>
> Doxey: "Summing up the analysis of the UN and southern Africa, one must concede that the deterrent and coercive force of sanctions is weak on almost every count . . ."[6]
>
> Wallensteen: "The general picture is that economic sanctions have been unsuccessful as a means of influence in the international system."[7]
>
> Adler-Karlsson: "From looking at all the facts presented in this book it is hard to avoid the overall conclusion that the described embargo policy has been a failure."[8]

Such conclusions are well-nigh inevitable, given the cases selected. It is no one's fault"; it is just the result of the authors' dealing with very public, high-profile cases. Lessons might be learned from them which would improve the international enforcement of legal norms. Even the definitions betray the legalistic orientation of the authors. For example, Doxey states that "sanctions, to deserve the name, must be conformity-defending instruments relating to behavior which is expected by custom or required by law."[9] Brown-John examines only three cases (Italy, 1935–36; the Dominican Republic, 1960–62; and Rhodesia, starting in 1965) that "possess the common theme of international collective sanctions as a response to a determined delict in law."[10]

---

nomic Measures Against Cuba and the Dominican Republic," *World Politics*, XXV (April 1973), 387-413; Adler-Karlsson, *Western Economic Warfare 1947–1967: A Case Study in Foreign Economic Policy* (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell 1968); Knorr, *The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations* (New York: Basic Books 1975), esp. chaps. I, IV, VI, and IX. For a brief summary of Knorr's thinking on this subject, see his "International Economic Leverage and its Uses," in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, eds., *Economic Issues and National Security* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1977), 99-126.

[5] Galtung (fn. 3), 409.

[6] Doxey, "International Sanctions" (fn. 3), 547.

[7] Wallensteen (fn. 3), 262.

[8] Adler-Karlsson (fn. 4), 9.

[9] Doxey, *Economic Sanctions* (fn. 3), 1.

[10] C. Lloyd Brown-John, *Multilateral Sanctions in International Law: A Comparative Analysis* (New York: Praeger 1975), v.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Johan Galtung's article, which is also concerned with a more orderly world (and focuses on Rhodesia), shows wider vision and greater political sensitivity. First, Galtung offers a useful general definition of sanctions. They are "actions initiated by one or more international actors (the 'senders') against one or more others (the 'receivers') with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the senders deem important."[11] Such a definition avoids the assumption that there really is an agreed-upon set of norms about important political questions; we are left with the more practical "norms the senders deem important." The only change that would sharpen the definition might be to use the word "target" instead of "receiver," and to make "coercion" interchangeable with "sanction," in order to capture more of the element of threat in these situations and to move a bit further away from legal terminology. Second—and referring back to his definition's purpose of economic sanctions—Galtung dismisses punishment in and for itself as theoretically uninteresting, and concentrates on compliance. From the perspective of international relations, this is understandable but, as both Knorr and Adler-Karlsson have argued, punishment may be quite important to the sender-state(s) for domestic reasons.[12] The term "compliance" also presents some problems that I will discuss before delving further into theoretical issues.

Virtually all those who write on the subject note that, ultimately, the objective of most attempts at sanction is to foster divisions between elements of the elite, or between the elite and the general populace, or both. But conceptually it is often unclear just what is being attacked by the sanctions, aside from the simplistic answer that it is "the economy." David Easton's distinction between the three objects of support in a political system may be of aid here: (1) *the political community*, the most abstract and general object of support, defined as "a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor"; (2) *the regime* or constitutional order, which comprises the values, norms, and structure of authority of the political community; and (3) *the authorities*, those individuals who occupy positions in the structure of authority.[13]

In discussing the actual points of attack of economic sanctions, sup-

[11] Galtung (fn. 3), 379.
[12] Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (fn. 4), 138; Adler-Karlsson (fn. 4), 33-34.
[13] Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley 1965), 177, 190, 193, and 212.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

port for the political community can probably be disregarded. If it were to be the target, the situation would have to be of such total conflict that it would be familiar only to a Scipio Africanus or a Genghis Khan. For our purposes, the points of attack are support for the authorities and/or the regime; it is here that compliance, as a term, creates difficulties. The sender's demands are made on different levels, and uncritical use of the word compliance in a specific case may mask important implications. For example, there have been several cases in which compliance was used to mean payment of compensation by the target to foreign corporations whose properties had been expropriated. In such cases, it did not matter who the authorities were or what the nature of the regime was; compliance meant conforming to demands in a relatively specific area. But the term compliance has also been used in cases in which the goal is (or was) to force significant regime changes, such as in Rhodesia; that is a demand on an entirely different level. In this case, the goal is really subversion of the regime (norms, values, and structure of authority) rather than compliance with specific demands. This point is illustrated by a comparison of the case of Rhodesia with that of Italy some thirty years earlier.

The goal of the League of Nations' sanctions against Italy in 1935–1936 was to get Mussolini to stop the war in Ethiopia. The goal was not necessarily to topple him as an authority or to end the fascist regime in Italy—although the mechanism of sanctions that was supposed to make him comply was designed to pose that threat by creating economic distress, and thus political unrest, in Italy.[14] Discussions of the sanctions mandated by the United Nations against Rhodesia since 1965 also use the word compliance, but in this case it connotes significant changes in the values, norms, and structure of authority in the country —that is, in the *regime*. Like apartheid in South Africa, white supremacy in Rhodesia is more than just a policy; it has been the core institution of the society, affecting all relationships. There is thus a qualitative difference in the senders' goals in these two cases, and the word compliance masks that difference.

Other examples abound where the goal of sanctions was a change in authority and/or regime, especially with regard to economic pressures by the United States against several Latin American countries. One of the official goals of the U.S. sanctions against Cuba after 1960 was "to make plain to the people of Cuba and to elements of the power structure . . . that the present *regime* cannot serve their interests."[15] In the

[14] See Baer (fn. 3), 173.
[15] Doxey, *Economic Sanctions* (fn. 3), 41; emphasis added.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

case of the sanctions against the Dominican Republic in 1960–1962, the initial goal was the fall of the dictator Trujillo and his coven-like family—that is, a change in *authority* which would presumably also affect the regime. (It did.)[16] Debate about the intent and degree of U.S. economic pressures against the Allende government in Chile from 1970 to 1973 is still lively, and will continue to be so for some time; but the Chilean case illustrates the further point that the goal of sanctions may change over time. Undoubtedly, there was pressure on the Allende government to compensate the American copper companies for their expropriated holdings, but as time went on, compliance on the specific issue of compensation was submerged into—or perhaps merged with—the goal of subversion of the authorities. The final outcome was not simply a coup to replace Allende with more attractive civilian politicians, but a drastic change of regime.[17] A similar argument could be made with regard to American actions against President Goulart of Brazil between 1961 and 1964.

In a case in which the target authorities show no signs of complying despite the pressures exerted on them by sanctions, a sender may succumb to the logic that compliance will occur only if the authorities are changed—which then becomes a collateral, or even the primary, goal. If this happens and the issue is resolved, rewards beyond the mere dropping of sanctions are often forthcoming. The central government of Sri Lanka, for example, received about $5 million per year in long-term loans from 1960 to 1962; then, during a dispute over the expropriation of some British and American gas stations, it suffered a *negative* net flow of $3.8 million for 1963–1965. After a new government took power in 1965 and compensated the oil companies, Sri Lanka received an average of nearly $30 million per year for four years.[18]

Galtung argues that the proper point of departure for a complete

[16] See Schreiber (fn. 4), 405-6.

[17] The literature on this case is expanding rapidly. For an early introduction to the differing viewpoints, see "Chile: What Was the U.S. Role?"—an exchange between Elizabeth Farnsworth taking the position "More Than Admitted," and Paul E. Sigmund saying "Less Than Charged," in *Foreign Policy*, XVI (Fall 1974), 126-56. A more recent book that keeps the domestic and international factors in some balance is Stefan de Vylder, *Allende's Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1976). Actually, more thought should be given to the importance of "merged" goals in getting coordination of sanctions by many senders. For example, it seems obvious that not all the elements hostile to Allende had the same ultimate goal for Chile, but they did share a common short-term objective, Allende's ouster.

[18] See my article on Ceylon (fn. 2), 211-12. This point brings up the very important argument that "sanctions" and "rewards" are perceptual in nature and depend on the target's base line of expectations. On this and related matters, see David S. Baldwin, "The Power of Positive Sanctions," *World Politics*, XXIV (October 1971), 19-38.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theory of economic sanctions is vulnerability, and the "key to the understanding of vulnerability seems to be *concentration*: the more a country's economy depends on one product, and the more its exports and imports are concentrated on one trade partner, the more vulnerable is the country."[19] Although he states in passing that economic boycott may include capital and services as well as goods, Galtung's emphasis is on trade. It would seem, however, to be a misplaced emphasis. In most cases of economic coercion, the sanctions are more subtle; they are applied in areas in which the target is the *solicitor*: aid, investment, finance, and technology.[20] Trade sanctions are usually highly visible and often legislated, thus lending themselves to those relatively rare instances in which the pressure is designed to be public, as in the cases of Italy and Rhodesia. Furthermore, trade, however unequal the terms, is a partnership in which groups in both the sender- and target-countries stand to lose when sanctions are applied.[21] This is much less the case in the more subtle and complex areas of international technology transfers, finance, investment, and aid. Ours is a capital- and technique-scarce world, with keen competition among LDCs for what is available.

In essence, Galtung is right, but his view of the world's political economy is dated. Concentration *is* vulnerability, but classic international trade is no longer the crucial variable or index, its relative decline hastened by the internationalization of production through the investment decisions of multinational corporations and the resulting increase in "intra-corporate" trade. Although this will be explored more fully in the discussion of dependency theory, it is obvious that economic coercion is now transnational as well as international. This combination was aptly described by Richard Goodwin at the height of a controversy on oil expropriation between Peru and the United States:

> Today, in Peru, United States interests own, *inter alia*, nearly all the copper, probably the country's most valuable natural resource; about a

[19] Galtung (fn. 3), 385; emphasis in original. For the important further distinction between vulnerability and sensitivity, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown 1977), 11-19.

[20] In a release by the United States Department of State, "U.S. Initiative for World Development" Special Report #28 (December 1976), the following were listed *in order* as the principal U.S. instruments for Third-World Development: "AID (official development assistance); CAPITAL (private loans; overseas investments); TECHNOLOGY (transfers of technology); TRADE."

[21] Economic sanctions do not come out of a nation-state's "black boxes." Adler-Karlsson (fn. 4), 34-36, does an especially good job of recognizing this; see also Stephen D. Krasner, "Domestic Constraints on International Economic Leverage," in Knorr and Trager (fn. 4), 160-81.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> quarter of the sugar and fishing industries; nearly all of the shipping; much of the oil; the telephone company; and many of the major retail establishments. . . . Moreover, Peru is almost totally dependent on the American government and private banks for the refinancing of its large external debt and for the funds necessary to expand its mining.[22]

The principal theoretical contribution of Johan Galtung is not so much definitional or even his insight on vulnerability; rather, it is his explicit appreciation of the psychological and political dimension of economic coercion. Generalizing from the U.N.'s experience with Rhodesia, he observes that a "naive" theory of sanctions holds that there is a rough correlation between economic dislocation in a target-country and its political disintegration. According to Galtung, this theory is naive because it neglects the unifying effect that negative, external sanctions may have on the target-country: the theory "does not take into account the possibility that value-deprivation may initially lead to political *integration* and only later—perhaps much later, or even never—to political disintegration."[23] This is an observation that is not confined to the Rhodesian case. For example,

> Baer on Italy: "An important consequence of sanctions was that while they were meant to put Mussolini into a mood for conciliation, sanctions were used by the Italian government to intensify statism and to consolidate Mussolini's personal rule. What was meant to be only instrumental economic pressure to elicit internal protest was transformed by the Italian government into a cause for rapid intensification of integral economic and political nationalism."[24]
>
> Schreiber on Cuba: "The policy of economic coercion has given Castro a scapegoat to divert attention from internal problems and the errors of the regime. . . . The regime has made the U.S. economic coercion a rallying point for the people as it attempts to bolster spirits and increase productivity. Standing up to the 'North American giant' helps make Castro look like a hero."[25]

Galtung notes that economic sanctions may well fail in their political purpose because (1) the target-state as a collectivity is threatened; (2) there is no identification with the attacker; and (3) there is firm belief in the country's own values. Furthermore, it may be possible to (4) adapt to sacrifice; (5) restructure the economy; and (6) smuggle.

[22] Goodwin, "Letter from Peru," *The New Yorker*, May 17, 1969, p. 41.
[23] Galtung (fn. 3), 389.
[24] Baer (fn. 3), 178-79.
[25] Schreiber (fn. 4), 404.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This view is convincing, however, only in those cases in which the economic sanctions are public and the sender(s) can be clearly and credibly identified as external and as threats to "the nation." There are some compelling reasons to argue that this situation is fairly rare, however.

III. Island Two: Dependency

The relatively recent elaboration of literature on transnationalism and interdependence has brought into sharper focus the general phenomenon of what was once called "penetrated states"; specifically, it has highlighted the increased role of the multinational corporation in the integration of the world economy.[26] Some attention has been paid to "unequal" or "asymmetrical" interdependence, but analyses even in this area have tended to emphasize interaction between the United States, Japan, and Europe. With the exception of OPEC and questions of oil revenue, the North-South relationship has remained relatively unexplored, and only quite recently has received increased scholarly attention.[27] Dependency theory, on the other hand, has addressed the North-South issue for more than a decade and can contribute to our understanding of vulnerability and coercion in that relationship.

In a recent work, James Caporaso has clarified the problem: "dependence" and "dependency" are not conceptually the same and therefore have different definitions; they spring from significantly different paradigms; and they may even require different methodologies. This

[26] See Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration* (New York: Random House 1965). Much of the attention given at present to the conceptual importance of an integrating world originated with Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1972), followed by *Power and Interdependence* (fn. 19). On the role of the multinational corporation, see (among other works), Richard Barnet and Ronald Müller, *Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations* (New York: Simon and Schuster 1974). The scholar who has devoted the most time to studying the MNC is Raymond Vernon; see his *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises* (New York: Basic Books 1971), and the more recent *Storm Over the Multinationals: The Real Issues* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1977).

[27] For examples of the focus on the First World displayed by much of the early work on unequal interdependence, see Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1968), "Eurodollars, Reserve Dollars, and Asymmetries in the International Monetary System," *Journal of International Economics*, II (1972), 325-44, and "Trade Policy is Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, IX (Winter 1972–1973), 18-36. See also Marina v. N. Whitman, "Leadership Without Hegemony," *Foreign Policy*, XX (Fall 1975), 138-60. On North-South issues, see Roger D. Hansen, "The Political Economy of North-South Relations: How Much Change?" *International Organization*, XXIX (Autumn 1975), 921-48; Tony Smith, "Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations Since 1945," *International Organization*, XXXI (Winter 1977), 1-29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

explicit recognition of the problem explains why so many scholars seem to talk right past each other in this area. Caporaso's clarification is worth quoting at length.

> The dependence orientation seeks to probe and explore the symmetries and asymmetries among nation-states. This approach most often proceeds from a *liberal* paradigm which focuses on individual actors and their goals and which sees power in decisional terms. The individual actors are usually internally unified states which confront the external environment as homogeneous units. . . . The dependency orientation, on the other hand, seeks to explore the process of integration of the periphery into the international capitalist system and to assess the developmental implications of this peripheral capitalism. This approach proceeds from a *structuralist* paradigm which focuses on the class structure and international capital, and the role of the state in shaping and managing the national, foreign, and class forces that propel development within countries. The dependency framework, in other words, explicitly rejects the unified state as actor as a useful conceptual building block of theory.[28]

Thus, while at one level of abstraction dependence and dependency share a similar focus, "relational inequality," at another level they are fundamentally divergent. This difference is perhaps a reflection of the fact that dependence has its origins in the work of scholars of international relations, while dependency has its in the work of sociologists, many of them Latin American. The perspective of dependency, because of its emphasis on the domestic political-economic aspects of foreign penetration, is more interesting to us at this point, although the approaches can overlap considerably when economic coercion is involved.

One of the earliest scholars interested in dependency theory, Theotonio Dos Santos, notes that dependency has had three historic forms or eras: (1) colonial, (2) financial-industrial, and (3) the "new dependence," technological-industrial.[29] The first two eras were trade-oriented: precious metals, agricultural products, and/or raw materials were brought to the nations of the First World in exchange for manufactured goods. The identifying characteristic of the present era,

[28] Caporaso, "Introduction: Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," *International Organization*, XXXII (Winter 1978), 2; emphases in original. The entire issue of the journal focuses directly on dependence and dependency, and analyzes the usefulness of the concepts. For an earlier bibliographic essay on dependency theory, see Ronald H. Chilcote, "A Critical Synthesis of the Dependency Literature," *Latin American Perspectives*, I (Spring 1974), 4-29.

[29] Dos Santos's thesis originally appeared in Spanish; for the English version, see "The Structure of Dependence," *American Economic Review*, Vol. 60 (May 1970), 231-36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, is the establishment of manufacturing facilities by multinational corporations inside a number of Third-World countries. These facilities produce both for the internal market and the integrated world market of the corporation; it is worth re-emphasizing that modern dependency is not primarily a trade or external relationship. First-World governments, their aid agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank or the regional development banks, private bank consortia, and multinational corporations are, for many LDCs, integral and influential parts of the *domestic* economy and policy-making apparatus. Dependency is indeed vulnerability; as George Ball has asked in apparent commiseration: "How can a national government make an economic plan with any confidence if a board of directors meeting 5,000 miles away can by altering its pattern of purchasing and production affect in a major way the country's economic life?"[30]

Foreign penetration of the LDCs at the macroeconomic level is compounded by the microeconomic problem of significant sectors of their populace becoming "de-nationalized," either because they identify with foreign values and life-styles and/or because their livelihood is tied directly (outright employment) or indirectly (as subcontractors or suppliers) to the operations of MNCs. Osvaldo Sunkel, among others, has written extensively on what is fundamentally a class problem; he calls dependencia "the crisis of the nation-state in Latin America," and describes it as

> the manifold and sometimes hidden or subtle political, financial, economic, technical and cultural presence of the developed capitalist states in the underdeveloped country, which contributes significantly to shaping the nature, structure, functioning and transformation of its economy, society, and policy; a kind of "fifth column" as it were.[31]

It is important to note that an orientation toward nominally external actors or values is not, as frequently presented, the exclusive province of an old, land-owning elite. Contemporary de-nationalization is important precisely because it involves not only the old aristocracy, but

[30] Quoted in Barnet and Müller (fn. 26), 21.

[31] Sunkel, "The Crisis of the Nation-State in Latin America," in Yale Ferguson and Walter Weiker, eds., *Continuing Issues in International Politics* (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear 1973), 356. Sunkel has also dealt with the problem of elite "de-nationalization" in his "Big Business and 'Dependencia,'" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50 (April 1972), 517-31. For another excellent case study, see Peter B. Evans, "The Military, the Multinationals, and the 'Miracle': The Political Economy of the 'Brazilian Model' of Development," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, IX (1974), 26-45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also at least part of the most influential contemporary groups in an LDC: industrial leaders, agri-businessmen, middle-class managers and office workers, and even labor (MNCs generally pay well and have created what is called a "labor aristocracy" in the working class).[32] This fact should be kept in mind in connection with the implications of the work of Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris: that economic growth in the LDCs has been accompanied by *increased*, not decreased, income inequality.[33] If it is not pushing their work too far, it seems at least possible to argue that the relatively privileged will experience increasing expectations (especially economic), while their societies as a whole are undergoing growing social tension. To the extent that the position of the relatively privileged is caused by ties to forces or groups that are nominally external, the status vulnerability of this group, and hence its susceptibility to coercion, goes up.

However, the relatively simple picture of powerful First-World actors and fragmented and vulnerable LDCs perhaps belongs more to the 1950s and 1960s than to the present or the future. Producer cartels, industrialization of LDCs, and increased consciousness of the methods of MNCs have certainly raised the less developed countries' awareness of the "power of the poor," but it is still something of a two-edged sword. Stratification within the LDCs as a group has already given us a Third and a Fourth World, with the latter still almost classically dependent. As developing and industrializing Third-World nations such as Brazil, South Korea, and Mexico become increasingly integrated into the global industrial structure, they also become more dependent on certain types of imports, market data, managerial skills, and computer technology. Thus, while the current situation for LDCs is clearly changing, it may not mean that the entire structure, but only the specific *form*, of dependency is changing—and then only for a number of relatively privileged LDCs. It may thus be premature to argue that the structure of dependency, which has shown remarkable adaptability over four hundred years, is about to be terminated. It is at least as possible that Dos Santos will have to devise a name for a fourth period or form of dependency—perhaps "managerial-informational?"

This discussion of the basics of dependency theory should help make clear why Galtung's observation—that economic sanctions tend to pro-

[32] Strict "class analysis" is therefore becoming somewhat irrelevant; it seems to make more sense to focus on the orientation of various interest-groups in those LDCs that are among the more penetrated and fragmented.

[33] See Adelman and Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1973), esp. 141-46 and 186-92.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mote political unity in a target-country—is likely to prove true only in those relatively rare cases in which the sanctions are public. Because of the depth, pervasiveness, and complexity of dependent relationships between patrons and LDCs, it has become possible to levy sanctions quietly and subtly. As an answer to Galtung's logic about the likely political failure of economic sanctions, a *dependentista* would argue that: (1) it is difficult to identify a credible external threat to the collectivity because the sanctions are not publicly announced and because the senders are as much internal as external; (2 and 3) there is likely to be a serious split in the target-country over appropriate values, with the denationalized elements essentially identifying with the sender's values; (4 and 5) without a unifying external threat, it is very unlikely that the target-state's authorities will be able to generate the political support necessary to restructure the economy and convince the people to adapt to sacrifice; it is more likely that the authorities themselves will be blamed for the deterioration of the economy; (6) smuggling is irrelevant because a total boycott is not the issue at all.

Although Knorr remains unconvinced about the empirical accuracy of the dependency literature, and carefully analyzes economic coercion from the dependence perspective, he also comes to the conclusion that "undramatic employment" of pressures is more likely to be effective than a highly public attempt.[34] Even with this *caveat*, Knorr argues that economic coercion has not proven historically effective; but he notes that such a conclusion might be the result of the relative paucity of information on the less public cases, and that more research is needed.

A sidelight on the problem of dependency and de-nationalization is the effect that the identification of the target-country's authorities with a foreign power or a "foreign" ideology has on legitimizing the opposition. For example, the alleged "de-nationalization" of both Goulart in Brazil and Allende in Chile—i.e., Goulart's leftist leanings and Allende's outright Marxism—was a constant theme of the opposition. Such accusations were firmly believed, especially by the economic elites; they probably helped these elites psychologically to legitimize their overt politicization, their alliance with U.S. interests, and their opposition to the "national" authorities—a transnational alliance if there ever was one.

A further illustration of the dilemma in the logic of highly public

[34] See Knorr and Trager (fn. 4), 109. Knorr's critique of dependency theory can be found in *Power of Nations* (fn. 4), 239-309, but esp. 279-82.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic sanctions is the early history of the famous "Hickenlooper Amendment," which was attached, in 1962, to the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of the previous year. Inspired originally by the Castro expropriations of American property in Cuba, and then reinforced by some later expropriations in Brazil and Ceylon, the amendment attempted to limit Presidential flexibility in matters of foreign aid by *requiring* suspension of U.S. aid to any country whose government expropriated American-owned property without making significant progress toward a compensation agreement within six months. This legislation was intended to be a deterrent/compellent: to deter expropriations of American property abroad and, failing that, to compel "just" compensation.[35] The utility of the amendment is open to severe questioning —in part because it was side-stepped by the executive, and in part because of failure to anticipate the nationalistic responses in the target-countries.

The executive branch (Kennedy Administration) opposed the amendment from its inception as unduly limiting on the President; but in practice, the State Department and the White House stretched the loophole of "progress toward a compensation agreement" so wide as to destroy the main virtue the Congress saw in the legislation: *automatic* sanctions. Application was then avoided so many times that both the deterrent and the compellent values were negligible. On the occasions when Congress threatened to invoke the amendment, the effect in the target-country was usually a resolve on the part of the authorities not to be humiliated; the popular response was to support them for their nationalistic stand.

Highly public, legislated economic sanctions—whether bilateral or decreed by an international organization—thus present a problem. Even if they are "effective" in causing an economic downturn in the target-country, they will in most cases be ineffective politically because (1) expectations are likely to be depressed since people know of the sanctions, and (2) a siege mentality develops which provides emotional and nationalistic support to the authorities. In short, public economic coercion of any sort actually accomplishes the opposite of politically effective economic coercion: it *cements* the relationship between people and authorities (or regime) in a target-country, rather than attacking

[35] I have dealt with this legislation in my own work (fn. 2); the best study of the amendment itself is Charles H. Lipson, "Corporate Preferences and Public Policies: Foreign Aid Sanctions and Investment Protection," *World Politics*, XXVIII (April 1976), 396-421. See also Richard B. Lillich, *The Protection of Foreign Investment* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press 1965), esp. 117-46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it. The economic effects of public sanctions would have to be much more severe in order to have the desired political effects. To state it perhaps more usefully: relatively covert, subtle economic sanctions will ultimately be *politically* effective with only moderate, purely *economic* effects. Indeed, a cynic might hold that, if you see public international economic sanctions, you should look for the motive in the domestic politics of the *sender* or in inter-sender relations—not in the target's compliance. Adler-Karlsson, in his study of the Western strategic embargo against the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1967, states that "The absence of any penetrating means-ends discussion in the embargo policy, and the many clearly emotional motives advanced in favor of it, suggest that the policy may have been as much an expression of popular or political sentiments as it was a calculated means to achieve a given end."[36] It should not surprise us that the same author concludes that the embargo policy was a failure and may even have helped the Soviet Union justify its control over the East European economies by proving the hostility of the West.

To sum up: modern dependency allows effective economic coercion to be applied without much publicity and without generating a widespread nationalist response in the target-country. Indeed, high-profile public sanctions should be avoided if the target's compliance is the goal. The list of subtle economic weapons is long: declines in investment, either in new funds or for expansion; delays in the delivery of spare parts and in other areas of trade; snags in licensing or other technology transfers; dwindling bilateral and multilateral loans and grants; refusals to refinance existing debts; drying up or outright elimination of credit lines (or even just changing the "risk category" of the applicant) by private bank consortia, etc. All of the above can create serious economic distress in an LDC while not providing much in the way of a nationalism-generating scapegoat. Against Allende in Chile, such tactics were called "the invisible blockade"; the term captures the feeling of an LDC's helplessness when all of its patrons coalesce on a policy. As the case of Chile makes clear, however, we must ask "economic distress for whom, and with what results?"

IV. Island Three: Political Instability

Theories of revolution, or of political instabilities and violence in general, have occupied thinkers from Plato and Aristotle, through

[36] Adler-Karlsson (fn. 4), 31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Machiavelli and Marx, to Sorokin in the contemporary period. It is only relatively recently, however, that empirical investigation has united with theoretical speculation, disciplining the latter and giving meaning to the former. In 1962, inspired by Crane Brinton's earlier work, James C. Davies introduced a blending of insight and evidence: the "J-curve" theory of revolution. He argued that "Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal. . . ."[37] Davies supported his hypothesis with evidence from several revolutions, including the Russian and the French. The generalizability of his findings was somewhat limited, however, by his explicit concern for "progressive" revolutions—that is, revolutions which have as their avowed goal "greater equality and liberty." The later theoretical and empirical work of Ted Robert Gurr subsumes many of Davies's ideas and has resulted in a broader attempt at generalization. Gurr proposes that "relative deprivation" is "the basic precondition for civil strife of any kind." He defines it as follows:

> Relative deprivation is [the] actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep).[38]

But it is Gurr's empirical research, using a cross-national study of 114 nations, that is of most interest:

> The fundamental proposition that strife varies directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative deprivation is strongly supported; the three deprivation variables alone provide an R of .60 ($R^2 = .36$), and when a fourth state-of-mind variable, legitimacy, is added, the R^2 increases to .43[39]

Although the three deprivation variables (economic, political, and persisting) are all relevant to present concerns, it is the variable of economic deprivation which is the most interesting. Gurr has devised indices of "five kinds of short-term economic deprivation" (two on trade and one each on inflation, growth rate of G.N.P., and "adverse economic conditions"); by combining them into a summary variable,

[37] Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXVII (February 1962), 6.

[38] Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (December 1968), 1104. Also see Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970).

[39] Gurr, "A Causal Model . . ." (fn. 38), 1123.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he has come up with a correlation to civil strife of .44. This result buttresses similar work by Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend on the relationship between systemic frustration and political instability, and by Douglas Bwy on the same subject but using only the Latin American countries as a set.[40] Gurr in particular argues that legitimacy and domestic coercive capability are mediating variables between relative deprivation and strife—legitimacy being linearly and inversely related to strife at any given level of deprivation (the higher the legitimacy, the lower the strife), and coercive capability being curvilinearly related ("middling" levels of coercive capability actually exacerbate strife).

Subsequent theoretical and empirical research attempts have both questioned and refined our understanding of the relationship between economic changes of various types and the potential for political violence.[41] The core argument remains, however, that economic deterioration can seriously exacerbate pre-existing social, ethnic, religious, and other tensions in a society. Knorr's conclusion about the resistance capability of a target-country is important: "Resistance to foreign economic pressure, however, is in part a function of the strength of government. As long as governments are *legitimate* and *undivided* and enjoy *strong domestic support*, the political basis for successful noncompliance exists."[42]

Although there are obvious exceptions, such fortunate governments are relatively rare in the Third and Fourth Worlds, and thus "the political basis for successful noncompliance" is lacking. More specifically, "the revolution of rising expectations" exists in a large part of the less-developed world; for many of its leaders and parties, signs of economic development, or at least growth, are the key to staying in power. If, by their aid and investment policies, First-World governments, IFIs, and MNCs can seriously affect development programs,

[40] Both are included in Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr eds., *Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1972).

[41] The relationship between changing economic conditions and political instability is increasingly understood to be a complex one. See Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York: Wiley 1973); Bernard N. Grofman and Edward N. Muller, "The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 67 (June 1973), 514-39; Abraham H. Miller, Louis H. Bolce, and Mark Halligan, "The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 71 (September 1977), 964-82.

[42] Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (fn. 4), 154; emphasis added. Knorr also discusses the measures that "small trading countries" could adopt to reduce their vulnerability to economic coercion; most are the exact opposite of the current situation of the majority of LDCs. *Ibid.*, 158.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there almost certainly will be unrest among the (relatively) most deprived of the target-countries' population: urban labor, the middle class, and those tied directly or indirectly to the operations of MNCs—groups that are, in many LDCs, among the most important politically. Faced with the threat or actuality of unpublicized economic pressures, the authorities in the affected countries either comply or face the possibility of being replaced, one way or another. However, when the pressures are not public and not "total" (aid does not end, it declines; so does investment, etc.), it is hard to identify the external enemy as Galtung's integration-motivator; it becomes even more difficult as that internal/external distinction becomes increasingly irrelevant. Economic pressures from the First World may exacerbate internal group, class, ethnic, or other tensions in LDCs while their populations' hopes and expectations are dashed, and costs are absorbed or passed on by different parts of the society. Assuming that the primary interest of incumbent authorities is to remain incumbent (or at least to pass power on to those of like minds), it seems that the political basis for *compliance* is what actually exists. Failing such compliance, the threat is to the entire regime.

Three disputes involving Brazil, Peru, and Chile serve as useful illustrations. All three entailed relatively covert economic pressures by the First World in the areas of aid, finance, and investment. President Goulart of Brazil was the target roughly between 1962 and 1964; a revolution and then compliance occurred in the latter year. Peru's President Belaunde was pressured from approximately 1965 to 1968 (a revolution removed him too); after continued pressure, a symbolic compliance by the new President, Velasco, took place in 1970. In Chile, President Allende was a target from at least 1970 until 1973, when he was killed during that especially bloody change of regime; a general agreement with foreign capital was reached shortly thereafter. Figures 1, 2, and 3, show a 25-year pattern in G.N.P. per capita for each country. Although, as aggregate data, these graphs do not provide any information about internal distribution, they are at least suggestive of relative deprivation at key times.

Not all illustrations of the relationships suggested here come from Latin America. In his study of Ghana, Ronald Libby also captures the connection between dependency, pressure, and political instability for an LDC. Interesting in that case is the fact that the First World apparently did not foresee the political effects that the Ghanaian government's compliance with their policy demands would have:

> Between 1969 and 1972, the World Bank, the International Monetary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 1
G.N.P. PER CAPITA FOR BRAZIL
CONSTANT 1972 PRICES (DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS)



Source: *Gross National Product: Growth Rates and Trend Data, by Region and Country* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, May 1, 1974). Original data are in table form.

Fund, and creditor countries structured the context in which their client, Ghana . . . formulated its economic policy. The intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and creditor countries failed to take into account the client country's domestic political situation. When the LDC became heavily dependent upon the IGOs and creditors for financial assistance to enable the government to survive a disastrous shortfall in foreign exchange earnings, it was forced to accept extreme, and politically dangerous, measures in order to secure assistance. The policies that were adopted were catastrophic for the LDC, and destroyed what remained of the democratic government's public support. This dramatic change in public climate made the government fatally vulnerable to a military coup d'état.[43]

[43] Libby, "External Co-optation of a Less Developed Country's Policy Making: The Case of Ghana, 1969–1972," *World Politics*, XXIX (October 1976), 67-89, at 67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 2
G.N.P. PER CAPITA FOR PERU
CONSTANT 1972 PRICES (DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS)



Source: *Gross National Product: Growth Rates and Trend Data, by Region and Country* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, May 1, 1974). Original data are in table form.

However, the relationship between dependency, economic coercion, relative deprivation, political instability, and compliance is hardly a simple causal chain. Although the argument seems reasonable and a possible guide for research, there are a number of problems that must be kept in mind.

First, "dependency" itself is a complex phenomenon, and the term is convenient rather than operational. In any specific case, dependency must be described in terms of dimension (type of dependency: economic, military, social); direction (patrons); and degree (how much). And some estimate must be made as to the number, sectoral position, and political importance of the de-nationalized elements in the target-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIGURE 3
G.N.P. PER CAPITA FOR CHILE
CONSTANT 1972 PRICES (DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS)



Source: *Gross National Product: Growth Rates and Trend Data, by Region and Country* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, May 1, 1974). Original data are in table form.

society. In that sense, a complete calculus requires elements from both the "dependence" and "dependency" frameworks.

Second, it bears repeating that the "First World" is not necessarily a monolith. Conflict as well as cooperation exists among governments, international financial institutions, and multinational corporations. Even in cases of expropriation, where the dispute normally revolves around private property rights—a basic value in the First World—a "united front" should not automatically be expected.[44]

[44] The potentially opposing interests and perceptions within the First World are illustrated by Theodore Moran, "Transnational Strategies of Protection and Defense by Multinational Corporations: Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost of Nationalization in Natural Resources," *International Organization*, XXVII (Spring 1973), 273-87. In the end, however, this article shows how a conscious strategy by Kennecott forged a united front within the First World.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Third, evidence of relative deprivation in the aggregate economic data of a nation-state may be misleading. Relative deprivation is a state-of-mind variable: for instance, in Brazil in the early 1960s and in Chile a decade later, it was the middle and upper classes that perceived their contemporary status as diminished and their future dim. Although the aggregate data in Figures 1 and 3 indicate the presence of relative deprivation, careful study of each case—focusing on the domestic interest-group and class structure—would show an unequal perception of loss and threat, with political consequences important for the path that the respective societies eventually took.

In terms of future research, Caporaso has identified three needs: (1) better measures for describing the internal anatomy of dependency; (2) more creative ways of aggregating information within and across nations "so that we are not captives of either the nation-state model or a class-based model"; and (3) an exploration of the ways in which "domestic political formations interact with the economic and social aspects of dependency."[45] I would suggest that relative deprivation may be a concept that provides a specific bridge between dependency and those "domestic political formations," just as it may represent a link between dependence and dependency. At the very least, it is a useful transitional concept for moving analyses from level to level, which would seem to be a necessity if we are to understand the present workings of the world political economy more fully.

V. Summary and Conclusion

As noted at the outset, it is my hope that this article will stimulate further research and reflection that will, in turn, improve our understanding of how economic coercion works (or does not work) in a world of considerable inequality. More attention must be paid to how economic sanctions thread their way through the domestic political economy of a targeted LDC, since the North-South relationship will continue to be an important one for the foreseeable future.

In brief, I have attempted to build bridges between various islands of literature and have come to the following conclusions:

1. Much of the previous literature on international economic sanctions has focused on highly public attempts at coercion; the unanimous conclusion has been that such measures have failed. Galtung, Adler-Karlsson, Knorr, and others have made clear that the problem with such sanctions is that they tend to lead to *political integration* (even

[45] Caporaso (fn. 28), 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

if there are serious economic effects) rather than disintegration, and are therefore self-defeating. Increased research attention should therefore be paid to a more common phenomenon: relatively subtle or covert cases of economic coercion. Where highly public economic sanctions are involved, the motive for such measures should be sought in the domestic politics of the sender-state and/or in inter-sender relations, but not in the target's compliance *per se*.

2. The term "compliance" should be more fully and more carefully defined. Does it mean a change in policy, a change of authorities, or even a change of regime? The goal itself may change over time; i.e., the sender's definition of compliance is dynamic—especially if the target puts up resistance to the sanctions.

3. Galtung's point, that vulnerability to sanctions depends on concentration, is well taken; but classic international trade is no longer as important as public and private capital flows, technology transfers, and intra-corporate trade. Because these latter aspects of the world political economy are inherently less visible than formal trade, they lend themselves more to manipulation and subtle sanctioning.

4. As Caporaso makes clear with his distinction between "dependence" and "dependency," the vulnerability of the LDCs is the result not only of a complex of basically unequal relationships with external actors, but also of internal penetration and fragmentation, which finds the senders of sanctions operating *within* the national boundaries of the target-state. This problem is exacerbated by the ongoing process of de-nationalization, in which classes or groups within the target-society identify with the values or interests of the sender. Such classes or groups then constitute what Sunkel calls a "fifth column"; it could also be argued that they constitute the potential leadership and support for an alternative set of authorities or a new regime.

5. The key to understanding how the economic effects of sanctions translate to political effects is the development of relative deprivation in the target-country. Because relative deprivation is not experienced equally throughout the society, the political effects of economic coercion will depend upon which groups or classes are the most intensely affected, and on the relative importance of these groups or classes in the support structure of the authorities and the regime. Domestic coercive capability and the legitimacy—or at least the initial legitimacy—of the authorities will be the mediating variables.

In sum, the process through which economic coercion by the First World results in compliance or noncompliance by an LDC is a com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plex one, and each case must be examined carefully. The crux of the process is how First-World sanctions work through the structure of dependency of a target-LDC to interact with both the target's international economic position *and* its domestic political economy. The study of economic coercion in world politics requires a careful combination of insights from the study of international and transnational relations, comparative politics, foreign policy, and economics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. "POSITIONS-OF-STRENGTH" DIPLOMACY IN THE 1970s

By WILLIAM B. HUSBAND

THE primary purpose of this paper is to examine the changing Soviet perceptions of the U.S. "positions-of-strength" foreign policy since 1970. An understanding of these changes of perception will provide an indication of the diversity of opinion within the Soviet Union's decision-making circles, and reveal a general softening over the last decade in the tone of Soviet pronouncements on Soviet-American cooperation. An examination of several Soviet scholarly journals will provide an outline of the framework of Soviet-American contacts desired by Soviet policy makers, and present the Soviet version of U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation in the 1970s.

Not all students of the Soviet political system agree that significantly different opinions on foreign policy exist among Soviet leaders. Robert Conquest, Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, believes that ideology and historical tradition play the leading role in Soviet policy making.

> [T]he Soviet leaders . . . are the products of history very different from our own, of a long-standing political psychology alien to ours in its motives, its judgments and its intentions. . . . The basic point . . . is that it isn't a matter of their having "opinions." . . . They are simply soaked in their tradition. . . . Brezhnev has enough ideology to get along and the rest is soaked into his bones.[1]

Taking a different approach, Jeremy Azrael of the University of Chicago speaks in terms of roughly homogeneous generations of Soviet leadership, and holds that "the underlying intentions and predispositions of the next 'generation' of Soviet policy-makers will remain essentially unchanged."[2] Representing a third view, Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, portrays the Soviet leadership as a single body without meaningful internal differences.[3]

[1] Conquest, *The Soviet Union: Internal Dynamics of Foreign Policy, Present and Future*. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations. House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st sess., September-October 1977. (Washington: G.P.O. 1978), 191-92.

[2] Azrael, Hearings, *ibid.*, 271.

[3] Nitze, "A Plea For Action," *New York Times Magazine*, May 7, 1978, pp. 42, 113, 116, 118.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/040495-23$01.15/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If such characterizations were correct, one would expect Soviet scholarly journals to reflect but one major interpretation of each important issue. Soviet publications, after all, emerge from a different tradition of scholarship and journalism than the one familiar to most Western scholars, and Soviet scholars freely admit that scholarship in the social sciences is a propaganda medium.[4] By Western standards, Soviet political writing appears "controlled." Thus, since Soviet journals reflect official attitudes, and since Soviet political tradition places special emphasis on presenting a united front by the leadership,[5] unity of opinion at the top of the decision-making process should produce political scholarship free of major interpretational differences.

An examination of the positions-of-strength issue in several Soviet scholarly journals shows that this is not the case. It is true that Soviet political writing is characterized at any given time by an official "line," but that is not the whole story. If we study Soviet political writing in terms of its own internal logic, we can move beyond rhetoric and propaganda. We can separate the official interpretation from differences of opinion that manifest themselves in the selection and manner of emphasis on details. To make such distinctions, especially in an area as complex as international relations, it is necessary to focus on an issue broad enough to attract wide comment and important enough to inspire significant differences of opinion.

Such an issue is provided by the representation, in Soviet scholarship, of the United States attachment to a positions-of-strength foreign policy. In the official Soviet interpretation, the idea of basing international relations upon military prowess has long been regarded as the foundation of American foreign policy. This propensity was most pronounced, the argument runs, in the period immediately following World War II, when the United States enjoyed a monopoly on nuclear weapons. American confidence in military intimidation was so complete, the argument continues, that the U.S. underestimated the power of political and economic processes as vital historical forces. Only when the United States began to suffer international setbacks due to changes in the postwar political and economic order did the Americans reluc-

[4] The Soviets proceed from the following assumptions concerning historical scholarship: history develops according to material laws and can, therefore, be studied scientifically; any situation has a correct and an incorrect interpretation; given the correct facts, historical situations can be understood objectively; historical science has propaganda value; scholars have ideological duties. "Ot redaktsii" [From the Editors], *Istoriia SSSR* (March-April 1957), 3-6.

[5] The origins of this tradition are discussed in Robert Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1960).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tantly begin to assess more critically their exaggerated reliance on projecting military strength. Soviet scholars uniformly present the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955 as the initial American admission of the inefficacy of an unmitigated positions-of-strength policy. At that time, they maintain, aggressive U.S. policy first began to give way to a mutual attempt at peaceful coexistence.[6] Nevertheless, Soviet scholars argue that, as long as the United States held a strategic advantage over the U.S.S.R., change came slowly. Not until 1970, when the Soviet Union is said to have achieved strategic parity and thereby nullified the military advantage necessary to make the positions-of-strength policy operable, did a more promising atmosphere for peaceful coexistence emerge.

Soviet scholars point to several factors that challenged the rationale behind the American positions-of-strength posture after 1970. Parity had fostered a deeper mutual awareness of the dangers of nuclear stockpiling. In addition, Soviet analysts maintain that by 1970, the socialist world had dramatically improved its military and economic position from what it had been in the years following World War II; economic growth in other capitalist countries, particularly Japan and West Germany, had altered the United States relationship with its allies. In Soviet terms, the positions-of-strength policy had come face-to-face with objective reality. However, the absence of America's strategic superiority in no way modified what many Soviet scholars consider to be its militarist mentality, nor did it alter the fundamental adversary relationship between the two powers. Whether the United States will try to re-establish its superiority or can be trusted in cooperative ven-

[6] The reader is reminded that the Soviets define "peaceful coexistence" as a form of non-military struggle between socialism and capitalism. Since, as Lenin wrote, uneven political and economic development make the simultaneous attainment of socialism in many countries impossible, and since a major war would be counterproductive for all the peoples of the world, socialism must unseat capitalism by methods other than direct military engagement. Such coexistence, however, "does not affect internal affairs in the states, does not affect the revolutionary struggle for socialism of the working class of the capitalist countries . . . [and] assumes no compromise on ideological questions. . . . The 'positions-of-strength' policy, the arms race, and the 'cold war' contradict the principle of p[eaceful] c[oexistence]." Anatoly A. Gromyko and others, *Diplomaticheskii slovar'* [Dictionary of Diplomatic Terms], II (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury 1971), 296-98. (Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the present author.)

Soviet writers maintain that the U.S.S.R. has pursued this policy since its early years. See *ibid.*; also V. Matveev, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie—real'naia sila mezhdunarodnogo razvitiia" [Peaceful Coexistence—the Real Force of International Progress], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (July 1973), 3; Nikolai Sivachev and Nikolai Yakovlev, *Russia and the United States*, trans. by Olga Adler Titelbaum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1979), 35-42.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tures, including disarmament, is the question over which consensus in Soviet political writing gives way to differences of opinion regarding the depth of America's commitment to the positions-of-strength policy.

Conclusions drawn from attempts to recreate the internal logic of Soviet argument are subject to serious limitations. First, determining what motivates different Soviet writers is an inexact exercise. Multiple motivations and the presence of subjective considerations (for example, a combination of sincere political conviction, polemical exaggeration, and toadyism may be reflected in a single article) hamper scientific analysis. Second, since our incomplete information does not allow us to know even how much of the puzzle is missing, we must beware of a tendency to overinterpret that evidence which is available. If we are conscious of these factors, however, there is no reason why either of them should destroy the legitimacy of using studies of variations in scholarship to assess general trends in Soviet political thinking. Foreign policy itself is often no more than a hypothesis put forward, even under the best of conditions, on the basis of imperfect information. A lack of access to large quantities of hard evidence in no way excuses us, from the practical or academic standpoint, from addressing issues that are crucial to our time.

The Soviet opinions to be presented here have come from a few journals examined in depth rather than from a broader, less manageable base of material. Three of the journals studied are published by institutes of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. They are: *Voprosy istorii* (Problems of History), issued by the Institute of History—a publication that often features articles hostile to the United States; *SShA* (USA), the monthly publication of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada; and *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (World Economy and International Relations) [hereafter cited as *Mirovaia ekonomica*], the monthly publication of the institute of the same name as the journal, and the most sophisticated of the periodicals examined. The fourth journal studied is *International Affairs*, or *Mezhdunaradnaia zhizn'*, one of several publications of the *Znanie* Society;[7] the journal, as its name implies, concentrates on issues of foreign policy. This particular mix was selected in order to attain a cross-section of Soviet scholarship; the daily and weekly press (*Pravda* and *Literaturnaia gazeta*, for example) was eschewed as being more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of day-to-day propaganda. Of the four,

[7] *Znanie* [Knowledge] is a society with a membership of 2.5 million in all the republics of the U.S.S.R. Of that number, 107,000 hold the Soviet degrees of doctor or candidate of science.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only *International Affairs/Mezhdunaradnaia zhizn'* is published both in English and Russian. These particular journals were selected in order to discern what differences, if any, exist between foreign-language publications such as *International Affairs/Mezhdunaradnaia zhizn'* and journals published in Russian, and between historical journals such as *Voprosy istorii* and the more specialized format of *SShA* and *Mirovaia ekonomika*. As it turns out, no significant difference was found to exist between the tone of the articles in *International Affairs/Mezhdunaradnaia zhizn'* and those directed exclusively to a Russian-speaking audience. And, although it is true that *Mirovaia ekonomika* is more likely than the others to contain articles favoring a broadening of Soviet-American contacts, the contemporary international climate and the individual author's biases seem to be more important in governing the opinions expressed than the personality of the journal in which an article appears. *Mirovaia ekonomika* was available through May 1978, *SShA* through April 1978, *International Affairs/Mezhdunaradnaia zhizn'* through July 1978, and *Voprosy istorii* through June 1978.

In Soviet scholarship, the positions-of-strength issue and the theme of international cooperation are closely related. To trace this relationship, I will first discuss the official Soviet view of pre-1970 American foreign policy. Second, I will outline the Soviet conditions for cooperation. Finally, I will present the Soviet version of the success and failure of cooperation in the 1970s.

The Soviet Understanding of the "Positions-of-Strength" Policy

If we are to discuss the United States departure or divergence from the positions-of-strength policy in the 1970s, it is necessary to explain the Soviet understanding of the term: What does "positions-of-strength" mean to the Soviet reader? How did American foreign policy evolve, in the Soviet view, before 1970? Why is 1970 a pivotal year?

Reduced to barest essentials, the Soviets perceive positions-of-strength as "positions-of-*superior*-strength." All of the Soviet writers examined maintain that the policy emerged definitively as a wager on the American nuclear weapons monopoly after World War II. There appears to be no disagreement among the Soviets on this point, nor on the belief that positions-of-strength quickly evinced specific programmatic manifestations. According to the Soviet interpretation, the cold war was the result of America's determination to dictate its will to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the world, primarily through military intimidation.[8] This policy, the argument runs, constituted America's reaction to the proliferation of socialist states after World War II, the collapse of the colonial system, and the appearance of new national liberation movements. The ultimate goal of the positions-of-strength policy, Soviet scholars argue, was to act as the world's gendarme and to impose, wherever possible, the so-called American way of life.[9] In short:

> In 1946, U.S. President Truman expressed the claims of American imperialism in the following manner: the United States is a strong power; there is no country stronger than the United States. This means that, possessing such strength, we should supervise the world. Thus was laid the foundation for what became known as the "positions-of-strength" policy, in whose implementation military means played a paramount role.
>
> . . . Accordingly, the very mechanism of American foreign policy was adapted to the policy of "cold war" and "positions-of-strength" guidelines.[10]

Thus, in the Soviet interpretation, the use of military force is a fundamental element of American foreign policy.

The Soviet preoccupation with American military superiority partially derives, no doubt, from a correct perception of Soviet military vulnerability in the postwar period.[11] The short-term nuclear monopoly and the longer period of American strategic superiority have made Soviet policy makers highly sensitive to American self-perceptions of strength. Their concerted effort during the Brezhnev period—particularly between 1965 and 1970—to achieve parity with the United States illustrates the Soviet leadership's determination to reverse the U.S.S.R.'s strategic inferiority. Many Soviet scholars still feel that American policy makers, if it were within their power, would heed Richard Nixon's advice of 1968: "Americans must remember that it is only our

[8] Sivachev and Yakovlev (fn. 6), 219-21, 224, 237.

[9] G. A. Trofimenko, *Strategiia global'noi voiny* [Strategy of Global War] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1968), 22-23, 159; L. Zavialov, "Kto formiruet politiky v sovremennoi Amerike?" [Who Formulates Policy in Contemporary America?], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (April 1970), 69-70.

[10] P. Zhilin and E. Rybkin, "Militarizm i sovremennye mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia" [Militarism and Contemporary International Relations], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (September 1973), 33.

[11] This vulnerability is not openly admitted in Soviet writing. Thus, even though the United States held a monopoly on atomic weapons at the end of World War II, the Soviet interpretation states that a "balance of power" existed between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. at the close of the war. The launching of a positions-of-strength foreign policy is depicted not as the pressing of an advantage, but as an attempt to use atomic stockpiling to upset the existing balance. See Sivachev and Yakovlev (fn. 6), 224, 249.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear superiority that has preserved peace for our generation. Maintaining superiority is necessary in order to speak to the Soviet Union from a position of strength."[12] When American spokesmen talk of peace, the official Soviet understanding is a situation in which the United States is powerful enough to dictate its will.

The fact that all parties concerned do not speak the same political language exacerbates the issue and magnifies the potential for misunderstanding. First, the phrase, positions-of-strength, does not connote the same meaning to Soviet and American readers. What the Soviets understand as "positions-of-superior-strength" can, in American usage, imply various meanings: "superior strength," "parity," or "a not inferior strength." In Soviet political writing, the positions-of-strength argument serves a dual function: as a literal warning to Soviet readers against American intentions, and as a stylistic shorthand for expressing general opposition to an increase in Soviet-American contacts. Thus, although some writers no doubt fully believe the grave warnings that they sound about impending American aggression, others quite likely raise the positions-of-strength issue simply to voice their distaste for closer ties with the United States. It is not necessary to determine the individual or collective motives of the Soviet scholars who focus on the positions-of-strength issue. For analytical purposes, it is important to understand that a stress on the theme signifies opposition to Soviet-American cooperation. When V. V. Larionov, for example, writes that "strategic sufficiency" is simply a politically palatable American euphemism for "nuclear superiority,"[13] it is less important to determine whether Larionov believes every word that he writes than it is to recognize his article as a manifestation of opposition to broader Soviet-American cooperation.

Although it has been presented as the by-product of American postwar military power, Soviet scholars generally agree that the positions-of-strength policy has roots deep within U.S. traditions. It is therefore not a policy which they would expect the American leaders to discard easily even if its efficacy were sharply reduced. The use of military strength, Soviet political writers argue, has characterized American foreign policy since its inception.[14] The United States was in no position to act definitively on this predilection, however, until it entered

[12] Quoted in V. V. Larionov, "Transformatsiia kontseptsii 'strategicheskoi dostatochnosti'" [The Transformation of the "Strategic Sufficiency" Concept], *SShA* (November 1971), 29.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] G. A. Trofimenko, *SShA: politika, voina, ideologiia* [The USA: Politics, Warfare, Ideology] (Moscow: Mysl' 1976), 333.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what the Soviets consider its imperialist phase at the end of the 19th century. Since that time, the argument goes, the United States has manifested its expansionist proclivities whenever possible: during the tenure of Theodore Roosevelt, for example, and in the anti-isolationist arguments of the period between the world wars.[15] After World War II, when the United States began to exert its influence more actively, the positions-of-strength policy became not only expansionist, but overtly antisocialist. Upon the death of Franklin Roosevelt, "forces whose actions were determined by their blind hatred for everything socialist again gained ascendency in the U.S. government."[16]

The postwar era, in which the Soviet writers are primarily interested, has its own periodization. The first decade, 1945–1954, reflected what the Soviet writers interpret as the confrontational policies of the cold war. During the Truman years, the argument runs, the United States greatly increased its military expenditures in preparation for an armed confrontation with the Soviet Union, and in order to weaken the Soviet regime through an economically ruinous arms race.[17] According to this view, U.S. aggression in the early 1950s was forestalled only by American perceptions of Soviet military might.[18] The Summit Conference of 1955 ushered in the second period, which continued until 1969. The Soviet writers maintain that during this time American leaders began to realize the limits of positions-of-strength, even though the idea continued to serve as the foundation of American foreign policy. Hence, the Soviet writers characterize the Kennedy years as a period in which America's aggressive international posture was modified, but the U.S. propensity to deal with the world militarily did not recede. According to this argument, the United States viewed the world as bipolar, with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at opposite poles. Nevertheless, Soviet scholars generally agree that by the end of the 1960s the inefficacy of a confrontational foreign policy had become evident to American decision makers. The third, and present, postwar period began in 1970.[19]

[15] A. A. Muradian, "Kontseptsiia 'sily' vo vneshnei politike SShA" [The Conception of "Power" in U.S. Foreign Policy], *Voprosy istorii* (November 1974), 102-6; see also A. A. Toporonin, "Doktrina 'balansa sil' i Vashington" [Washington and the "Balance of Power" Doctrine], *SShA* (November 1970), 8-20.

[16] K. M. Georgiev and M. O. Kolosev, "Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia na novom etape" [Soviet-American Relations in a New Stage], *SShA* (March 1973), 13. See also Sivachev and Yakovlev (fn. 6), 226-27.

[17] *Ibid.*, 226-30.

[18] *Ibid.*, 238.

[19] G. A. Trofimenko, "SSSR SShA: mirnoe sosushchestvovanie kak norma vzaimootnoshenii" [U.S.S.R.-U.S.A.: Peaceful Coexistence As the Norm of Relations],

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No single factor dominates the Soviet explanation of the improved climate for cooperation which began to develop at the outset of the present decade.[20] Foremost, of course, is the claim that the Soviets achieved strategic parity by 1970. The importance of this factor is paramount; without it, the possibilities for cooperation would have been even more severely limited than they have been.[21] In addition, the growth of greater economic and diplomatic independence from the United States throughout the nonsocialist world, Soviet scholars feel, has undermined the influence of the United States among its allies. National interests among Western nations have begun to conflict more often, and in the Soviet view, the dramatic economic recovery in the socialist sphere has hastened America's decline. Finally, the Vietnam War taught the U.S. an unmistakable lesson about the limitations of military force, while domestic opposition to the war, and to militarism in general, forced American decision makers toward a new course.[22] In 1970, the concept of bipolarity was shelved in favor of multipolarity, a development that, according to the Soviets, was officially acknowledged by Nixon in 1971.[23] The Soviet writers do not maintain that forces hostile to the Soviet Union disappeared from American policy making, but several agree that "the United States was forced to renounce attempts to talk to the Soviet Union 'from a position of strength' and to shift to a dialog with it from a position of equality."[24]

SShA (February 1974), 8-10; Trofimenko, "Voprosy ukrepleniia mira i bezopastnosti v sovetsko-amerikanskikh otnosheniiakh" [The Problems of Fortifying Peace and Security in Soviet-American Relations], *SShA* (September 1974), 7-18; Trofimenko, "Evoliutsiia voenno-politicheskoi strategii SShA posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny" [The Evolution of the Military-Political Strategy of the U.S.A. after World War II], *Voprosy istorii* (March 1976), 65; G. A. Vorontsov, "Evoliutsiia vneshnei politiki SShA v usloviiakh razriadki" [The Evolution of U.S. Foreign Policy during Détente], *Voprosy istorii* (September 1976), 48.

[20] The significance of 1970 is accepted without exception among Soviet writers. By late 1976, G. A. Trofimenko refers to the "axiom" that the end of the 1960s marked the beginning of a new era. "Vneshniaia politika SShA v 70-e gody: deklaratsii i praktika" [U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1970s: Declarations and Practice], *SShA* (December 1976), 15.

[21] G. A. Trofimenko, "Sovetsko-amerikanskie soglasheniia ob ogranichenii strategicheskikh vooruzhenii" [The Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements], *SShA* (September 1972), 7; Georgiev and Kolosov (fn. 16), 9; O. Bykov, "Mezhdunarodnaia razriadka: bor'ba tendentsii v politike Zapada" [Détente: The Struggle of Tendencies in Western Policy], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (March 1976), 25-26.

[22] Georgiev and Kolosev (fn. 16), 14-15; Vorontsov (fn. 19), 45-46; Sivachev and Yakovlev (fn. 6), 247.

[23] Muradian (fn. 15), 109.

[24] Georgiev and Kolosev (fn. 16), 9. See also V. Petrovskii, "Sovremennye vneshnepoliticheskie kontseptsii SShA" [Current U.S. Foreign Policy Conceptions], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (October 1973), 100-101.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Conditions for Cooperation

Since the early 1970s, Soviet scholarship has emphasized three fundamental conditions for cooperation: the parties must treat each other as equals; relations must be businesslike; and cooperation can reasonably be expected only in areas involving common interests and mutual benefit. Whether the U.S.S.R. itself has observed these conditions is an issue that many Americans would be inclined to debate. The more germane point is that the Soviet Union insists on being treated as an equal, and has declared its intention to strike the best possible bargain for itself. In addition, various Soviet writers insist that the Soviet Union will not allow the United States to interfere in its internal affairs.[25]

The "relaxation of international tension"[26] in the 1970s does not, according to Soviet writers, represent an end in itself, but is only the latest stage in the ongoing competitive process that the Soviets call peaceful coexistence. Hence, in the Soviet understanding, cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. retains a competitive aspect; a commitment to peaceful coexistence by no means reduces the competitiveness of either participant. On the contrary, "It is an objective fact that even in conditions of peaceful coexistence, which historically is one of the forms of class struggle between two systems, friction and considerable difficulties are inevitable in the relations between capitalist and socialist states."[27] Therefore, if cooperation in the 1970s "is characterized by a slow pace, vacillations, and zigzags,"[28] it is not a cause for serious concern: "It is perfectly obvious . . . that, even given good interstate relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, the principled ideological struggle and the historically inevitable competition between socialism and capitalism in various spheres, including, of course, the international sphere, will continue."[29] Unlike the United States, which Soviet scholars criticize for outlining its expectations only vaguely,[30] the Soviet Union considers itself to be operating from a clearly defined bargaining position.

[25] V. Matveev, "Perspektivy sovetsko-amerikanskie otnoshenii" [Prospects for Soviet-American Relations], *SShA* (May 1972), 8-9; Iu. Nikolaev, "Razvitie otnoshenii mezhdu SSSR i SShA" [The Development of U.S.S.R.-U.S.A. Relations], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (May 1973), 19.

[26] The Soviet term for what is called "détente" in the West.

[27] V. Nikitin, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie i sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia" [Peaceful Coexistence and Soviet-American Relations], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (May 1974), 9-10.

[28] Petrovskii (fn. 24), 101.

[29] Georgiev and Kolosov (fn. 16), 19.

[30] A. A. Aleksimov, "C realisticheskii pozitsii" [From Positions of Realism], *SShA* (October 1977), 91.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is far more difficult to judge just how spirited the competition may become without causing a serious regression in the cooperative process; the Soviets fail to address this issue in their writings. Either side may impede cooperation in one sphere because of losses suffered in another. Soviet writers are much more vague about their conditions for withdrawing from cooperation than for entering into it; they furnish only an impressionistic sense of the outer boundaries of cooperation. Generally speaking, the fundamental nature of the respective social and ideological systems is not negotiable.[31] Although the Soviet leaders are understandably reluctant to publicize the limits to which they can be pushed, various Soviet writers make clear that American ventures such as the Vietnam War and President Carter's human rights campaign, (which the Soviets choose to interpret not as an ideological struggle but as psychological warfare) are outside the acceptable framework.[32]

Two messages emerge from the Soviet writings on cooperation. First, the Soviets have a genuine interest in disarmament. This issue is the linchpin of the easing of international tension. If possible, the Soviet leaders would like to emerge from a partial disarmament in a stronger position vis-à-vis the United States. Conversely, the principal fear expressed by writers who believe in America's commitment to an aggressive foreign policy is that the United States will exploit an improved international climate to re-arm for another round of positions-of-strength diplomacy. Second, the Soviet writers officially proclaim that the U.S.S.R. will win any long-term, non-military competition. The majority of Soviet writers state that the balance of strength and influence in the world is swinging toward the Soviet Union and the socialist countries (which are not synonymous, although treated as such in Soviet rhetoric). They therefore treat any reduction in the possibility of a serious military confrontation as a benefit accrued to the U.S.S.R.[33]

With these preconceptions about American intentions, international conditions, and the nature of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union

[31] V. M. Berezhkov, "Perspektivy razriadki: sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia" [Prospects for Détente: Soviet-American Relations], *SShA* (September 1975), 5. See also Iu. Nikolaev, "Ideinye osnovy vneshnei politiki SSSR" [The Ideological Foundations of Soviet Foreign Policy], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (October 1973), 81-91.

[32] Georgiev and Kolosov (fn. 16), 10; V. F. Petrovskii, "O sovremennykh vneshnepoliticheskikh kontseptsii SShA" [Regarding Current U.S. Foreign Policy Conceptions], *SShA* (August 1977), 16.

[33] For a frank exposition by the Director of the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, see G. A. Arbatov, "Perspektivy razriadki sovetsko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii" [The Prospects for Détente in Soviet-American Relations], *SShA* (February 1972), 26-31.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

entered a new phase of foreign relations with the United States in 1970. While the legacy of the cold war was, and is, still very much in evidence on both sides, each country has expressed its intention to cooperate, at least insofar as it might be possible to curb the arms race. Neither the process of cooperation nor the issues involved were completely new, but 1970 marked the first time when the two states were dealing with one another on an approximately equal military footing.

The "Positions-of-Strength" Policy in the 1970s

Soviet scholarly writing in the 1970s reflects three main issues through which different perceptions of the American positions-of-strength mentality and, by extension, the prospects for Soviet-American cooperation emerge. The most direct of these issues is the status of the military-industrial complex; that is, whether "realists" or "reactionaries" appear to predominate in formulating U.S. foreign policy at a given time. Prospects for cooperation also manifest themselves indirectly but clearly in the two other prominent themes: disarmament, and the degree to which the Soviet conditions for cooperation are being observed.

In Soviet political writing, discussion of the military-industrial complex is inseparably linked to the positions-of-strength issue. The most optimistic prognoses for broadening cooperation during the 1970s have coincided with what Soviet scholars perceive as the high point of American opposition to the influence of the military-industrial complex. During the mid-1970s, a period of relatively good Soviet-American contacts, disarmament—the second theme—has appeared in Soviet political writing as the base from which further cooperation would issue. In less auspicious periods, such as 1970 and the present, disarmament has been almost the exclusive focus of whatever discussion of cooperation takes place, and issues such as trade have receded into the background. The third issue, Soviet conditions for cooperation, serves as a negative barometer. Although throughout the 1970s Soviet writing has continually restated the three conditions for cooperation, a more vigorous reiteration has usually appeared when conditions seemed to threaten the future of cooperation itself. For example, Soviet rebuttals of the human rights campaign have often stressed the need to maintain "businesslike relations," which in this context means non-interference in Soviet internal affairs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In short, a period during which the positions-of-strength mentality is being played down in Soviet scholarship would correspond to one in which depictions of American opposition to the military-industrial complex are pronounced, international contacts in areas other than disarmament are being discussed, and the Soviet conditions for cooperation are not being restated frequently and forcefully. In this section, we will examine Soviet scholarship both chronologically and topically, analyzing the stages of Soviet political writing on the issue of cooperation in the 1970s, and pointing out the dominant mood of each period. A synopsis of the themes of the military-industrial complex, disarmament, and the conditions for cooperation will then follow.

On the subject of Soviet-American cooperation in the present decade, not all major issues have received equal emphasis in all periods. At the beginning of the decade, distrust and hostility dominated Soviet attitudes toward the United States; not until December 1971 did Soviet writing reflect a pronounced optimism toward the prospects for cooperation. From early 1972 until mid-1975, a circumscribed enthusiasm characterized one mode of Soviet writing, while a second mode expressed growing distrust of the U.S. In mid-1975, both groups of Soviet writers began to assert that the United States was blatantly ignoring the original Soviet conditions for cooperation. From mid-1975 on, statements of distrust, based on the fear that the U.S. would try to reassert its military prowess, emerged more frequently. Soviet-American relations have continued to worsen; by mid-1978, Soviet scholars of all persuasions maintained a silence on the topic of cooperation as such and referred to it only tangentially in their writings on other subjects.

In 1970, the majority of Soviet writers believed that the United States was ruled by a clique committed to preparing for an aggressive war; only a scattered minority believed that future Soviet-American relations might be better instead of worse. Both trends of Soviet scholarship agreed, however, that the United States had a master plan for the future; that in spite of setbacks in the 1960s the plan was based on retaining the positions-of-strength policy; and that the effort would fail because it violated the objective laws of history. The two Soviet groups disagreed over how the U.S. would react to this inevitability. For the pessimistic majority, the danger of a proliferation of regional conflicts similar to the Vietnam War loomed large. The minority would say only that the failure of the positions-of-strength policy was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a foregone conclusion, and that not every American policy maker was a power-crazed imperialist. Just how future relations might improve was not elaborated upon at that time.

Soviet scholars greeted Richard Nixon's message to Congress of February 18, 1970, which proclaimed a transition from an era of confrontation to a period of negotiation, with universal skepticism; the most anti-American of them labelled it a pure deceit.[34] The so-called Nixon Doctrine, which advocated both American military preparedness and increased international cooperation, appeared to the more cautious Soviets as rhetoric which did not coincide with U.S. actions. Washington, the argument ran, only desired new methods of projecting power throughout the world in spite of the interests of peace and of domestic social needs.[35] In the face of its declining world influence, "U.S. political and strategic thought has been persistently . . . seeking ways to retain war as an instrument for implementing the foreign policy aims of U.S. imperialism, on the one hand, and, on the other, to utilize military force in such a way that its application does not threaten the United States very existence."[36] Consequently, "it is evident that a position of strength, despite numerous reservations, appears as before the most important criterion determining American foreign policy and strategy."[37]

The Soviet writers who were more critical of the United States maintained that the military-industrial complex was responsible for this course. In their view, this coalition of banks, monopolies, and the military had committed the U.S. to militarism as state policy. They argued that military spending had become a mainstay of the American budget, and that the concomitant problems of an overly militarized economy (inflation, rising taxes, a dearth of social services, etc.) plagued American society. In addition, they maintained that the complex had under-

[34] V. Matveev, " 'Novye' doktriny Vashingtona: forma i soderzhanie" [Washington's "New" Doctrines: Form and Content], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (March 1971), 35-44; A. Zimin, "Vashington: politicheskie deklaratsii i real'nye fakti" [Washington: Political Declarations and Realities], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (July 1970), 84-85; O. Bykov, "O nekotorykh chertakh vneshnepoliticheskoi strategii SShA" [Regarding Several Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy Strategy], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (April 1971), 53.

[35] M. Milstein, "Amerikanskie voennye doktriny: preemstvennost' i modifikatsiia" [American Military Doctrines: Continuity and Change], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (August 1971), 30-41.

[36] G. A. Trofimenko, "Nekotorye aspekty voenno-politicheskoi strategii SShA" [Several Aspects of U.S. Military-Political Strategy], *SShA* (October 1970), 15.

[37] B. L. Teplinskii, "Novoe v stroitel'stve vooruzhennykh sil SShA" [What Is New in the Build-up of the U.S. Armed Forces], *SShA* (December 1970), 36. See also Bykov (fn. 34), 53-64; Zimin (fn. 34), 81-85.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taken a domestic propaganda campaign designed to identify its own interests with the national interest in the public consciousness.[38]

The fact that the military-industrial complex was at no time during the 1970s identified with the entire American "bourgeoisie" constitutes the only positive expression of Soviet opinion on cooperation in the early writings of the present decade. Articulating what was a minority opinion at the time, Arkady Shevchenko wrote that "militarism in the U.S.A. . . . has become so sweeping that even the captains of the capitalist world have been forced to sound the alarm about the excessive influence of the military-industrial complex."[39] Such feelings of alarm were attributed both to members of Congress and to business leaders, and several Soviet writers cited the domestic opposition to the Vietnam War as a manifestation of public disgruntlement.[40] The impact of such arguments was slight, however, and at the beginning of the 1970s the idea that increased Soviet-American cooperation might be possible was only implied. Nevertheless, an examination of Soviet scholarship before the Nixon-Brezhnev relaxation of tension leads to the conclusion that a predisposition toward cooperation existed among a small number of Soviet writers as early as 1970. Thus, although all Soviet scholars believed that the United States would attempt to salvage its positions-of-strength policy, one cannot really speak of "the Soviets" in 1970 as being of a single mind on the issue of future cooperation.

At the end of the 1960s, the Soviet leadership was facing two alternatives: increased confrontation with the United States (from a stronger military position than previously) or relaxation of tension. Between 1970 and 1972, support for both courses appeared in Soviet journals—sometimes within the same article—but the tendency toward relaxation temporarily emerged stronger. Soviet writing was, in a sense, caught by its own logic: If history had proven the bankruptcy of America's

[38] Zavialov (fn. 9), 67-68.

[39] A. Shevchenko, "Razoruzhenie—razreshimaia zadacha" [Disarmament—A Soluble Problem], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (April 1971), 100. In view of Shevchenko's defection to the United States in 1977 while he was employed at the United Nations, and of his involvement with U.S. intelligence services, the sincerity of his pre-defection writings might be questioned. However, since his ambivalent articles are not dissimilar to other Soviet writings of the period, and since those articles both advocate disarmament and warn of future U.S. aggression (see below), I feel that it would be a mistake, in reading his articles, to overemphasize his subsequent defection.

[40] E. Bugrov, "Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks SShA" [The U.S. Military-Industrial Complex], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (March 1970), 29-40; Zavialov (fn. 9), 67-70; G. N. Tsaglov, "Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks: nekotorye obshchie aspekty" [The Military-Industrial Complex: Several General Aspects], *SShA* (November 1970), 21-30; Bykov (fn. 34), 63-64; Matveev (fn. 34), 35-44; Iu. P. Davidov and V. P. Lukin, "Ideologicheskie aspekty vneshnei politiki SShA" [Ideological Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy], *SShA* (May 1971), 44-46.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

positions-of-strength policy, did it make sense for the Soviet Union to pursue a confrontational course? Objective reality would apply to the U.S.S.R. as well.

Soviet writing therefore wavered between confrontation and relaxation. In one three-month period of 1971, Shevchenko warned his readers that the United States was preparing for another round of the arms race;[41] at the same time, he championed cooperation on the disarmament issue.[42] Genrykh Trofimenko, the most prolific writer on American foreign policy in the journals examined in this study, also left his options open. In a single article, he advocated supporting "extraparliamentary opposition forces" in the U.S.[43] and pointed optimistically to the possibility of improving Soviet-American relations through Congressional action.[44] Judging by Soviet scholarship between 1970 and 1972, no single plan dominated Soviet thought on how best to counter America's positions-of-strength posture.

In December 1971, before internal opposition to the U.S. military-industrial complex had become a major theme in Soviet writing (as it would be in 1972–1975), Soviet-American cooperation began to gather significant support. In a lead article in *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, V. Matveev, a leading political commentator for *Izvestiia* who had only recently criticized the United States sharply, described the prospects for peaceful relations between the two countries optimistically. Making sure to credit the Soviet Union with the initiative in improving the international climate, Matveev wrote cautiously but glowingly about the potential of the scheduled meeting between Brezhnev and Nixon in May 1972. Instead of citing a standard quotation stressing steadfastness in the face of American aggression, which had been *de rigueur* in recent articles criticizing the Nixon Doctrine, Matveev selected a more conciliatory quotation from Brezhnev: "We proceed from the assumption that an improvement of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is possible."[45] Thus, although still distrustful of American intentions, Soviet writing indicated that the climate for cooperation was improving at the end of 1971.

The appearance of new support for cooperation also provoked an

[41] A. Shevchenko, "Nekotorye uroki bor'by za razoruzhenie" [Several Lessons of the Struggle for Disarmament], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (February 1971), 41.

[42] Shevchenko (fn. 39), 102.

[43] Trofimenko, "Militarizm i vnutripoliticheskaia bor'ba SShA" [Militarism and the Domestic Power Struggle of the U.S.A.], *SShA* (January 1972), 72.

[44] *Ibid.*, 66-72.

[45] V. Matveev, "Bor'ba za mir v meniaiushchemsia mire" [The Struggle for Peace in a Changing World], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (December 1971), 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increased number of articles opposing Soviet-American ties. From early 1972 until mid-1975, the relaxation of tension became a truly dominant theme, with articles on both sides of the issue more numerous in Soviet scholarship than at any other time during the 1970s. During this period, the general tone of Soviet writing grew less antagonistic toward the United States; what would have been highly conciliatory in 1970 became a common form of expression in 1972. Within this new framework, Soviet writers were divided over whether "realists," those who recognized the futility of positions-of-strength, or "reactionaries," those determined to regain and reassert military superiority, dominated policy making in the United States.[46]

One element in this exchange was the need to define the limit to which one side would sustain setbacks without withdrawing from cooperation; but the Soviet scholars refused to confront this issue squarely. On the one hand, the more cautious of them used the threat of a rejuvenated positions-of-strength policy to argue against too great a Soviet commitment to cooperation. On the other hand, Soviet writers in general played down American objections to ventures such as the U.S.S.R.'s African involvement. Admonishing the United States for its tendency to link various issues in foreign policy, Soviet scholars of all persuasions repeated the original Soviet conditions for cooperation—equality, businesslike dealings, mutual benefit—and reiterated that cooperation does not preclude ideological struggle. In the short run, the tendency has been to take the Soviet Union's gains for granted and to concentrate concern on what it might stand to lose.

For the immediate future, various writers have expressed the desire to "supplement political détente with military détente"; but this Soviet terminology is misleading. It is clear from the context of their writing that virtually all Soviet scholars believed that, because of the threat of nuclear war, a relaxation of Soviet-American tension was in the world's best interest. The Soviets hoped to move from mutual agreement on

[46] Articles stressing the influence of "realists" include Harry Freeman, "Razvitie sovetsko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii: storoniki i protivniki" [The Development of Soviet-American Relations: Advocates and Opponents], *SShA* (December 1973), 16-17; V. I. Krivokhiza, "Poniatie 'sila' v amerikanskikh issledovaniakh" [The Concept of "Power" in American Research], *SShA* (September 1975), 113-20. Articles focusing on "reactionaries" include B. Borisov, "Pentagon i amerikanskaia nauka" [The Pentagon and the American Scientific Community], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (August 1972), 66-72; A. Sovetov, "Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie—real'nyi faktor mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii" [Peaceful Coexistence—A Real Factor in International Relations], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (August 1972), 22; B. L. Teplinskii, "Mirovoi okean i voennaia strategiia SShA" [The World Ocean and U.S. Military Strategy], *SShA* (October 1972), 24; Zhilin and Rybkin (fn. 10), 36-37.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this point to expanded trade in general and most-favored-nation status in particular, in addition to an agreement on disarmament.[47] Thus, what the Soviets actually desired was not a transition from a political to a military relaxation of tension, but the development of a tentative moratorium on military confrontations into a larger program of economic and political cooperation.

It is noteworthy that Soviet scholars have increasingly presented the problems that arose over the extension of trade and disarmament, not as the product of monolithic American hostility toward the Soviet Union, but as the result of the machinations of one group of Americans against another. Soviet writing has been reporting on internal differences in American politics in greater detail—either from an improved Soviet understanding of American politics or, as is more likely, because the more complex demands of argument during 1972–1975 have caused various analysts to display their sophisticated knowledge of the American system. The significant issue is the fact that the American "bourgeoisie" and public have emerged as more variegated entities: American trustworthiness was being seriously scrutinized at this time. The question whether the United States could be counted upon to abandon its positions-of-strength orientation has made it necessary to identify specifically which American groups have opposed a relaxation of hostility toward the Soviet Union, and to assess the influence of these groups upon U.S. policy making.

Thus, although American sympathy for abandoning a threatening military posture appeared stronger to Soviet scholars in 1972–1975 than it had previously,[48] Soviet writers in general worried that the forces supporting positions-of-strength might be firmly enough entrenched to continue their domination over U.S. policy. In the Soviet understanding, a fundamental shift of influence would have to occur for the United States to enter into broad, long-term cooperation. Soviet writers generally have argued that unless forces in favor of cooperation could overcome the supporters of the military-industrial complex, the United States could only be expected to use improved

[47] Trofimenko (fn. 21), 7-16; Trofimenko, "SSSR-SShA . . ." (fn. 19), 12; E. Primakov, "Politicheskaia razriadka i problema razoruzheniia" [Political Détente and the Problem of Disarmament], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (October 1975), 3-12.

[48] B. D. Iashin, "Informatsionnyi tsentr po voennym problemam: prichiny i tseli sozdaniia" [The Center for Defense Information: Origins and Purposes], *SShA* (June 1973), 63-66; Nikolaev (fn. 25), 18-19; Matveev (fn. 7), 10-11; Sh. Sanakoev, "Sovetsko-amerikanskie otnosheniia: istoricheskii povorot" [Soviet-American Relations: A Historic Turning Point], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (August 1973), 3-12; Petrovskii (fn. 24), 101; Vorontsov (fn. 19), 61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations as a diversion in order to attempt a new round of positions-of-strength diplomacy.

The argument of Soviet scholars opposed to closer ties has been that the military-industrial complex is determined to forestall Soviet-American cooperation. The short-term plan of the complex, according to these scholars, is to use tactics such as the Jackson-Vanick Amendment (which violates the Soviet conditions for cooperation)[49] to prevent favorable conditions of trade from being implemented. In the long run, they view the military-industrial complex as hoping to marshal enough support to achieve its aims regardless of the consequences.

> A common front has been set up against détente by the most reactionary imperialist circles, the military-industrial complexes representing an alliance of militarists and arms monopolies. It has been joined by professional anticommunists from some bourgeois party leaderships, the trade union elite in some countries, and ultra-Rightist organizations, Zionist leaders, and scientists involved in entering into a cold war and in preparation for a "hot" war.
>
> Trying to undermine détente, they rely on the continuation of a policy based on "positions of strength," which for over a quarter-century has constituted the main line of the foreign policy pursued by the leading Western powers, particularly the United States.[50]

In short, the positions-of-strength argument served as the primary focus of Soviet assessments of U.S. trustworthiness between 1972 and 1975.

Before mid-1975, the Soviet scholars had not resolved whether the United States would emerge from its internal controversy more amenable to cooperation; but since that time, Soviet journals have increasingly reported that American "reactionaries" hold the advantage. No single event has influenced this trend, nor did the change come abruptly. Articles optimistic about cooperation continued to appear well after mid-1975, just as pessimistic articles had appeared throughout the most promising days of the previous three years. Several factors reduced Soviet enthusiasm: growing concern that the Americans did not understand or respect the Soviet conditions for cooperation; the firm stand on communism as an issue in the Presidential campaign; and uncertainty over a possible transition in the Presidency. Nevertheless, although the international climate had started to deteriorate even

[49] Matveev (fn. 25), 8; Nikitin (fn. 27), 10-11; V. S. Anichkina, "Bor'ba v kongresse po voprosu sovetsko-amerikanskikh otnoshenii" [Struggle in Congress on the Question of Soviet-American Relations], *SShA* (June 1974), 78-81.

[50] V. Zhurkin, "Razriadka i mezhdunarodnye konflikty" [Détente and International Conflicts], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (June 1974), 96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

before Carter's election, hopeful (if superficial) declarations of confidence that his administration would continue the positive momentum in Soviet-American relations greeted the new chief executive.[51] Expressions of serious Soviet concern about the future of U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperation reappeared only with the launching of the human rights campaign.[52]

At that point, all Soviet scholars narrowed the focus of their discussion from what was desirable to what was considered absolutely essential. Topics such as expanding trade no longer appeared as major themes in Soviet journals, as they had in 1972–1975, and disarmament re-emerged as the primary focus.[53] Within this narrower framework, two viewpoints have been characteristic through the end of 1977. In general, those who warned against trusting the United States have emphasized the enduring strength of the military-industrial complex and of the positions-of-strength mentality.[54] Those writers who still promoted cooperation have done so more guardedly and with an air of disillusionment.[55]

Unlike the restrained writings of 1970, however, Soviet articles advocating cooperation after the 1972–1975 period have been positive concerning the need to reach an accord with the United States. Various writers have asserted that, in spite of setbacks, the principle of peaceful coexistence dictates the necessity of establishing an understanding, at

[51] Trofimenko, "Evoliutsiia . . ." (fn. 19), 90; A. Svetlov, "Bor'ba Sovetskogo Soiuza za voennuiu razriadku" [The Struggle of the Soviet Union for Military Détente], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (January 1976), 83-94; V. M. Berezhkov, "Osnovnye printsipy sovetsko-amerikanskykh otnoshenii" [Basic Principles of Soviet-American Relations], *SShA* (April 1977), 11; Sivachev and Yakovlev (fn. 6), 262-63.

[52] V. Matveev, "Ideologiia i diplomatiia v usloviakh razriadki" [Ideology and Diplomacy in the Conditions of Détente], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (June 1977), 90-99; I. A. Geevski, "Vashington i prava cheloveka" [Washington and Human Rights], *SShA* (July 1977), 9.

[53] A Svetlov, "Razoruzhenie—nasushchnaia zadacha bor'by za mir" [Disarmament—A Vital Problem in the Struggle for Peace], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (July 1976), 3-16; A. Kaliadin, "Obshchvennost' v bor'be za razoruzhenie i razriadki" [Public Opinion in the Struggle for Disarmament and Détente], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (December 1976), 17-25; G. Stakh and B. Afanas'ev, "Razoruzhenie—v tsentre vnimaniia narodov" [Disarmament at the Center of Attention], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (May 1978), 3-12.

[54] A few examples: E. Khesin, "Militarizm i uglublenie obshchego krizisa kapitalizma" [Militarism and the Deepening of the General Crisis of Capitalism], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (December 1975), 57-68; D. P. Iur'ev, "Chto stoit za mifom o 'sovetskoi ugroze?'" [What Is Behind the Myth of the "Soviet Menace?"], *SShA* (September 1976), 62-68; V. V. Zhurkin, "Vzgliad iznutri VPK" [The View from Inside the Military-Industrial Complex], *SShA* (January 1977), 79-81; A. Nikonov, "Voennaia razriadka i perestroika mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii" [Military Détente and the Reorientation of International Relations], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (June 1977), 28-39.

[55] A good example is Trofimenko (fn. 20), 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least on the issue of disarmament.[56] The most recent turn in this debate is impossible to assess: since 1978, all of the journals involved in this study have maintained a silence on the specific subject of cooperation.[57] Silence, too, is a statement; but its full meaning will become clear only in the light of future events.

Before offering conclusions, I should recapitulate briefly how the themes outlined at the beginning of this section—the military-industrial complex, disarmament, and the Soviet conditions for cooperation—relate to Soviet understanding of American foreign policy in the 1970s. The military-industrial complex has been the theme tied most directly to the discussion of America's positions-of-strength policy. At the beginning of the 1970s, the majority of Soviet writers portrayed American policy makers as generally supporting what the Soviets describe as a coalition of armaments monopolies, the military, and major banks. At that time, to argue that the American "bourgeoisie" was divided in its feelings toward the military-industrial complex was to assume a conciliatory posture on the issue of Soviet-American cooperation. By mid-decade, more Soviet scholars began to concede that differences among American interest groups were deeper than had previously been assumed. The writers unanimously maintained, however, that for genuine cooperation to occur, forces less hostile to the U.S.S.R. would have to replace the military-industrial complex in formulating U.S. policy. In short, America appeared in Soviet writing as struggling between "realism" and "reaction." Since 1975, Soviet scholars have concluded that "realism" has suffered a serious, but not irreversible, defeat.

Disarmament has dominated Soviet writing throughout the 1970s as the factor compelling both sides to seek an accord. At the high point of good relations in 1972–1975, Soviet writing expanded the base of discourse established by disarmament discussion to examine the prospects for broader economic ties. With the passing of this peak, eco-

[56] G. A. Trofimenko, "Ot politiki konfrontatsii k politike sosushchestvovanie" [From a Policy of Confrontation to Peaceful Coexistence], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (September 1975), 37-46; A. Migolat'ev, "Voenno-promyshlennyi kompleks i gonka vooruzhenii" [The Military-Industrial Complex and the Arms Race], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (October 1975), 76; N. Ivanov, "Razriadka mezhdunarodnoi napriazhennosti i al'ternativy voennoi ekonomike" [Détente and the Alternatives to a Military Economy], *Mirovaia ekonomika* (November 1976), 62; Iu. F. Oleshchuk, "Nesostoiatel'nye argumenty protivnikov razriadki" [Bankrupt Arguments of the Opponents of Détente], *SShA* (October 1977), 33-39.

[57] The sole exception: T. N. Iudina, " 'Faktor kongressa' vo vneshnoi politike SShA 70-kh godov" [The "Congress Factor" in U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1970s], *SShA* (April 1978), 71-77.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic issues receded, but pronounced interest in disarmament remains in evidence to this day, even when cooperation as such is not discussed. In 1977–1978, the more conciliatory Soviet writers argued no less vigorously than the anti-American writers that the United States has been responsible for the present regression in relations. However, the former also asserted that an objective need to reach a disarmament accord still exists.

Throughout the 1970s, Soviet writers have criticized the Americans for failing to understand the Soviet terms for cooperation and for not articulating a concrete position of their own. Having posited their own requirements—equality, businesslike relations, and mutual benefit—early in the decade, Soviet writers of all persuasions felt compelled to restate these conditions even during the period that was most promising for cooperation. With the start of the human rights campaign, however, Soviet criticisms of the American failure to understand the nature of cooperation became more strident. When the present downturn in relations intensified in 1976, the most common Soviet argument rested on the contention that the United States had violated a fundamental premise of cooperation and had sought to alter the Soviet social system.

In sum, each of these issues relates to the positions-of-strength argument in a different way. With the military-industrial complex, the tie is direct. Disarmament and the conditions for cooperation appear less directly, but they do create a more general understanding of how various Soviet scholars view cooperation. By examining Soviet writing on these three issues, one can see Soviet attitudes moving gradually in favor of cooperation with the United States—but only very cautiously, amid frequent setbacks, and with the Soviets strictly trying to set their own terms.

We have seen that a Soviet scholar's perception of America's commitment to the positions-of-strength policy relates directly to his attitude toward prospects for cooperation. When Soviet analysts of all persuasions perceive a growth of the positions-of-strength mentality, their prognoses for Soviet-American cooperation tend to be negative. Prospects for cooperation appear better when the minority of Soviet scholars who are in favor of a broadening of Soviet-American ties are more in evidence in Soviet journals, and articles that actively play down the positions-of-strength argument are more numerous.

We have been able to discern general trends in the climate of Soviet-American relations, but it would be a mistake to stretch the evidence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beyond its limits. A general improvement in Soviet-American relations will not necessarily lead to agreement in any specific area (future disarmament agreements, for example). On the contrary, each area of negotiation has its own dynamics, and the Soviet Union seeks to attain for itself the best bargain possible. In sum, examining the positions-of-strength issue in Soviet scholarly journals has shown that Soviet policy makers are far from united in their attitudes toward the U.S., that it is possible to identify changing Soviet perceptions of American foreign policy, and that Soviet pronouncements on the possibility of cooperation with the U.S. have softened since 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONCORDE SST AND CHANGE IN THE BRITISH POLITY

By JOSEPH M. GRIECO*

INTRODUCTION

PERHAPS the most distinctive characteristic of the British experience with the Concorde SST is that the objectives of state policy, for which the Concorde was to serve as an instrument, shifted dramatically over time. In the earliest period of development, the British state used the Concorde to rationalize its aircraft industry and to serve as one means of entering the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). The international objective became much less salient during the later period of its development; more importantly, the domestic objective itself changed from seeking a more efficient use of resources in the aircraft industry to simply maintaining the aircraft industry's levels of employment, in order to promote political stability—regardless of whether the project was appropriate on an economic basis.

This shift in the purposes of the Concorde can be linked to changes in the power relations between Britain's society and its state.[1] Specifically, when development of the SST was used by the British government to restructure a somewhat reluctant aircraft industry, it succeeded because of the government's superior bargaining position and internal cohesion relative to the British aircraft companies (i.e., societal segments). Later on, the state had fewer bargaining advantages and en-

* The author wishes to thank Professor Peter J. Katzenstein for his guidance and support during the preparation of this paper. He is also grateful to Alan Cafruny and Professor Michael Hodges for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.

[1] The present effort relies heavily on "Introduction" and "Conclusion" by Peter J. Katzenstein in Katzenstein, ed., *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial Societies*, in *International Organization*, XXI (Special Issue, Autumn 1977). For useful theoretical discussions of different approaches to state-society relations, see Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and the Political Community," *European Journal of Sociology*, I (No. 2, 1960), 181-210, and Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1978), 3-42. Interesting country studies can be found in Katzenstein; see T. J. Pempel, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy: the Domestic Bases for International Behavior," and John Zysman, "The French State in the International Economy"; also see Zysman, *Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in France* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977), 190-214. For a discussion of the British context using a similar approach, see Ernest Barker, *Principles of Social and Political Theory* (London: Oxford University Press 1951), 50. For a discussion of policy formation in Britain which explicitly avoids reliance on domestic structures, see Stephen Blank, "Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, the Domestic Economy, and the Problem of Pluralistic Stagnation," in Katzenstein, 673-722.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/040518-21$01.05/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

joyed less cohesion, while the societal segments concerned with the project were mobilized and capable of influencing the state. This particular case is concerned with the general issue of changes in the relationship of state to society in Britain; it raises important questions about recent British politics, and indeed, political developments in other advanced industrialized societies.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONCORDE:

THE COLLAPSE OF THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY

In 1943, the British government had agreed with that of the United States that the former would concentrate on developing and manufacturing fighters while the latter would specialize in heavy bombers and military transports. The resulting division of labor placed Britain at a commercial disadvantage after the war, for the American wartime experience was more relevant to peacetime industrial requirements than that of the British.[2] To meet this challenge, a group of British officials under the chairmanship of Lord Brabazon began, in 1943, to map an industrial strategy that would offset the U.S. advantage in turboprop transports. The British focused on the one key lead they had over the Americans: turbojet technology. One major conclusion of the Brabazon committee was that Britain should exploit that advantage, and devote resources to the development of commercial jet transports.[3]

In the meantime, however, the committee believed that Britain could hold its own by producing luxury turboprop transports, such as the Brabazon, Princess, and Britannia, and a short/medium-haul turboprop, the Viscount. The first three were failures (they were either cancelled or never sold in quantities large enough to recover development costs); and even though the Viscount was enormously successful, its production run could not maintain the commercial aircraft industry indefinitely.[4] Thus, the hope of leapfrogging the United States with a turbojet commercial transport took on increasing significance for the entire industry. The first commercial jet transport, Britain's Comet, had tremendous market potential and was two or three years in advance of American efforts. Unfortunately, design problems led to two

[2] On the U.S.-U.K. agreement, see Arthur Reed, *Britain's Aircraft Industry: What Went Right, What Went Wrong?* (London: Dent and Sons 1973), 8, 15; on its impact, see Great Britain, Ministry of Aviation, *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Aircraft Industry* [hereafter cited as *Plowden Report*], Cmnd. 2853, 1965, p. 19.

[3] On the Brabazon Committee, see Reed (fn. 2), 17; Andrew Wilson, *The Concorde Fiasco* (Middlesex, England: Penguin 1973), 16; and John Costello and Terry Hughes, *The Concorde Conspiracy: The International Race for the SST* (New York: Scribners 1976), 18-20.

[4] Reed (fn. 2), 16-19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crashes of Comets, in January and April 1954. The entire fleet was grounded, and three crucial years were lost while the problems were being corrected. By the time the Comets re-entered service (1956–1957), the American DC-8s and Boeing 707s were coming onto the market. In the end, only about a hundred Comets were sold—an insignificant volume compared to the American jets; and this was the craft on which the British had placed so many hopes for their industry.[5]

After the stimulus from the Korean war build-up began to subside, the lack of growth in the British aircraft industry became apparent.[6] At the same time, the British were faced with competition from the American industry, which enjoyed increasingly favorable economies of scale due to rapidly expanding markets. Whether measured by volume of production runs, relative market shares and sizes, or relative average prices, the U.S. aircraft industry enjoyed substantial, almost decisive advantages over the industries of Britain and the Continent.[7] Even its own military sales became less of a source of demand for the British industry after the 1957 White Paper on defense signaled a decision to place greater reliance on ballistic missile systems than on manned aircraft; the Plowden Report noted in 1965 that the White Paper "shattered the hopes of the industry for its future programme."[8]

THE DECISION TO GO SUPERSONIC: 1959–1962

The problems of the turboprops and the Comet, the competition of the United States, and the shift in military strategy in 1957 led to three conclusions concerning the survival of the British aircraft industry. First, Britain had to develop a product that would successfully leapfrog America's near-monopoly over Western turbojet commercial transport sales. Second, the British government determined that the aircraft industry needed to be rationalized, both in terms of corporate structures (the industry was characterized by several relatively small firms that were ill-suited to the achievement of substantial economies of scale), and in terms of total employment (the industry was expected to face overcapacity). Third, a new product would have to be export-oriented in order to match the demand-induced economies of

[5] *Plowden Report* (fn. 2), 19-20, 123; Reed (fn. 2), 31-51.

[6] *Plowden Report* (fn. 2), 119. From 1957 to 1964, the index of British output at constant prices remained virtually constant.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-13, 119. See also Milton S. Hochmuth, "Aerospace," in Raymond Vernon, ed., *Big Business and the State: Changing Relations in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1974), 148-52.

[8] *Plowden Report* (fn. 2), 16. On the impact of the end of the Korean War and the judgment that defense requirements had to be curtailed, see the statement of Minister of Supply Aubrey Jones, *Hansard*, Vol. 588, May 22, 1958, pp. 1519-20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scale enjoyed by the Americans solely on the basis of their own home market. New aircraft should therefore be attractive to the major intercontinental carriers, especially those flying the trans-Atlantic routes.[9]

In November 1956, the Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee, composed of representatives from the aircraft and airline industries as well as the British government, began to meet at Britain's aircraft development center at Farnborough to examine the technical and commercial feasibility of supersonic flight. After about three years of study, the Committee reported to Aubrey Jones, who as Minister of Supply was responsible for aviation, and urged that the government undertake development of an SST.[10] In October 1959, the Ministry of Aviation was formed in order to give greater attention to the industry; in November, its Minister, Duncan Sandys, is reported to have argued before the Cabinet that the SST would be vital to the British air industry:

> I am absolutely certain that if we don't go in for the next generation of civil aircraft we might as well pack up the British industry. We have to go on or opt out. And we can't opt out. The decisive factor is obviously that supersonic airliners are coming in. And if we want to be in the business we've got to go on.[11]

The SST was thus expected to fulfill the first requirement for a successful British aircraft industry: it would leapfrog over America's.

Pursuit of an SST project also afforded the British government an instrument to meet the second requirement for the industry—structural reorganization, or rationalization. In 1959, there were 15 airframe and 5 air-engine companies. By carefully allocating government contracts, Jones and Sandys were able to encourage a merger of these firms into five larger groups, two each in airframes and engines, and the fifth in helicopter production.[12] Sandys in fact reported to the Commons that it was *his preference* that the air industry be composed of five major groups; he declared explicitly that the government would, with only a few exceptions, concentrate its orders on these major producers. This policy was, according to one analyst, "the basic weapon which the Government used to compel the industry to merge into a smaller number of large firms."[13]

[9] *Ibid.*, 1521.

[10] John Barry, Peter Gillman, and Roger Eglin, "The Concorde Conspiracy," Part I, *Sunday Times* (London), February 8, 1976, p. 11.

[11] *Ibid.*, 11.

[12] Statement of Minister of Aviation Duncan Sandys, *Hansard*, Vol. 617, February 15, 1960, p. 957. For a discussion of the mergers, see K. Hartley, "The Mergers in the UK Aircraft Industry, 1957–60," *Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society*, Vol. 69 (December 1965), 848-51.

[13] *Ibid.*, 848.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contract awards for the SST played an important part in the process of rationalization. According to one report, Aviation Deputy Minister Denis Haviland believed that during this early period the SST contract "was held out as a 'makeweight sop,' i.e., the companies were warned that there was little prospect of encouragement for the supersonic project unless they agreed to rationalization."[14] This policy probably had its greatest impact on the Bristol Aircraft Corporation. A retired aircraft executive recalls:

> Bristol had always been one of the most fiercely independent firms in the country, but when it was made clear to them that such a grouping [the larger group that the government wanted Bristol to join] would be the only hope of sharing in major contracts, they had no choice but to conform. Bristol was already involved in work on the supersonic commercial transport and was not going to let that slip out of its hands as well.[15]

Bristol became part of the British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), and the latter eventually received the airframe contract for the Concorde.

Development of an SST was thus expected to meet the first two requirements of the industry—technological innovation and industrial rationalization. At the same time, it offered an opportunity to realize the third requirement for the industry as it entered the 1960s: to develop assured markets for its aircraft exports. If another government could be found to cooperate on an SST, it would reduce development costs for Britain; moreover, it would provide an additional area in which the craft could be marketed. At the very least, it would prevent the potential partner from developing an SST by itself or with a third country, thereby excluding the British SST from the markets of the potential partner (and indeed of the third country). After unsuccessful contacts with the United States, Britain turned to France. In April 1960, Sandys met with French officials on the possibility of cooperation on an SST, and both sides agreed that it would make sense. In his report to the House of Commons, Sandys emphasized the advantages of cooperation: "The problem of aircraft manufacture today really is the high cost of development and the limited volume of orders. Therefore, cooperation with other countries reduces the number of competitors and enables our industry to share in an assured market."[16] In sum,

[14] Jock Bruce-Gardyn and Nigel Lawson, *The Power Game: An Examination of Decision-Making in Government* (London: Macmillan 1976), 13.

[15] Geoffrey Knight, *Concorde: The Inside Story* (New York: Stein and Day 1976), 18-19.

[16] Statement of Minister of Aviation Duncan Sandys, *Hansard*, Vol. 622, May 2, 1960, p. 681.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development of the SST afforded the British government a strong chance to compete with the United States, to renovate its aircraft industry, and through a partnership with France, to obtain an assured export market for its SSTs, as well as the potential for exploration of other projects and additional assured sales.

Yet the scope for cooperation with France, if its basis remained strictly commercial, appeared to be very narrow. Due to differing assessments of how best to compete with the United States, the French wanted to develop a medium-range SST and possibly a long-range aircraft later; the British thought it necessary to start with a long-range craft and to consider a medium-range SST later.[17] By early 1961, it appeared that cooperation would be limited to sharing technology on a few selected items, such as the engine, air conditioning, and landing gear.[18] Prospects were dim for attainment of a common design and joint financing; the possibility of actually co-producing and co-marketing an SST went almost unmentioned. This lack of agreement resulted from unsuccessful talks between the *firms*, which wanted to pursue divergent strategies of development.

By mid-1961, Prime Minister Macmillan had decided to seek entry into the European Economic Community. During the summer of 1961, when the firms' differences on which type of SST to develop seemed to have become irreconcilable, the two governments intervened. Julian Amery, who became Aviation Minister in 1962, has spoken of "the serious attention that the British government gave at the time to establishing European partnership at every possible level, and in particular Franco-British partnership on such projects as the supersonic air transport, chiefly as a means of asserting European independence of America."[19] Thus, Britain saw cooperation with France on an SST as a way to show its economic independence of the United States and to signal its political commitment to Europe. Indeed, visits by several American officials to Amery made it clear that the United States preferred that no SST project be undertaken; it is quite likely that France was made aware of these visits.[20]

After the British government decided to intervene, it played a very active role in persuading the British firms to cooperate with their French counterparts. The heads of the two Aviation Ministries, Robert Buron of France and Peter Thorneycroft of Britain (who had

[17] John Davis, *The Concorde Affair* (London: Frewin 1969), 63-64.
[18] Wilson (fn. 3), 28.
[19] Knight (fn. 15), 25-26.
[20] *Ibid.*, 28-29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

replaced Sandys in mid-1961, and was in turn replaced by Julian Amery in July 1962), met in September and December 1961, and confirmed at each meeting that the two Ministries would pressure their respective firms to come to an agreement.[21] These efforts continued into 1962; after intensive negotiations between the two firms, and between the two firms and their respective governments, an agreement was reached in October and formalized in a treaty signed in November 1962. The treaty illustrated the political as well as the commercial interests of the British government. The two governments (and the firms) were to share costs and revenues, but the design study on which the treaty was based specified only the shape (not the size) of the craft to be developed, and the two firms continued their plans to develop aircraft with different ranges; this ambiguity was finally resolved in 1963–1964 in favor of the British preference for long-range craft.[22] Moreover, no escape clause was included for the parties to the treaty; this unusual omission was "a deliberate act of policy on the British side."[23] The reasons for the omission were complex, but the purpose was at least partly to signal unmistakably to the French that the British were committed to European cooperation.

Even though the agreement on joint production of an SST was insufficient to persuade de Gaulle that Britain should be permitted to join the E.E.C., for purposes of the present discussion the treaty clearly illustrates the British government's ability to use society to achieve state-determined objectives. The French and British firms started at an enormous distance from one another; it required the states' encouragement to bring them together. The British government could not force them to agree on a common design; that would either have required pressure on the French for acceptance of the British viewpoint (which would have been resisted by the French government), or pressure on BAC to accept the French designs. The British government chose not to apply such pressure, especially as it agreed with BAC's interest in a long-range aircraft. Eventually, the difference was accepted by the British government in order to achieve a higher political end—its bid to join the E.E.C.

Concerning internal policy processes, at least three major actors can be identified: the Ministry for Aviation, the Treasury, and the Prime

[21] Davis (fn. 17), 64-65.

[22] Costello and Hughes (fn. 3), 50.

[23] Wilson (fn. 3), 30. See also Peter Gillman, "Supersonic Bust: The Story of the Concorde," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 239 (January 1977), 78. The treaty is reprinted in an appendix to Donald Alfred Nelson, "Concorde: International Cooperation in Aviation," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, XVII (No. 3 1969), 466-67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Minister. Of the three, Aviation was the most enthusiastic supporter of the SST project, with Treasury more cautious; the Prime Minister was active only in 1962. Between 1959 and 1962, there was a notable degree of consensus—or at least an absence of intense public disagreement about the project. No less than six Cabinet meetings were devoted to the subject of the proposed SST. Although the Treasury did express misgivings about cost estimates, its objections were not forceful; moreover, they were always made within the government, never in public.[24] Indeed, a Parliamentary committee later found fault with the Treasury for not having been more actively critical in governmental deliberations while the project was in the planning stage.[25]

There are three possible reasons for this lack of aggressiveness on the part of the Treasury. First, the technical complexity of the project may have overwhelmed the Treasury's ability to make a confident critical assessment.[26] Second, the project was being used to rationalize the aircraft industry, a goal that probably met with the approval of the efficiency-minded Treasury. The third reason was perhaps the most important one: supporters of the project were able to link it to international cooperation in such a way as to blunt the Treasury's objections on the development costs for an SST. In 1959, Aubrey Jones is reported to have told his colleagues at the Supply Ministry that he planned to "seek a European partner for the venture as a way of sharing costs and pre-empting Treasury objections." In line with this strategy, Julian Amery was able to persuade the Treasury in 1962 that the absence of an escape clause was to the advantage of Britain when dealing with France. Since Prime Minister Macmillan was interested in the SST as a political symbol, the British government thus stood united in support of the project.[27] That unity, however, was not to last.

BRITAIN'S LAST CHANCE: MARCH–JULY 1974

The development of the Concorde after 1962 was characterized by repeated crises. Twice, the Labour government almost decided to abandon the project; and upon coming to office in 1970, the Conserva-

[24] Barry and others (fn. 10); Bruce-Gardyn and Lawson (fn. 14), 18-19.

[25] Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers (Commons), 1963–1964, v, *Reports from Committees*, 11, December 19, 1963, "Second Report from the Estimates Committee: Transport Aircraft," pp. xxv-xxvii, 149.

[26] John Barry, Peter Gillman, and Roger Eglin, "The Concorde Conspiracy, Part 11," *Sunday Times* (London), February 15, 1976, p. 11.

[27] For the strategy of both Jones and Amery, see Gillman (fn. 23), 75. Jones later alluded to his strategy; see Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers (Commons), 1971–1972, xxvii, *Sixth Report from the Expenditure Committee: Public Money in the Private Sector*, 11, "Minutes of Evidence (to 21st July 1971) and Appendices," 238-39.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive government conducted an intensive study of its viability. On each of these occasions, the Concorde was found to be a less and less worthwhile investment on commercial grounds. However, the foreign policy argument—i.e., using Concorde to enter the Common Market, was so strong through 1970 that the project was continued.[28]

By 1974, conditions had changed dramatically. Research and development costs for Britain had increased from £150 million (the estimate in 1959) to £535 million; none of these expenses could be recovered through sales. Cancellation could not bring back those funds already dispersed, but it would at least avoid the loss of the £130 million for R & D that had yet to be spent.[29] Meanwhile, sales prospects for the Concorde had collapsed in 1973, after a period of initial interest on the part of several international airlines; in 1974, there were only nine firm orders for the aircraft, and these were from the state-supported British Airways and Air France.[30]

When the Labour government took office in March 1974, it conducted another study of the implications of undertaking actual production of the Concorde (which at that point had completed the prototype phase). The study indicated that outright cancellation of the project would cost Britain £80 million. By comparison £205 to £245 million would be lost if 16 aircraft were produced; £260 to £300 million would be lost if 35 aircraft were produced; at 100 aircraft produced, the loss would be £120 to £250 million.[31] In other words, losses would decrease only after a very substantial production run, a possibility that seemed most unlikely. What needs to be explained is the decision of the Labour government to undertake production of the Concorde in the face of almost overwhelming evidence that the project could no longer be justified at all on economic grounds.

In 1964, 1966, and 1970, similar crises had been resolved on the basis of foreign policy. However, since Britain had gained entry into the E.E.C. in 1973, its commitment to Europe was no longer in great doubt. The February 1974 election did mean that the new Labour government would seek renegotiation of the specific terms, but the concept of membership itself was no longer the major issue. It is pos-

[28] On the period, 1964–1969, see Davis (fn. 17), 104-8; Nelson (fn. 23), 460-65. On the period as a whole, see Knight (fn. 15), 46-112.

[29] Statement of Secretary of State for Industry Mr. Anthony Wedgwood Benn, *Hansard*, Vol. 870, March 18, 1974, p. 667. For an official analysis of the causes of the increases in costs, see Great Britain, Parliament, Sessional Papers (Commons), 1972–1973, XIX, *Sixth and Seventh Reports from the Committee of Public Accounts*, "Development and Production of the Concorde Aircraft," pp. xi-xiv.

[30] Knight (fn. 15), 88-102; Benn (fn. 29), 667.

[31] Benn (fn. 29), 675-76.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sible that the Labour government chose not to risk overloading the diplomatic channels with Europe by seeking renegotiation or cancellation of the Concorde treaty. Also, it is reported that Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey, the major bureaucratic opponent of the Concorde, was reluctant to press his argument for fear of the European reaction.[32] In contrast, the major advocate of the Concorde, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, was highly critical of Britain's membership in the E.E.C. There is thus no clear correlation between attitudes on foreign policy and the SST.

Meanwhile, domestic political factors were escalating in significance. In trying to meet Britain's economic crisis when it came into office, the Labour government sought to cut unnecessary expenditures; the Concorde was soon known to be "at risk."[33] Knight recalls that "it became apparent to us within a few days of the new government taking office that Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as part of the action that he had to take to deal with the economic crisis, was going to carve up the Concorde project."[34] Healey, in arguments within the government, sought to limit production to the nine planes already begun, although other reports suggest that he might have tried to stop production altogether.[35] In addition, British Airways announced on March 18 that it would suffer high losses if it were compelled to operate Concordes.[36] Thus, in early 1974 two important British actors sought to limit the project severely or to stop it altogether.

The sequence of events that eventually saved the SST began, ironically enough, with an apparent attack upon it. On March 18, 1974 (perhaps in order to pre-empt British Airways), Benn presented to the House of Commons the report on the Concorde that had been done in his Department of Industry. It explained officially, and for the first time publicly, the severe economic problems facing the aircraft. The impact of the report was staggering: "It looked like the end of the line, as the general tone of the document was doom-laden."[37] Benn said that the report had been released because, "in view of the size of sums of public expenditure involved and the importance of the deci-

[32] See *The Times* (London), May 24, 1974, p. 4, and May 27, 1974, p. 1.

[33] Arthur Reed, "Planemakers Fear Labour Axe," *The Times* (London), March 11, 1974, p. 15.

[34] Knight, (fn. 15), 113.

[35] Andrew Wilson, "Concorde Will Die within Three Months," *The Observer*, March 31, 1974, p. 1; Alvin Shuster, "British Prepared to Drop Concorde," *New York Times*, April 16, 1974, p. 5; Arthur Reed, "No Unilateral Decision on Concorde by Britain," *The Times* (London), May 24, 1974, p. 2.

[36] Knight (fn. 15), 115.

[37] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sions that must now be made, I thought it right to place all these facts before the House."[38] In contrast to 1962, when the text of the treaty was released and discussed only after it had been negotiated with France and accepted by the Cabinet, the Department of Industry report was released before the Cabinet had made a decision. By revealing that a final decision had not as yet been made, Benn left open the possibility of influence being exerted upon the Cabinet by those concerned with the project.

Benn also helped to mobilize support for the Concorde by stepping outside of his role as a Minister and going directly to the particular group of people he sought to enlist in his bureaucratic struggle for the project. In a key meeting with aircraft union leaders in Bristol, Benn said, "Concorde is one of the finest aircraft in the world. Concorde is not dead. Supersonic travel will come. It is up to the workers and townspeople to keep it alive."[39] The workers served as the chief instrument for exerting pressure on the new government.[40] They were supported by an *ad hoc* group of BAC and Rolls-Royce middle management called "Campaign for Action on Supersonic Engineering" (CASE), and, less directly, by upper-level BAC management.[41]

In late March and early April, groups of aircraft workers started lobbying with members of Parliament. In May, a group of about two thousand workers demonstrated at the residence of the Prime Minister.[42] The workers referred to a study produced by CASE, and another, later study by BAC, which argued that both the benefits of production and the costs of cancellation were higher than forecast in Benn's report in March.[43]

In addition to these economic arguments, the unions used political pressure. A letter to Benn by the aircraft workers union stated in late March, "Neither you nor the Labour Party were elected to throw 20,000 workers onto the scrap heap."[44] Another letter said that the

[38] Benn (fn. 29), 668.

[39] Benn, quoted in Tim Jones, "Union Officials Plead for Concorde Project," *The Times* (London), March 20, 1974, p. 2.

[40] Alan Hamilton, "Delegates of Concorde Unions Meet Mr Benn," *The Times* (London), April 11, 1974, p. 2.

[41] Arthur Reed, "Concorde Group Forecasts £929 Million Benefit for UK," *The Times* (London), March 29, 1974, p. 2.

[42] Reed (fn. 35).

[43] Arthur Reed, "BAC Warning on Effect of Cancelling the Concorde," *The Times* (London), March 28, 1978, p. 1; "Concorde Can Fly at Profit, BAC Claims," *The Times*, 4 April 1974, p. 4. Later, Freddy Laker, of Laker Airways, said he could operate the Concorde at a profit; see Knight (fn. 15), 122-23.

[44] Arthur Reed, "Workers Start Campaign to Save Concorde," *The Times* (London), March 26, 1974, p. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

workers would not "passively allow the cancellation of the Concorde Supersonic Transport."[45] These threats should be seen in the context of the situation of 1974: a Conservative government had just been crippled by the mineworkers' union, and Labour's minority government was trying, almost desperately, to achieve a social compact with the unions. The aircraft workers, themselves part of one of Britain's largest and most militant unions, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), were also affiliated with an even larger and more strategically important entity, the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU).[46] After the workers had begun to agitate for the SST, opponents of the project, such as Healey, are reported to have been reluctant to press their arguments too hard; and sixty Labour MPs signed a letter to Prime Minister Wilson warning against "precipitate actions" on the Concorde.[47] Cancellation, if it led to the rebellion of only a few Labour MPs, might have put Wilson's government in extreme jeopardy.

The height of the crisis for the Labour government came in May, when conflict within the Cabinet became public and fierce. In what was supposed to be a deep-background briefing, Lord Beswick, who served under Benn as Minister for Aviation, verbally attacked the correspondent from the London *Observer*. The latter retaliated by bringing the conflict into the open and naming his source. The *Observer* reported Beswick as saying "that Mr Healey wanted to cancel the Concorde project in his Budget Statement in March on the basis of figures that 'are now questionable.'"[48] This development is notable in two respects. First, it is a clear illustration of the extent to which the Labour government was unable to act cohesively: an important aspect of Cabinet government, collective responsibility, was no

[45] "British Unions Back Concorde, Raise Issue of Nationalization," *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, April 22, 1974, p. 25.

[46] On interunion relationships among the engineering unions, see N. Robertson and J. L. Thomas, *Trade Unions and Industrial Relations* (London: Business Books 1968), 70-71; B. C. Roberts, *Trade Union Government and Administration in Britain* (London: G. Bell and Sons 1956), 407-10, 496-98. George Doughty, the secretary general of the technical and supervisory section of the AUEW, representatives of the CSEW, and Moss Evans, of the Transport and General Workers Union, met with Benn to press for the Concorde; see Hamilton (fn. 40), 2. At the Trade Union Congress (TUC) Convention in September 1974, the new secretary general of the technical and supervisory section sought to have a motion passed that would have destroyed the concept of the social contract between the TUC and the Labour Party; see Paul Routledge, "Bold Initiative by Mr Murray Wins the Day for Social Contract," *The Times* (London), September 5, 1974, p. 1.

[47] Costello and Hughes (fn. 22), 254.

[48] Andrew Wilson, "Minister Hits at Healey on Concorde," *The Observer*, May 26, 1974, p. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

longer consistently in operation.[49] Second, Beswick (and indirectly, Benn) was either accusing Healey of dissembling, or he was demonstrating the effectiveness of Benn's strategy to save the Concorde.

Since no set of figures was considered authoritative by anyone, there could be no "empirical" basis for a government decision; therefore, if the government decided to cancel the project, it could not rationalize its decision to the aircraft workers by reference to "facts" that compelled cancellation, for there were no "facts" on which everyone agreed. Consequently, the "political" considerations became more important: threatened actions by the aircraft unions; the danger that the conflict might spill over into other talks with unions; problems with British managers and capitalists who might lose even more faith in Labour; and finally, possible challenges within the Labour Party at a time when the government had almost no margin for disloyalty. Since cancellation might invite an unwanted test of Labour's (and more precisely, Harold Wilson's) hold over the government, these considerations weighed heavily in favor of the status quo.

Benn had, in effect, won his political struggle for the Concorde by taking the issue to the public before a decision had been reached. Societal forces were thus able to mobilize and to increase the political costs of cancellation. That had apparently been Benn's strategy:

> [Benn] does insist on the point that, by putting the problem to the public before any decisions had been made, when the Cabinet did make up its mind about Concorde some weeks later it had had the benefit of formidable representations by those most concerned, so that it was the best informed debate on Concorde that there had ever been.[50]

Knight says that he had "no doubt that he [Benn] saw in this precipitate publication of his officials' report a way of staving off what might have been the alternative, an early Treasury-backed decision to cancel the project." While Benn refused to confirm Knight's hypothesis, Knight reports that "I have since talked to Tony Benn in calmer times about the episode, and although he is very careful not to reveal any Cabinet secrets, I doubt whether my interpretation goes far astray."[51]

In sum, the evidence suggests, first, that in early 1974 Healey had a very strong case for cancellation; second, that perhaps out of despera-

[49] On the importance of collective responsibility, see Samuel H. Beer, "The British Political System," in Samuel H. Beer and Adam Ulam, eds., *Patterns of Government* (New York: Random House 1973), 151.

[50] Knight, (fn. 15), 119.

[51] *Ibid.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion, Benn decided it was necessary to go outside of the Cabinet to find support for the Concorde. As a catalyst for mobilizing social forces against the government, Benn was able to distract its attention from the purely economic issues involved in the Concorde decision. Indeed, he created the political situation in which continuation of the project became important to the effectiveness of the new and very weak Labour government.

The crisis was resolved in July, when Prime Minister Wilson told President Giscard d'Estaing that the British would carry on with the project and go into production. But Wilson would commit himself only to sixteen units, as had been agreed to before he took office. After these were produced, sales prospects for the Concorde were to be reassessed to see if further production was warranted. As it turned out, it was not; in March 1976, both governments announced that production would not go beyond sixteen.[52] After initial reluctance, the aircraft unions—working in what would soon be a nationalized industry and aware that a boom was about to begin in subsonic jet production in which Britain would finally be able to participate—accepted the decision of the government.[53] By late 1978, the last Concorde was almost completed, the work teams had been dispersed to other projects, and it was unclear if there would ever be sales beyond the initial nine to British Airways and Air France.

THE CONCORDE AND CHANGE IN THE BRITISH POLITY

The history of the Concorde reflects the general context of the two periods involved, as well as the change that took place between them. During the first period, the state, with its superior bargaining advantages and internal cohesion, was able to lead British society, in this particular case the aircraft industry. This assertiveness was illustrative of British statecraft in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Prior to this period, the Conservatives had relied on macroeconomic principles to guide the British economy very indirectly; stop-go fiscal and monetary

[52] Arthur Reed, "No Further Concordes until Airlines Buy, *The Times* (London), March 30, 1976, p. 1.

[53] Arthur Reed, "Government Will Resist Pressure on Concorde" *The Times* (London), March 27, 1976; Reed, "Concorde Jobs Stay," *The Times* (London), May 6, 1977, p. 20; Reed, "British Aerospace Exports Likely to Exceed £1000 Million," *The Times* (London), January 13, 1978, p. 18. The British policy now is to cooperate with both the U.S. and Europe on subsonic jet projects; see "What the British Lose in Boeing's Big Gain," *Business Week*, September 18, 1978; and David Brown, "Europeans Fearful of US Dominance," and "RB 211-524 Production Boosted," both in *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, October 23, 1978, pp. 73-74, 51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policies, in response to repeated balance-of-payments crises, resulted in slow growth relative to other advanced, industrialized societies.[54]

As a reaction to this poor performance, a "major rethinking" about economic policy led to an "ideological wave" sweeping over the Conservative government, replacing reliance on the indirect approach with a perceived need for direct governmental intervention in the British economy.[55] The late 1950s and early 1960s "heralded the shift towards the managed economy."[56] The focus was on "modernization," and this concept "radically affected the style of political rhetoric" of Britain's two major parties.[57] A clear ideological shift had taken place in favor of the state's economic leadership of society.

At the same time, the Conservative Party was able to increase its parliamentary majorities in the elections of 1955 and 1961.[58] The state therefore possessed both the ideological justification and electoral mandate to remold British society. It allocated greater governmental expenditures for civil research, and in particular created the National Economic Development Council (NEDC).[59] Although the latter did not make a great impact on British society, it represented a new commitment by the Conservatives to come into closer contact with Britain's major producer groups.

Thus, the case of the Concorde during 1962 reflects the general British environment of the time—an environment characterized by a shift toward greater state intervention in the economy. Indeed, the Concorde may have been at the cutting edge of this trend. That is, the state's contacts with society in regard to the Concorde—because it involved the very restructuring of the aircraft industry along the lines desired and was almost dictated by the state—were far greater than the contacts generally associated with the concept of the NEDC. The Concorde may have been the apogee of the ability and willingness of

[54] Geoffrey Denton and others, *Economic Planning and Policies in Britain, France and Germany* (London: Allen and Unwin 1969), 109; Andrew Shonfield, *Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power* (London: Oxford University Press 1965); Stephen Blank, *Industry and Government in Britain* (Lexington: Lexington Books 1973), 139.

[55] *Ibid.*; Shonfield (fn. 54), 102.

[56] Trevor Smith, "Britain," in Jack Hayward and Michael Watson, *Planning, Politics and Public Policy: The British, French and Italian Experiences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975), 52.

[57] Norman J. Vig, *Science and Technology in British Politics* (Oxford: Pergamon Press 1968), 39-40.

[58] David Butler and Anne Sloman, *British Political Facts, 1900–1975* (4th ed.; New York: St. Martins Press 1975), 184-85.

[59] Vig (fn. 57), 56-57; Denton (fn. 54), 108-17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conservative governments to remold British society in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

In contrast, the decision by the Labour government in 1974 to go ahead with the Concorde was a sign of the weakness of the British state. The government authorized production out of fear of the reaction by the aircraft workers (and, what is perhaps more important, by their affiliates in the engineering union) if it attempted to cancel the project. The state's weakness stemmed from its narrow base in the House of Commons and in the country as a whole. The Labour government of 1974 was the first minority government in Britain since 1929;[60] it simply could not afford to alienate an important segment of its electoral coalition.

The weakness of 1974 also reflected a general decline in the authority of the state in Britain. The Labour government of 1970 had not been re-elected because it had estranged itself from its primary power base, the labor unions;[61] by 1974, it had not yet regained their confidence. Meanwhile, the Conservative government of 1970–1974 had done much to weaken the authority of the state. Rather than contain problems with the unions, it had probably exacerbated them. Through the Industrial Relations Act of 1971, the Conservatives had imposed a policy on the unions that the latter perceived as a fundamental threat to their autonomy. They therefore rendered vigorous resistance to the Act.[62] In response to this resistance, the Conservative government appeared to "backpedal" on the Act.[63] The unions, sensing the government's weakness, became more militant in their wage demands; the strikes of 1972 and 1973 involved industrial actions and occasional violence.[64]

The climax, of course, was the miners' strike of 1973–1974, when the Conservative government again shifted course and chose a policy of confrontation. Its failure confirmed for many the fundamental shift in power from the government to the unions, and therefore it has been

[60] David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, *The British General Election of February 1974* (London: Macmillan 1974), 258.

[61] *Ibid.*; David Farnham, "The Labour Alliance: Reality or Myth?" *Parliamentary Affairs*, XXIX (Winter 1976), 39-40.

[62] John F.B. Goodman, "Great Britain: Toward the Social Contract," in Solomon Barkin, ed., *Worker Militancy and Its Consequences: New Directions in Western Industrial Relations* (New York: Praeger 1975), 66-68.

[63] *Ibid.*, 69; see also Smith (fn. 56), 125.

[64] Butler and Kavanagh (fn. 60), 22; Samuel Brittan, "The Economic Tensions of Democracy," in R. Tyrell, ed., *The Future that Doesn't Work* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1977), 137-38; Norman H. Keehn, "Great Britain: The Illusion of Governmental Authority," *World Politics*, XXX (July 1978), 558.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seen as a "major political, even constitutional event."[65] Henceforth, rather than seek conflict, it was expected that "Governments will more than ever wish to know what terms can be negotiated in order to try to avoid a major conflict of the kind clearly represented by the events of 1974."[66] The case of the Concorde illustrated this new pattern: the Labour government's range of choice in deciding whether to produce the craft was sharply curtailed by the unions and other private actors affected by the decision. Society had begun to lead the state.

Three trends contributed to the shifts in the government's rationale in favor of the Concorde: the decline in mass support for the major parties, the increase in union militancy, and the loss of cohesion within the British state. The first, electoral change, was the result of several factors. During the 1960s, mass cleavages according to class had declined in Britain, largely because of the introduction of younger voters into the political system. This factor, in combination with the growth of the white-collar sector, contributed to a resurgence (albeit fragile) of the Liberal Party. Issues such as nationalism in Scotland and Wales became increasingly important.[67] Partly in response, the two major parties tended in the 1960s and until the early 1970s to converge on public issues; the effect, however, was to diminish the reasons for voters to be particularly loyal to one or the other party.[68]

Paradoxically, as the mass bases of the two major parties declined, the militancy of particular industrial unions increased. There have been at least two explanations for this trend. The first is that during the 1960s, the power of the unions increased, and with it their demands for higher wages. When these demands met with resistance by man-

[65] Anthony King, "The Problem of Overload," in King, ed., *Why is Britain Becoming Harder to Govern?* (London: Love and Malcomson, 1976), 20; also see Butler and Kavanagh (fn. 60), 24-53.

[66] Timothy C. May, *Trade Unions and Pressure Group Politics* (Westmead, England: Saxon House and Lexington 1975), 116.

[67] On the significance of new voters in Britain, see David E. Butler and Donald E. Stokes, *Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of Electoral Choice* (2d ed.; New York: St. Martin's Press 1974), 193, 201-205, 411-13. The importance of younger voters for the Liberal Party is noted in Butler and Stokes, 412; The Gallup Poll, "Voting Behaviour in Britain, 1945-1974," in Richard Rose, ed., *Studies in British Politics: A Reader in Political Sociology* (3rd ed.; London: Macmillan 1976), 212-13. Youth and white-collar occupation as factors are noted in Ivor Crewe, Bo Sarlvik, and James Alt, "The Why and How of Voting in February 1974," *ibid.*, 252-53. On the importance of regionalism, see Rose, "The United Kingdom as a Multi-National State," *ibid.*, 142-43; Butler and Kavanagh (fn. 60), 258.

[68] On the trend toward consensus, see Butler and Stokes (fn. 67), 196-97; the impact on British voters is discussed in Samuel H. Beer, *British Politics in a Collectivist Age* (New York: Vintage 1969), 410.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agement in the early 1970s, the unions became militant out of frustration.[69] The other explanation is that the unions' demands for higher wages were a defensive response (as were their political actions) to efforts by management and capital to downgrade the position of labor in Britain.[70] The dispute cannot be resolved here; the fact remains that the unions did become more militant, and that in the early 1970s this militancy became politicized. One observer has argued that there has been an absence of countervailing opinions in Britain because the British middle class is thought to sympathize with the unions; at least up to the mid-1970s, the unions' demands commanded a greater degree of legitimacy than those of the other major social groups.[71]

Hence, the bases for action declined for the state at the same time they increased for the unions. Finally, the state, because of its own weakness, lost an important degree of its ability to act cohesively and with flexibility. Benn, a key leader of the left wing of the Labour Party, might not have acted as he did on the Concorde if he had not realized that Prime Minister Wilson desperately needed the support of his faction. Since Wilson also needed the support of the unions in order to hold power, Benn was able to utilize the unions to save the project (and, not incidentally, gain their gratitude and that of his Bristol constituents). Benn could thus go outside the government without fear of retribution by Wilson. (He had used this method on other issues.)[72]

There was another, more basic trend that eroded the flexibility of successive governments. As the state became more closely associated with the Concorde project, it became a hostage to the project's well-being. The government, because it was seen as the sponsor of the SST, was also considered responsible for its progress; it would be judged unfavorably if dislocations were caused by the failure of the project.[73] Hence, even if the officials of the government determined on grounds of economics that the Concorde could not be justified, their judgments

[69] Sir John Hicks, "The Permissive Society," in A. Seldon, ed., *Crisis 1975* (London: Institute for Economic Affairs 1975), 18-19.

[70] These arguments are summarized by Leo Panitch, "Profits and Politics: Labour and the Crisis of Capitalism," paper presented at the Conference on British Studies, Claremont, Calif. (April 1977), 2-11.

[71] Peregrine Worsthorne, "The Trade Unions: New Lads on Top," in Tyrell (fn. 64), 6-7; however, for contradictory evidence, see Butler and Stokes (fn. 67), 198-99.

[72] See "Mr Wilson Stresses Need for Loyalty," *The Times* (London), May 15, 1974, p. 2; "Minute by Treasury Started Benn Campaign," *The Times* (London), June 17, 1974, p. 1; and Arthur Silkin, "The 'Agreement to Differ' of 1975 and Its Effect on Ministerial Responsibility," *Political Quarterly*, XXXXVIII (January-March 1977), 65-77.

[73] Keehn (fn. 64), 539.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would at the very least be contested by others in the government who were concerned with more purely political aspects of the project.

That is not to say that British governments have no flexibility at all; there have been cases of the U.K.'s withdrawal from potentially costly projects. In September 1967, Britain agreed with France and West Germany to develop the Airbus, but then withdrew its support in the summer of 1968.[74] Another project from which Britain withdrew in 1968 was the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO).[75] In 1974, the Labour government announced that it would not build a new airport at Maplin, as had been planned by the Conservative government, and that it would withdraw from an agreement with the French to build a tunnel under the English Channel, another commitment made by the previous government.[76] Still, when compared to the Concorde decision, the circumstances surrounding cancellation of these projects emphasize the tight limits on the government's flexibility regarding economic projects. Withdrawal from the Airbus project (in which Britain was to provide the air engine) was possible, even necessary, because Rolls-Royce had just won a contract to produce engines for Lockheed, and was unable to expand production facilities further at that time. The ELDO program affected very few British firms and workers, for Britain's role was primarily to provide launchers it had already developed (the Blue Streak). In the case of Maplin, the issue was not whether to devote resources to an expansion of airport facilities *per se*, but whether to build a new one, or—as was ultimately decided—to expand existing facilities. Finally, at the time of cancellation of the Channel tunnel, Britain had made only a small financial commitment to the project. Thus, governments have shown flexibility when the implications of cancellation are marginal; but when, as in the case of the Concorde, large numbers of people who are strategically located in the political economy are affected, maneuverability is likely to be curtailed sharply.

[74] See Keith Hayward, "Politics and European Aerospace Collaboration: The A300 Airbus," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, XIV (June 1976), 354-68; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XVII (1969-70), 23450-451. In 1978 Britain appeared to be about to reenter the project; see fn. 53.

[75] See Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and James Deghand, "European Technological Collaboration: The Experience of the European Launcher Organization (ELDO)," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, VII (September 1968), 22-35; Roger Williams, *European Technology: The Politics of Collaboration* (New York: Halsted 1973), 70-75; Statement of Minister of Technology Anthony Wedgwood Benn, *Hansard*, Vol. 763, April 23, 1968, pp. 40-47; and *Hansard*, Vol. 798, March 23, 1970, p. 962.

[76] On Maplin, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, XX (1974), 26684; on the Channel tunnel, *ibid.*, XX (1975), 26969-70, and *Hansard*, Vol. 884, January 20, 1975, pp. 1021-1034, 1094-1162.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Conclusion: The Concorde, Britain, and the Problem of Public Policy

The first conclusion to be drawn is that—in the case of Britain and the Concorde—as the state became more involved with society, it became less able to control that involvement. To some extent, the British experience has been shared by other industrialized democracies. In France, for example, the state at first directed economic development; but as French firms grew and went out into the international economy, the government had to permit greater leeway for them; thus, successful nurturing of firms ultimately led to reduced control.[77] The Italian government has found it necessary to save ailing firms, in part because it has attempted to lead the development of the economy and is now considered responsible for it.[78] Finally, in the United States, firms that were supposed to be regulated by the government were eventually able to "capture" their would-be regulator.[79] The performance record of advanced industrial democracies in the area of rational interaction with social economic forces has thus been, at best, of mixed quality.

Second, since 1945, the state and society in Great Britain have become increasingly interdependent; the relationship may be characterized as approaching society-dominated corporatism.[80] Initial discussions of corporatism considered state-society relations to be fairly durable; however, the experience of Britain confirms more recent studies that emphasize the fluidity of state-society relations in corporatist polities.[81]

[77] Charles-Albert Michalet, "France," in Vernon (fn. 7), 115-18.

[78] Stephen Young, "A Comparison of Industrial Experiences," in Hayward and Watson (fn. 56), 144, 152-53.

[79] Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf 1966), passim.

[80] The most important discussions of corporatism as an ideal type are in Phillipe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *Review of Politics*, XXXVII (January 1974), 102-3, and Schmitter, "Modes of Interest Intermediation and Models of Societal Change in Western Europe," *Comparative Political Studies*, X (April 1977), 10-11. A helpful discussion of the concept of corporatism is found in Stepan (fn. 1), 46-113. On the question of corporatism in Britain, see R. E. Paul and J. T. Winkler, "The Coming Corporatism," *Challenge*, XVIII (March-April 1975), 28-35; Samuel Brittan, "Towards a Corporatist State?" *Encounter*, XLIV (June 1975), 58-63; J. T. Winkler, "Corporatism," *European Journal of Sociology*, XVII (No. 1, 1976), 100-136; H. M. Drucker, "Devolution and Corporatism," *Government and Opposition*, XII (Summer 1977), 178-93; David Marsh and Wyn Grant, "Tripartism: Myth or Reality," *Government and Opposition*, XII (Summer 1977), 194-211; Alan Crawson, "Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Role of the State," *Government and Opposition*, XIII (Spring 1978), 178-98.

[81] On dynamic models of corporatism, see Birgitta Nedelmann and Kurt Meier, "Theories of Contemporary Corporatism: Static or Dynamic?" *Comparative Political Studies*, X (April 1977), 47; Leo Panitch, "The Development of Corporatism in Liberal Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies*, X (April 1977), 82-87; and Stepan (fn. 1), 69, 78.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The concept of dynamic corporatism is in accord with studies of European polities considered more corporatist than Britain—for example, Sweden and the Netherlands—which have experienced sociopolitical turmoil that would not have been predicted by corporatist models that assume static relations between state and society.[82] The next step, of course, is to understand transformations in the relation between state and society; the experience of the Concorde suggests that the very fusion between them may lead to instability.

Third, the Concorde experience confirms that, with greater state intervention in the Western economies, there have developed "methods of governance that have reduced the role of the parliamentary process and elevated the roles of specialized groups such as large enterprises and large unions."[83] Each solution brings with it new problems. On the one hand, if the state refrains from as much intervention into the economy as has been the recent practice, the result may be a lack of concentration on crucial problems, such as income disparities among regions or social groups within society. On the other hand, efforts to ensure that the autonomy of the state is not subjected to undue pressures by particularistic segments of society can lead to ominous implications for liberal democratic structures. One of the great challenges before the Western democracies today is to find the means to be responsive to those who are affected by policy without running the danger of being held hostage by private interests.

[82] Nedelmann and Meier (fn. 81), 50-58; Panitch (fn. 81), 83; Bran Peper, "The Netherlands: From an Ordered Harmonic to a Bargaining Relationship," and Casten van Otter, "Sweden: Labor Reformism Reshapes the System," both in Barkin (fn. 62).

[83] Raymond Vernon, "Enterprise and Government in Western Europe," in Vernon (fn. 7), 3. For a similar conclusion, see Stephen Young, in Hayward and Watson (fn. 56), 153-54.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SOVIET COMPUTING AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: An Overview

By SEYMOUR E. GOODMAN*

I. Introduction

BY the early 1950s, the United States had established itself as the leading developer of computer technology. The United Kingdom held a strong second place, and West Germany, France, Sweden, and the Soviet Union had each built working electronic digital computers. During the next several years, a dozen other countries developed their own machines, but the U.S. lead widened rapidly, and by the mid-1960s it was overwhelming.[1] Consequently, each of the non-communist industrialized states found it necessary to come to an accommodation with the dominant position of the United States. Such accommodations have taken the form of extensive interfaces with American research and development, products, and service. These countries have also allowed American firms to acquire significant shares of their internal markets. Several states have developed respectable indigenous industries of their own, and the strengths of these firms often reflect American technology or competition. Still, most of them have had trouble being competitive with U.S. corporations in their own countries (even with some government protection). Essentially, they were faced with a choice between an accommodation with the dynamic U.S. industry, or denying themselves some of the advantages of the technology.

The Soviets opted for a distant relationship with the U.S.-dominated international computer community. As a result, they denied themselves many of the benefits of computing that were available elsewhere, and the indigenous industry of the U.S.S.R. rapidly fell behind that of the United States. Soviet policy reflected both a desire to develop an independent capability in an important strategic technology, and a rational but somewhat shortsighted perception of computing and its value to the U.S.S.R. For a long time, the influence of the West, and particularly of the United States, was primarily technical. The Soviet pattern

* This work was partially supported by a N.S.F. Science Faculty Fellowship while the author was a member of the Center of International Studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.

[1] O.E.C.D., *Gaps in Technology: Electronic Computers* (Paris: O.E.C.D. 1969).

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/040539-32$01.60/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of development differed considerably in terms of time-scale, philosophy, institutional arrangements, capital decisions, and applications.

This Soviet perception slowly began to change in the late 1950s. During the next dozen years a major political, military, and economic reassessment of the value of computing took place as a result of internal economic and external military pressures. The overall Soviet view of computing and its applications moved much closer to that of the rest of the developed world. The new perception has been backed by large political and economic commitments. Apparently, the Soviet leaders are hoping that this technology will help to make the existing economic system more efficient and effective, and thus avoid fundamental, and politically unacceptable, reforms. In this context, it is worth noting that in the United States, computing has been so successful, both as a technology and in its applications,[2] precisely because of a cultural and economic environment that the Soviet leadership wants to avoid.

The U.S.S.R. has learned that the development of its national computing capabilities on the scale it desires cannot be achieved without a substantial involvement with the rest of the world's computing community. Its considerable progress over the last decade has been characterized by a massive transfer of foreign computer technology. The Soviet computing industry is now much less isolated than it was during the 1960s, although its interfaces with the outside world are still narrowly defined. It would appear that the Soviets are reasonably content with the present "closer but still at a distance" relationship.

This article presents a broad, nontechnical survey and analysis of the Soviet effort to develop a national computing capability in semi-isolation from the rest of the world. It will emphasize the role played by technology transfers from abroad, and the difficulties of trying to transplant a sophisticated and pervasive technology into a systemic

[2] It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find a sector of the American economy with a more impressive technological performance record and deep and pervasive applications than the computer industry. This statement could also include the closely related semiconductor and communications industries. The data processing industry has been doubling in volume every five years and is expected to continue to do so until 1990. By then, it has been estimated that 20% of the U.S. labor force will require some functional knowledge of data processing. One industry executive has characterized cost/performance improvement as follows: "If we compare the automotive and computer industries over the last 30 years, we find that if there had been similar progress in the auto industry as there was in the computer industry . . . then the auto industry would today be able to offer us a Rolls-Royce for $2.50 with an E.P.A. gas rating of 2 million miles per gallon." "Computing for Business into the 1980s," *Fortune*, June 5, 1978, pp. 23-86, at 25. Other readily available and relatively nontechnical sources include: *Science* (special issue), March 18, 1977; *Scientific American* (special issue), September 1977; and *Information Processing in the United States: A Quantitative Summary* (Montvale, N.J.: A.F.I.P.S. Press 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

environment very different from that in which it originated and thrived.

At the outset, it is necessary to make a distinction between technology and its products. Technology is the *know-how* required to define, design, build, maintain, and use a product. It is not the end product itself. Thus the transfer of a product does not generally constitute a technology transfer, unless the product itself reveals some of this know-how. The term "technology transfer" will also be used on a higher level, to describe foreign influence on the overall Soviet perception of computing.

II. A History[3]

THE BEGINNING

The modern digital computer era originated in the United States and Germany during World War II.[4] After the war, a number of German electronics experts were taken to the U.S.S.R., but we know very little about their influence on Soviet work. The American ENIAC, the world's first large electronic digital computer, was completed in 1946. The Soviets tried to buy the ENIAC documentation and ultimately tried to purchase the whole machine. By 1950 they had built the EV-80, a punchcard calculator that was based on the design of the IBM 604.

The most important early Soviet achievements demonstrated a substantial indigenous capability. The U.S.S.R. was the first country in continental Europe to build a stored-program electronic digital computer. Work on this machine, the MESM, began in 1948; it was operational in 1951. The first computer of this type, the British EDSAC, had become operational in 1949; the American SEAC and BINAC followed in 1950. The MESM was thus an important achievement close to the technical state of the art. The Soviet Union was also the third country to put a machine into serial production (the STRELA in 1953).

Both the United States and the Soviet Union regarded their early

[3] The following articles should be consulted for summaries of technical details on early U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. computers: Saul Rosen, "Electronic Computers: A Historical Survey," *ACM Computing Surveys*, I (March 1969), 7-36; Willis H. Ware, ed., "Soviet Computer Technology—1959," *Communications of the ACM*, III (No. 3, 1960), 131-66; George Rudins, "Soviet Computers: A Historical Survey," *Soviet Cybernetics Review* (January 1970), 6-44. The journal *Soviet Cybernetics Review*, known earlier under the title *Soviet Cybernetics: Recent News Items*, was published by the Rand Corporation from early 1967 to mid-1974.

[4] F. L. Bauer and H. Wössner, "The Plankalkül of Konrad Zuse: A Forerunner of Today's Programming Languages," *Communications of the ACM*, XV (1972), 678-85; B. Randell, ed., *The Origins of Digital Computers* (Berlin: Springer Verlag 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

computers primarily as engines for doing scientific and engineering calculations. Neither country was using computers to any great extent for data processing or economic planning. The technology was not available for such applications.[5]

There was a legitimate technical controversy at that time as to whether analog or digital computers were most suitable for the scientific and engineering work that was being done. For the purposes of this article, which will be almost exclusively concerned with digital computers, it will suffice to distinguish digital and analog machines by the form in which they store and manipulate information. Digital computers use codes that represent alphanumeric characters as binary digit patterns. Analog devices use the values of electrical parameters such as voltages or currents to represent other variables. A digital computer can store and manipulate textual material more efficiently. However, a variety of arguments could then be made as to which was better for solving differential equations, one being that analog devices were usually simpler to build and operate.

The Soviets leaned toward analog technology because it served their purposes, they were good at it, and their electronics industry could support it more effectively. They did not have a well-developed business equipment industry: there were no Soviet counterparts to the salesmen for N.C.R., Burroughs, I.B.M., and so forth, who were running around the United States selling cash registers, adding machines, punchcard calculators, and typewriters. Nor did they have the established organizational structure or the bases of customer and sales support and of production talent that the American business-equipment industry would soon use to change the character of U.S. and world computing.

But the U.S.S.R. did not ignore digital computers. By 1953, the Soviets had built two new small models and the large BESM-1. The latter machine was, in some ways, comparable to the first American "supercomputer," the NORC. The BESM-1 was built earlier, but it was less powerful.

The level of technology transfer was weak during this period, even

[5] The commonly held view that the development of computing and cybernetics was politically suppressed under Stalin is something of a myth. There was, however, considerable and very serious ideological opposition to the use of economic theory and quantitative methods in economic planning, and thus indirectly to the use of computers for this purpose. For a discussion of the political pressures on the mathematically oriented economists, see Richard W. Judy, "The Economists," in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971), 209-52.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

though Soviet hardware designs showed a familiarity with Western work, and Soviet software was influenced by Western developments.[6] However, for the most part the agent of this transfer was the technical literature. There was little product transfer and hardly any use of the more active mechanisms, such as joint ventures, which transfer technology through very effective personal contacts. Innovative, lasting Soviet contributions to the technology were essentially nonexistent, although the Soviets seem to have reproduced some Western ideas independently, and it may not really be fair to expect them to have come up with totally different concepts.

EUPHORIA AND REALITY

The most visible form of Soviet computer-related activity during the next decade was the pro-cybernetic euphoria that had developed by the late 1950s. The death of Stalin brought an opportunity for more open philosophical discussion.[7] Soviet academics and the public media took this opportunity to become enamored with cybernetics to an extent that is without precedent in the history of science in the U.S.S.R.[8] In this new philosophical perception, cybernetics was not merely consistent with Marxist-Leninist thought, but somehow the communist state had become uniquely capable of developing and using this new science and its associated technology for the benefit of the human condition. The social-cybernetic visions imported from the United States soon paled before the abstract innovations of Soviet cyberneticists. While the Americans were losing interest in large-scale cybernetic applications, the Soviets were cranking out literature and creating institutes and long-range plans.

[6] Hardware consists of the physical devices of a computer system. Software is the control logic used internally to manage computer resources (operating systems), facilitate the use of applications programs (e.g., translators for English-related programming languages), and the applications programs themselves. The early influence of the Western literature on the development of Soviet software is described in A. P. Ershov and M. R. Shura-Bura, "Directions of Development of Programming in the U.S.S.R.," *Kibernetika*, XII (November-December 1976), 141-60.

[7] Apparently, Norbert Wiener's *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1950) was read by the Politburo; see Martin Dewhirst and Robert Farrel, eds., *The Soviet Censorship* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press 1973), 74. Unfortunately, the source of this information seems to have had no knowledge of the discussion that must have followed this group reading-assignment. Wiener's book became something of a best seller in the U.S.S.R. It should be noted that cybernetics and computing are not the same. The subject matter of the science of cybernetics is the dynamic control of complex (including social) processes. Cyberneticists see computing/communications as the technological means for implementing the practical application of cybernetic concepts.

[8] Loren R. Graham, *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union* (New York: Knopf 1972).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For the most part, technical leaders and government officials who were in positions to determine policy and capital investment ignored the popular and academic discussions. Of course, they did not come right out and denounce the academics as dreamers; but clearly, little effort was made to produce large quantities of suitable computer hardware intended for widespread general-purpose use. No great need for this was perceived in the industrial or military sectors; the cost would have been a severe strain on the limited capabilities available, and would have been out of proportion to the short-term benefits.

The foregoing does not mean that nothing was done. Quite a bit of serious research, development, and production of analog computers took place. Almost two dozen different digital computer models had been developed by 1961. Most of this work was done under the Ministry of the Radio Industry, one of the major defense-related ministries. Many of these models were one-of-a-kind research projects, and only a few hundred units were made of all the models that did go into serial production. Of these, the most important was the M-20, a machine that was used by the Soviet military and by high-priority industrial enterprises.

In the United States, there was also a certain amount of euphoria during this period, but it was more concerned with the practical applications of digital computers than with general cybernetic concepts. Americans and West Europeans were discovering that digital computers could be used for all sorts of applications besides small- and medium-scale engineering computations, and that analog computers could not be used to anywhere near the same extent. The most important of these applications was data processing.

This is not to say that the United States had a great deal of conscious foresight when it went primarily digital, and that the Soviet Union did not when it believed analog technology to be suitable for most of its needs. The market for business and government data processing by digital computer (rather than by simple punchcard devices) was at first not fully appreciated by the American computer industry—including I.B.M. Marketing forecasts grossly underestimated the rate at which Western commercial enterprises would utilize this technology. But the American computer industry was quick to take advantage of its unanticipated windfall. Service for the technically unsophisticated customer became a major part of the industry. The invention of the transistor made possible smaller, cheaper, more powerful, and more

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reliable computers.[9] By the early 1960s, the American industry had stopped manufacturing vacuum-tube machines, and had essentially replaced them with transistorized computers (although many models still had some vacuum-tube components). Data processing was a major stimulant for the development of new, larger, and more reliable forms of memory and input/output technology. Technological advances in the U.S. computer industry were frequently customer-inspired.

The U.S. military became interested in the digital computer for a variety of reasons.[10] One of its most revolutionary uses was in the area of command, control, and communications systems. By the end of the 1950s, the military potential of the computer had been significantly demonstrated by the SAGE air defense system and other developments. The military was also a major customer for computers for both scientific/engineering (such as nuclear weapons design) and data processing (such as logistics) applications.

The Soviets were not oblivious to what was happening in the West. They were busy collecting information and hardware through a number of overt and covert sources. The technology transferred during this period helped computer specialists produce better products in the U.S.S.R. But the use of computers for applications other than those that primarily involved numerical computation was much less common than in the West, resulting in a major long-term negative influence on the design and utility of Soviet machines.

The apparent attitude of the Soviet military is helpful in understanding the Soviet perception of computing during this period. Although the military had the capability to insist on the massive commitment of resources that would have been necessary to close the "computing gap" with the West, that task was clearly not near the top of its list of priorities. Design work on the M-20 (a vacuum-tube model) began in the mid-fifties, but production probably did not start until 1958–1959. A transistorized version, the M-220, did not appear until late 1964. Perhaps 3,000 of these units were produced during a combined production period that lasted about 15 years. By comparison, I.B.M.

[9] The transistor was developed in 1948, but it was not until 1954–1955 that it became technically and economically possible to use it as the component base for computers. The first large-scale commercial transistorized computer was the Philco S-2000 (1958). Transistors had been used in military computers before then. By the mid-sixties, all new Soviet computers were based on transistors, although many vacuum-tube machines were still in use.

[10] R. Turn and others, "Computers and Strategic Advantage: II. Capability-Enhancing Applications," *RAND Corporation Report R-1643-PR,* February 1976 draft.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

built over 14,000 of the 1400 series second-generation discrete transistorized computers between 1960 and 1963.[11] The technical secrets of the transistor were quickly diffused throughout the Western world.[12] The Soviet military could have had second-generation computers more powerful than the M-220 before 1964 if it had felt the need and had pressed hard for them. In view of its awareness of what its U.S. counterparts were doing, there must have been a conscious policy decision. This is not to say that the Soviet military could have technically matched American products and service, but there is little doubt that it could have done better with an additional investment of resources that was within its means.

The relative lack of interest in the general-purpose use of computers certainly affected the volume and effectiveness of technology transfer from the West. Entire Western computer systems were acquired. The first machine to go to the U.S.S.R. was a British Elliott 802 in 1959. Several other models were obtained by the Warsaw Pact countries. Although East European specialists read the Western literature and could have had more contact with West European and American technical people, they did not get as much technology as they could have, nor did they use what they got particularly well. Travel restrictions imposed by the Soviets on their own citizens effectively prevented technology transfers, while other political restrictions also prevented the widespread internal diffusion of the computer technology that was obtained.

The net result was that the Soviets were more or less following the Western technical pattern, but their development was spread out over a longer period of time. Several individual Soviet scientists and engineers came up with some imaginative new ideas, but most of these were theoretical. They produced no new major practical contributions, and essentially seemed content to do little more than build functional equivalents of selected Western products at a rate slower than they had been produced originally in the West. The traditional gap between Soviet theoretical science and technology remained wide. Neither the euphoric academic visionaries nor the managers at the computer factories seemed to be seriously interested in the hardware (such as alphanumeric line printers) and software (such as simple data-processing

[11] O.E.C.D. Report (fn. 1), 64, 176.

[12] John E. Tilton, *International Diffusion of Technology: The Case of Semiconductors* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution 1971).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

languages) that made possible the use of digital computers for a wide variety of dull applications by people with little technical training.

A PERIOD OF REASSESSMENT

Between the late 1950s and the early 1970s, a combination of internal economic and, to a lesser extent, external military pressures produced major changes in the Soviet attitude toward computing. Economic planners were distressed by falling growth rates, poor factor productivity, the rising percentage of nonproductive (e.g., clerical) workers, and increasing difficulties with the centralized control of the economy.[13] The military began to recognize that the Soviet Union's small, isolated computer industry was increasingly incapable of keeping pace with that of the United States, or even with the less demanding Soviet perception of the military value of this technology.[14] The high-prestige space program was being run on a computing shoestring—one of the reasons it was being increasingly overshadowed by American achievements.

During this period, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) gradually came to see that an enhanced national computing capability was essential. Public endorsements of the development and use of this technology and its products became more frequent and were made more prominently.[15] Computers became the obvious means for the practical implementation of many concepts of the scientific-technological revolution,[16] which was perhaps the most important ideological extension of Marxism-Leninism since the early days of the U.S.S.R. This rhetoric began to be increasingly supplemented by serious commitments and practical measures.

[13] See, for example, Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Recent Developments in Soviet Planning and Incentives," in J. P. Hardt, ed., *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee 1973). *Soviet Cybernetics Review* (fn. 3) regularly carried articles concerned with the use of computers for these problems.

[14] One of the few nontrivial, unclassified comparisons of U.S.-U.S.S.R. military-related computing capabilities is R. Turn and A. E. Nimitz, "Computers and Strategic Advantage: I. Computer Technology in the United States and the Soviet Union," *RAND Corporation Report R-1642-PR*, May 1975. Given the conservative nature of the Soviet military, it is not unlikely that changes in the military's perception may have been partially the result of pressure by the Party.

[15] See, for example, Wade B. Holland, "Party Congress Emphasizes Computer Technology," *Soviet Cybernetics Review*, July 1971, 7-14.

[16] See Erik P. Hoffmann, "Soviet Views of the 'Scientific-Technological Revolution'," *World Politics*, xxx (July 1978), 615-44, and Hoffmann, "The 'Scientific Management' of Soviet Society," *Problems of Communism*, xxvi (May-June 1977), 59-67.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some of the earliest, and most important, evidence of a real change in attitude and commitment came in the early 1960s, when record-keeping and data-processing tasks began to require suitable equipment at all levels. Furthermore, any rational approach demanded that the equipment and methods used at lower levels also be useful at higher levels without major modification. An upward-compatible family of computers was therefore needed. Simply stated, an upward-compatible series consists of a sequence of increasingly more powerful computers that have been designed so that programs and data which can be run on any one machine can also be run, without modification, on all the larger models in the family. Thus, the same management programs and data formats for keeping track of rolling stock at a small railroad yard on a small computer model can be used at a larger yard using a larger machine. Such compatibility is very important to future growth. An enterprise that outgrows its current computer is able to switch to a larger one without the time-consuming, error-prone, and disruptive experience of rewriting all of its programs and reformatting all of its data.

The first Soviet attempt to produce an upward-compatible family was the Ural-10 series of three machines, Soviet-designed and manufactured in Penza under the Ministry of the Radio Industry. This series was difficult to program and had design features that were poorly suited for data processing. It is doubtful whether more than 1,000 of all versions of all three machines were ever produced, although the production period extended from 1965 to at least 1972. The failure of the Ural series to satisfy Soviet needs influenced later decisions that determined the course of computing in the Soviet bloc.

In 1964–1965, essentially the same time that the U.S.S.R. announced and began to produce the Ural-10 series, I.B.M. announced and began to produce its System 360 (s/360) family. In spite of some technical and organizational difficulties,[17] I.B.M. had built more than 35,000 units of over a dozen models by 1970.[18] This family was a monumental technological achievement that consolidated I.B.M.'s dominance over

[17] T. A. Wise, "IBM's $5,000,000,000 Gamble," *Fortune* (September 1966), 116 ff.; Wise, "The Rocky Road to the Marketplace," *Fortune* (October 1966), 138 ff.

[18] "IBM System/360 Models 22-195," *Datapro Reports*, 70C-491-03, January 1974. The early s/360 units were based on hybrid circuits that represented a transition from discrete transistors to integrated circuits. The first large-scale commercial use of integrated circuits was in the R.C.A. Spectra 70/45 in late 1965. Many people consider the integrated circuit as the most important characteristic of third-generation hardware. The first Soviet computer to use integrated circuits was the small Nairi-3 (1968–1969), but it was not until 1972–1973 that this technology was really successfully used on a medium-scale Soviet computer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

both the domestic and the non-communist international data-processing markets.

By any standard, the Ural-10 series was very limited in comparison with the IBM s/360, or with the products of a dozen other Western vendors.

Although the Ural-10 series appeared concurrently with the s/360, it can be argued that its real counterpart was the IBM 1400 series which appeared in quantity in 1960–1961, and was an immediate success. Prominent Soviet computer scientists had been advocating the development of a compatible family since at least 1959. The decision to go ahead with the Ural family probably followed in 1961–1962, and was most likely based on this American success. Technically, the Ural machines—though not close copies of the 1400s—were much more comparable to them than to the 360s. The apparent policy of minimizing technological risk by using an already proven U.S. system as a model for their own efforts has characterized Soviet computing developments.

In 1966–1967, the Soviets began working on another upward-compatible family. The M-1000, M-2000 and M-3000 were developed under the Ministry of Instrument Construction, Means of Automation and Control Systems (Minpribor). Production was announced in 1968; these are the earliest models of the ASVT (the transliterated abbreviation of the Russian for Aggregate System of Computer Technology) family intended for industrial automation and data processing. The M-2000 and M-3000 used the IBM s/360 instruction set. This effort represents the first serious attempt by the Soviets to copy serially the architecture of a Western computer at a level intended to provide actual program compatibility. However, inexperience and the use of an inadequate circuit technology doomed this first effort to achieve compatibility with the s/360.

The Soviets were not doing particularly well in scientific/engineering computing. They produced a number of undistinguished, small-scale machines. The BESM-6 (which had many of the features of the British Atlas) had a CPU (Central Processing Unit) performance that, until 1973, was more powerful by at least a factor of ten than any other serially produced Soviet computer. Over 150 of these machines were built between 1965 and 1977, but they fell short of their American counterparts. Comparable to the CDC 3600 in CPU speed, they were much less powerful than the CDC 6600 (1963–1964), and were soon to be dwarfed by several other U.S. computers by the early 1970s. The per-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formance of the BESM-6, like that of all Soviet computers, was severely degraded by a slow and inadequate core memory and by a lack of suitable and reliable peripherals (magnetic secondary storage and input/output devices).

The use of computers in industrial automation suffered further from a lack of commercially available devices that could connect computers with the manufacturing processes to be controlled.

The hardware situation in the Soviet Union, aggravated by the lack of customer service by hardware vendors, crippled the development of software. The users themselves had to write all but the most basic utility programs. The fact that they also had to maintain the hardware themselves eventually led to local engineering modifications that made it difficult or impossible to share software, even with users who had the same CPU model. Soviet computer systems were not large or complex enough to necessitate the development of modern operating systems. Most machines were so small, and so poorly equipped with peripheral devices, that only one application program could be in memory at any one time. With some simple utility programs for input/output and a few other functions, an intelligent Soviet scientist or engineer could manage the memory resources and supervise execution for his own program. By contrast, American vendors—in order to make efficient use of all the hardware power and flexibility they were selling—supplied huge operating systems which could manipulate several concurrently resident applications programs and their data. An operating system itself took up a large volume of memory, and much of it had to be quickly accessible in core or from disk.

Communicating with the computer was another software problem. Every computer has its own basic set of "built in" instructions, known as the machine language. Writing programs directly in machine language generally involves writing lines of a numeric or cryptic symbolic code that requires a detailed knowledge of the internal structure of the computer. Such programs tend to be difficult to read and debug; but writing small machine language programs is within the capabilities of most scientists and engineers. Since the mid-fifties, American and West European computer scientists have been developing so-called high-order languages (HOL), which use stunted English syntax and standard mathematical notation. Programs written in a HOL are easier to read and correct than those in machine language, and the detailed management of memory locations and register contents is done by the HOL translator and other software that is supplied to the user. It is thus possible for relatively unsophisticated users to write large applications

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

programs in a HOL, enter the program via some convenient means, and let the systems software (translators, operating systems, etc.) handle it from there. Hardware limitations forced Soviet programmers to write most of their programs in machine language until the end of the early 1970s: core memory was in short supply and a good HOL translator could take up most of what was available. Furthermore, until the mid-to-late sixties, high-performance line printers that could handle alphabetic and other non-numeric characters were not widely available in the Soviet Union.

Thus, by the early 1970s, Soviet software existed primarily in the form of many isolated pockets of machine language programs. There was very little portability between installations. Computer centers were essentially on their own once the hardware had been delivered. Many applications, especially those of a non-numeric nature, were out of the range of the hardware. Little experience had been built up in the development of large, modern software systems. And, most important, computers were not accessible to users who had not had much technical training.

Although Western hardware imports continued to trickle into Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.,[19] the Soviets did not use the available computer technology transfer sources and mechanisms to the extent that they might have. They also did not use their own college-trained computer specialists effectively. Many seem to have been merely duplicating work done elsewhere (both at home and abroad), or working on trivial refinements of earlier developments. The vast majority of Soviet managers and administrators had little or no perception of the practical and potential value of computers.

The most important condition for upgrading the state of general-purpose computing in the U.S.S.R. was the creation of a modern, upward-compatible family of computers with adequate quantities of primary memory, a suitable assortment of peripherals, and the systems and applications software necessary to enable people with little technical training to use computers effectively.

The Soviets made the decision to start work on a new upward-compatible family of general-purpose data processing computers as soon as the success of the IBM S/360 series became apparent. The first official statement concerning the Unified System (known as ES or Ryad),[20]

[19] Ivan Berenyi, "Computers in Eastern Europe," *Scientific American* (October 1970), 102-8. This reference contains a listing of many of the Western computers in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. before 1970, but Berenyi's estimate of the total number of computers in the U.S.S.R. before 1970 is much too low.

[20] G. Kazanskiy, *Moscow Nedelya*, No. 43 (December 4, 1967), 7. Kazanskiy was a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in December 1967, implied that it was a Soviet project. However, by 1968 the U.S.S.R. was hard at work trying to persuade its CEMA allies into joining the effort.[21] Hungary, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic were the most amenable. Poland wanted to continue its ODRA program, which was based on that of England's International Computers Ltd. Czechoslovakia also had a program of its own and proved to be less than wholeheartedly committed to the Unified System. Romania remained especially obstinate, preferring to look to the West, and France in particular, for help.

Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union had attempted to organize cooperative efforts in computer technology as part of a more general effort to increase technological integration within CEMA. Technical prestige and the hope of eventual export opportunities were important goals. In general, cooperation was desirable as a means of solidifying economic and military ties through technical interdependence. The Warsaw Pact countries appreciated the value of computers for military purposes. A compatible family of computers and related equipment would be an invaluable asset for combined Warsaw Pact activities—particularly for command, control, and communications systems.

The computer industries of the G.D.R., Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were much smaller than that of the U.S.S.R., but in some ways they were more sophisticated. Because they had been more in contact with the Western computer community, their experience proved to be a valuable asset for the Ryad project. They also had more advanced capabilities in some aspects of peripheral technology and software development.

The decision on the basic architecture of the new system was made only after some discussion both within the U.S.S.R. and among the CEMA partners. National pride was an important factor in the argument favoring the use of a design of CEMA origin. The G.D.R. wanted to use the IBM S/360 architecture and to make the Ryads compatible with the I.B.M. computers. The East Germans were already pursuing

---

deputy minister of the Radio Industry. Ryad, the Russian word for "row" or "series," is the popular name for the Unified System of Computers. ES, an abbreviation of the transliterated Russian for Unified System, is used as a prefix to designate equipment numbers. N. C. Davis and S. E. Goodman, "The Soviet Bloc's Unified System of Computers," *ACM Computing Surveys*, x (June 1978), 93-122, presents an extensive description of Ryad. It should also be consulted for references to the Soviet technical literature.

[21] The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance includes Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), Hungary, Poland, and the U.S.S.R. Cuba, Mongolia, Romania, and Vietnam are also affiliated.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this approach on their own—probably aided by either direct or indirect access to I.B.M. and other U.S. technology in Western Europe. For this reason, plus the availability of vast amounts of I.B.M. software and favorable experience with imported I.B.M. products in Eastern Europe, the I.B.M. architecture was finally adopted.

The potential for problems in this arrangement was enormous. There were language barriers, the difficulty of trying to duplicate sophisticated foreign technology, poor telecommunications and long physical distances, weak support industries, assorted international bad feelings, and an untested control structure that supervised many development and production facilities which had never worked together before.[22]

Perhaps with these problems in mind, or at least in anticipation of delays in the ES program, the Soviets and their partners chose to continue developing their other projects, such as the production and upgrading of several second-generation computers.[23] Minpribor proceeded with the development of the ASVT family, and work continued on specialized military projects and computers for scientific applications, as well as on several East European programs.

Before investigating the current consequences of this period, it is worth summarizing the role of technology transfer from foreign sources. Technology transfer was important at two levels, even though Western influence was for the most part at a distance. At the policy-making level, it is clear that the Soviets were conscious of what was being done in the West, and decided that some of their problems could be alleviated through the emulation of the Western pattern. At the technical level, it is equally clear that Soviet computer scientists were much influenced by Western technical progress. The Soviets' substantial efforts, through both overt and covert channels, to obtain Western technical information and products had relatively little effect on the overall development of Soviet computing except in an extremely narrow technical sense. Even there, Soviet hardware and systemic constraints made it impossible to use Western technology to the fullest extent.

[22] The basic effort involved 70 to 80 R & D and production enterprises and several hundred thousand workers, engineers, and scientists. M. Rakovskiy, "Control and Cybernetics," *Pravda*, May 31, 1973. Rakovskiy is a deputy chairman of U.S.S.R. Gosplan, and head of the CEMA commission supervising the development of the Unified System.

[23] V. A. Myasnikov, "Results and Priority Tasks in the Field of Automation of Control Processes in the National Economy of the U.S.S.R.," *Upravlyayushchie sistemy i mashiny* (January-February 1977), 3-6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

III. Progress and Problems

A NEW ERA

The Ryad program represents a new era in Soviet computing. With the development of the Unified System, the Soviets have begun to follow the West in the production and installation of complex general-purpose computer systems that are intended for widespread general use. Ryad is the most important concrete manifestation of their commitment to the use of computers in their economy. The entire project has been based on a massive transfer of Western technology.

The first Ryad computers, prototypes of the small ES-1020 model, were seen on display in Bulgaria and Poland in 1971.[24] Only a small batch were made for initial production, and within two months they were back at the Minsk Ordzhonikidze Plant for "redesign."[25] It was not until May 1973 that six of the seven Unified System models could be put on display at the Exposition of Achievements of the National Economy in Moscow.[26] (All seven machines had been described in 1970 in a detailed set of design specifications.) The two largest models were in considerable technical trouble. Of the six models exhibited, only the Hungarian ES-1010 and the Soviet ES-1020 and ES-1030 were said to be actually in production.[27] By early 1974, the Czech and East German models had gone into production. Four new Ryad models appeared between 1975 and 1977.

Neither the Hungarian nor the Czech model has much compatibility with the other Ryad models. The first is based on a small French computer, itself a licensed version of an American model. The second is a modification of a Czech design to incorporate some s/360-like Ryad features. The inclusion of this machine represents a political compromise with Czech interests in order to obtain their participation in the Unified System project.

Peripherals—input-output devices and auxiliary storage—are the weakest part of the Unified System. In 1973, orders were being accepted for only about half of the announced peripherals. Many of those not

[24] Wade B. Holland, "Ryad Arrives—And So Does the Party," *Soviet Cybernetics Review* (May 1972), 7-11. Production was formally announced in 1972: N. Novikov, "Computers: Third Generation," *Pravda*, January 21, 1972, p. 3; M. Shimanskiy, "All-Powerful Electronics," *Izvestiya*, January 22, 1972, p. 5.

[25] A. Reut, Director of the Minsk plant where the ES-1020 was built, in an interview in *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, March 11, 1972, p. 2.

[26] The largest Ryad model, the Soviet ES-1060, was not on display. It would not go into production until 1977.

[27] A. M. Larionov, interviewed in *Pravda Ukrainy*, May 20, 1973, p. 4. Larionov was head of the main Ryad technical planning group in Moscow.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

available were devices for auxiliary storage and servicing of remote users via telecommunications channels. Hungary was most successful in meeting its goals for peripherals; the Soviet Union was perhaps least successful. Most of the equipment was at the level at which I.B.M.'s products had been in the mid-sixties. The collection of Ryad peripherals includes some that were being produced under foreign licenses, but were added after modification to minimum standards. However, in some ways the peripheral situation is a major achievement. For the first time, a Soviet computer system provided for a little customer convenience. The ES card readers might be a bit slow; but what is that compared to the pre-Ryad situation where input had to be via papertape, or where the card readers were so sensitive to the poor quality of the cards that they would crush decks and jam so often as to be effectively out of commission half the time? Similarly, the ES tape drives may be slow and the tapes themselves not very densely packed, but they represent a substantial improvement when compared to paper or magnetic tape so unreliable that users had to use back-up tapes like chain smokers to avoid losing everything. For the first time, disk storage and alphanumeric printers with Cyrillic characters are generally available; ES peripheral quality and availability is such that they are being used with non-Ryad machines.

The CEMA countries have done reasonably well in achieving their goal of adapting the IBM S/360 operating systems to the Ryad hardware, thus placing themselves in a position to borrow huge quantities of systems and applications software that have taken I.B.M. and its customers several billions of dollars and tens of thousands of man-years to develop. There was no effective way to deny either the software itself or the documentation to the CEMA countries. Any serious effort to do so would have harmed the United States more than the Soviet Union. In any case, it was available from many other places. These include I.B.M. itself, with thousands of user installations all over the world, and other assorted sources, such as the open literature. Furthermore, several CEMA countries had legally purchased some small- and medium-scale S/360 systems, including the software and the opportunity to participate in SHARE, the major I.B.M. user group. Soviet and East European computer scientists could also legitimately talk to Western counterparts at meetings, use Western consultants, exchange visits, and so forth.

Some covert procurement was also helpful, but such activities are beyond the scope of this article. The information sought was not ex-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

traordinarily difficult to obtain. Determined efforts have regularly resulted in the acquisition of much better-protected U.S. defense secrets. The Soviets have demonstrated that, if they are willing to try hard enough, they can illegally obtain entire I.B.M. computer systems.[28]

The models of the Unified System are not a reverse engineering of the IBM s/360 machines in the sense that the CEMA countries have achieved quantity production, at reasonable cost, of exact (or nearly exact) copies of the I.B.M. equipment. That would imply duplication down to the level of circuit components and, if truly successful, interchangeability of parts between the original and the copy. This level of reverse engineering of a major computer system has never been carried out anywhere in the world. Ryad and other attempts to "copy" I.B.M. products might be described as an effective functional duplication. The architecture, instruction set, and data channel interfaces are the same, permitting the use of I.B.M. software and interchange at the CPU or major subsystem level with relatively little difficulty. Although there is no detailed copying of electrical or mechanical components or manufacturing techniques, the CEMA countries have achieved some limited compatibility of media, permitting the exchange of cards, magnetic tapes, and disk packs.[29]

It is important not to underestimate the achievements of the CEMA computer scientists. They have mastered the quantity production of reasonably modern hardware and succeeded in adapting the s/360 operating systems to this hardware. That is not to say that they did not have considerable help from external sources, or that they did a good, or fast, or imaginative job. In fact, the effort took them as long as it took I.B.M. in the first place, and they have yet to achieve the quality and reliability standards of the s/360 across the Unified System product line. Nevertheless, they had the talent and resources to achieve the basic goals and, relative to their own past, they have acquired a much enhanced indigenous computing capability. There is every reason to think that, as this capability improves further, they will use technology transfer more effectively.

The CEMA partners themselves are not unsatisfied with their progress, although there is evidence that they had hoped to achieve more, and that they seriously underestimated many problems.[30] The best

[28] " 'Reexporting': How Peter Lorenz Shipped IBM Hardware to Russia," *Datamation* (January 1975), 92-93.

[29] R. A. Koenig, "The Issue of 'Reverse Engineering,' " Control Data Corporation, memo, July 25, 1978.

[30] Wade B. Holland, Comments on an article by M. Rakovskiy, *Soviet Cybernetics Review* (November 1971), 33. Ryad production may have only been a third of what was planned for the Ninth Five-Year Plan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

evidence that they are basically satisfied with the policy of copying the I.B.M. product line is their current effort to develop a new group of Ryad-2 models that are clearly intended to be a functional duplication of the IBM S/370 family. By early 1977 most of the new models were well into the design stage, and prototypes for at least three models existed by the end of 1978. The appearance of other prototypes and the initiation of serial production will probably take place between 1979 and 1982.

Currently, there is an unprecedented effort to instruct people in the use of the new computers. Programming courses are proliferating in both industry and the higher educational institutes. Not long ago, 10,000 copies of a programming or software text was a large printing; now books on the ES system are appearing in quantities of 50,000 to 100,000. Considerable efforts continue to be expended on software for second-generation machines.

Although most of what appears in communist publications relates to Ryad, the Unified System project has not absorbed the entire computer industry of the Soviet bloc. The focus is on Ryad because it is by far the largest project, and most of the others are officially classified. The known manufacture of ES equipment involves only a fraction of the U.S.S.R.'s known capacity for computer production. A good deal remains classified and is used to build military systems, scientific computers of all sizes, and other special-purpose machines. The same is true of the other CEMA industries. The influence of Western, and particularly of American, technology on most of the developments we know about is significant; but it is not yet possible, on the basis of publicly available information, to comment in any detail on the extent to which Western products have been copied.[31]

INTEGRATION

During the last decade, the Soviet computing community has moved from almost total isolation to substantial, but still restricted, integration with the outside world. Integration has been at three levels: with the worldwide community, with CEMA, and within the economy of the Soviet Union.

Current Soviet policy on computer development is very conservative: to a considerable extent, the goal is to try to re-create systems that have

[31] In addition to Ryad, other major efforts that seem to be based on U.S. products include large computers for scientific applications (the El'brus-1 and -2) and minicomputers (the M-6000, M-7000, and new SM series). The El'brus-1 appears to be patterned on the Burroughs B7700. The M-6000 and M-7000 are based on the Hewlett-Packard HP21XX. The SM minicomputers seem to be based on Hewlett-Packard and Digital Equipment Corporation designs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been in use in the rest of the world. This policy reflects the leadership's perception of the important role assigned to computing as a means of improving economic performance, and their desire to fulfill their goals as safely and as expeditiously as possible. The performance of the Soviet computer industry during most of the 1950s and 1960s—admittedly highly constrained by limited goals and resources—provided little cause for confidence. An obvious course of action was to use well-tested systems from abroad, and the obvious choice for a general-purpose family was the s/360.[32]

In order to achieve their goals, the Soviets have had to widen their contacts with the worldwide computing community. In the United States, the development and use of computers is based on extraordinarily effective and dynamic relationships between vendors and customers. In the absence of such a mechanism, the Soviets appear to have little choice but to wait and see what has been done in the West before they can take their next step. Greater commercial and academic contacts partly account for the expanded intake. The atmosphere of détente has permitted more effective people-to-people technology transfers; in an indirect way, American users and manufacturers may have as much of an input into the Soviet decision-making process as their Soviet counterparts.

These first steps toward integration have been limited. They involve only a fraction of the Soviet computing community. Much of it is still very secretive. Covert efforts to acquire computer technology have never been more extensive than they are now. The Soviet commitment to a high level of sustained computer technology transfer has been going on for over a decade, but it is a matter of conjecture as to how long it will last. If the technology successfully fulfills the hopes of the leadership without giving rise to unwanted pressures for reforms, the present trends are likely to continue. Otherwise, there might well be a withdrawal after a certain level of indigenous capability has been reached.

The level of integration with the other CEMA countries runs deeper. There are strong political, military, economic, and technical reasons for the Soviet Union to maintain a cooperative arrangement with its East European allies. The joint Unified System is regularly hailed as

[32] The CEMA countries were neither the first nor the most successful users of this policy. The first was R.C.A. with their Spectra 70 series. The most successful have been the Japanese. An important consideration for these non-communist companies was the possibility of capturing part of I.B.M.'s share of the market by using the architecture of the s/360 and s/370. Program compatibility was expected to make it easier for a customer to switch vendors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one of the most important examples of "fraternal socialist cooperation" and a demonstration of the technological strength of the socialist system.[33] Ryad provides a broad base of common hardware and software that should do much to relieve many of the deficiencies that have limited the computing activities of the Warsaw Pact countries. There are now several thousand Ryads in operation, and the priority allocation practices of the centrally planned economies have presumably put most of these machines in places where they will have the greatest impact. There is also a fair amount of trade in computing equipment among the CEMA countries, and the hope that they might have some success as vendors in the international marketplace.[34]

The joint CEMA Unified System is not as tightly knit as the corresponding I.B.M. projects, and various Ryad hardware products and operating systems are not as family-compatible or interchangeable as the I.B.M. products. There is an Intergovernmental Commission of Socialist Nations on the Field of Computer Technology, under M. Rakovskiy, one of whose jobs is to enforce conformity to technical compatibility standards; but the fact that Ryad hardware and software are not as well matched as I.B.M.'s would seem to indicate that the CEMA countries had a fair amount of technical autonomy. To a considerable extent, the level of autonomy is determined by Soviet needs and desires. The Hungarian and East German contributions help to fill important gaps in the Soviet Union's indigenous capabilities. Around one-third of the production of these machines is exported to the U.S.S.R. As far as we know, not a single Czech-made Ryad CPU has left that country (for all sorts of reasons that may be conjectured), and most of the small output of Polish Ryads has stayed in Poland. The other CEMA countries' needs for computers in this performance range are filled by Soviet exports. The most extensive mixing of products occurs at the level of peripherals. Many of the Ryad-producing countries have developed peripheral specialities: e.g., the Poles in line printers, the Hungarians in graphics devices, the Bulgarians in disk units.[35] The con-

[34] Davis and Goodman (fn. 20), 118-19.

[35] At the start of the Ryad project, the Bulgarians had by far the lowest technological capabilities of any of the participating countries. It is thus surprising that they should become "masters" of this difficult technology. They may have received considerable help from the U.S.S.R., as they did in their production of the ES-1020. The Soviet Union seems to have something of a paternal interest in helping Bulgaria. During the last decade, the Bulgarians have built up a substantial export-oriented electronics industry. See, for example, *Vunshna Turgovia*, Sofia (No. 10, 1978), 9-12.

[33] See, for example, S. Kipnis, "Integrated Family of Computers," *Nauka i zhizn'* (No. 8, 1973), 2-11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

figurations of peripherals at virtually all unrestricted Ryad installations are of multinational manufacture.

With a reasonably common base of hardware and operating systems, one would expect a certain amount of integration in building and using applications systems among the CEMA countries. Some of this is going on, and there are visions of great efficiencies to be achieved from the partition of these activities among the member countries.[36] But since the various East European economies differ considerably at the microeconomic level, and there are differences in adaptations of the I.B.M. operating systems, one might entertain doubts as to how well this will actually work out. It seems likely that the various CEMA countries, and the installations within each country, will continue to be dependent on local resources for the great bulk of their applications software and systems.[37]

In spite of its assorted problems, the Ryad project apparently has been working well enough for the CEMA countries to undertake a similar unifying joint effort in the area of minicomputers. The new project, known as SM (transliteration of the Russian for Small System), currently consists of four models, and the announcement of two others is expected in 1979. The details of the participation of the various countries are not yet known. It is likely that Cuba will be an active participant.

The East European countries, particularly the G.D.R. and Hungary, are useful to the Soviets as conduits for technology transfer from the West, as sources of technology in their own right, and as models for institutional innovations that might be used in the U.S.S.R. The "per capita" capabilities of some of these countries may exceed that of the Soviet Union, probably as a result of many factors; one of the most important may be the greater contact these countries have with the Western computing community. Although one cannot go so far as to conclude that the ES project would have failed without help from Eastern Europe (especially from the G.D.R.), the role of these countries should not be underestimated. As communist countries using a common hardware base, they are the best external source the Soviets have for many industrial and management-related products, either in

[36] M. Rakovskiy, "According to a Single Plan," *Pravda*, February 3, 1978, p. 4.

[37] The adaptation of the huge number of applications programs available for the S/360 has not yet occurred to the extent that the CEMA countries might have planned. Reasons include the lack of adequate quantities of memory at most Ryad installations (actual deliveries seem to be running at not much more than half of what was planned), a shortage of trained people to make the adaptations, and the realization that much of the software may not be appropriate for their needs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the form of licenses or of contracts for the development of new systems. Problems that inhibit active involvement with the West, such as travel restrictions, "cultural contamination," and a lack of hard currency, are much less important.

The integration of the Soviet and East European computer communities is asymmetric. The U.S.S.R. has access to anything it wants in most of Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the Soviet exposure is limited to the Unified System, the SM minicomputers, and a few other developments. Much of what the Soviets do within the U.S.S.R.—including some work on Ryad—is off limits to their CEMA partners. Conversely, some East European communist countries (Romania, Yugoslavia) have kept their computing activity separate from that of the Soviets.

Although the CEMA countries have not achieved the levels of integration and centralized control that I.B.M. has in its multinational operations, by their own past standards they have made considerable progress in the last decade. A reasonable case can be made that they now effectively possess the second-largest computer company in the world, and that their long-term prospects are fairly bright. The Soviet Union alone, and the CEMA countries together, have assets that no other computer organization except I.B.M. has: huge capital and personnel resources and centralized management control involved on a large scale with the full spectrum of computer-related R & D, products, and services.[38]

STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIORAL PROBLEMS

The most basic and difficult problem of technology transfer has been that of taking a complicated, pervasive, and successful technology out of its original and nurturing environment, and attempting to transplant it into a fundamentally different one.

Although the Soviet Union has managed to acquire a fairly respectable base of hardware and systems software during the last decade, in terms of the U.S./West European/Japanese technological state of the art, the Soviets are still backward (particularly in the quality and availability of telecommunications). But it is important to distinguish between technology viewed in terms of technological frontiers, and technology as a means of providing functions and capabilities. The U.S.S.R. now has many of the hardware and systems software "pieces" that would enable it to get on with its ambitious plans. Its output of hard-

[38] Another possibility is Japan, but it is not yet clear, at least to this author, how unified the Japanese computer industry is.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ware is now behind only that of the United States and its multinational facilities abroad.

At this stage, most of the Soviet Union's pure technology and product needs are in software. One could argue that the number of computers per capita is still quite low by American standards, but this point is secondary and somewhat moot, since the U.S.S.R. is currently producing more machines than it can adequately support in the field. Of greater importance than pure technology and products is the problem of systemic integration: the users' perception of need, the acquisition of experience, the effects of institutional structure and economic-social practices, and so forth. It is obviously not possible to provide a comprehensive overview of these problems in a few pages. Accordingly, the present discussion will focus on software and customer services,[39] starting with brief, somewhat simplistic, reviews of the most relevant characteristics of the structures and behavioral patterns of the Soviet economic system and the American computer industry.

To a first approximation, the Soviet government/economy is organized in a hierarchical, tree-like structure.[40] At the topmost level is the Council of Ministers. The next levels represent a few score ministries, state committees, and other high administrative agencies. Then there are intermediate levels of Republic, branch, and departmental administration and management. Finally, the lower levels contain the institutes and enterprises that are responsible for R & D and the production and distribution of goods and services. This large bureaucratic hierarchy encompasses almost every economic aspect of Soviet society. As a result of this vertical structure, plus a very long and strong Russian bureaucratic tradition, much of the Soviet economy is unofficially partitioned into assorted domains or fiefdoms. These exist along ministerial, geographical, and personality divisions. As is frequently the case in large bureaucratic structures, people and institutions develop behavior patterns that please the higher levels of their domains. This behavior may or may not coincide with the goal of providing customers with products or services of high quality.

Superimposed on this vertical hierarchy are a variety of horizontal relationships. The domains are not self-sufficient; in addition to directions from above, they receive supplies and services from units in other

[39] A more extensive discussion may be found in S. E. Goodman, "Software in the Soviet Union: Progress and Problems," *Advances in Computers*, XVIII (1979), 231-88. This source contains many references to the Soviet literature.

[40] See Morris Bornstein and Daniel R. Fusfeld, eds., *The Soviet Economy: A Book of Readings* (4th ed.; Homewood, Ill.: Irwin 1974); Joseph S. Berliner, *The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

domains, and in turn, supply goods and services elsewhere. The centralized planning apparatus, in collaboration with other levels in the hierarchy, specifies suppliers and customers for almost every Soviet institute and enterprise. Although there is some flexibility in establishing these horizontal relationships, they are for the most part beyond the control of lower-level management. One of the most important of the self-assigned tasks of the Communist Party is to expedite all sorts of governmental and economic activities; it intercedes to get things done. Although the Party organization is also subdivided into fiefdoms, it is more tightly controlled and operates across government/economic domains. Finally, there are the unofficial (sometimes illegal), horizontal arrangements that are created to enable an enterprise to function successfully despite bureaucratic handicaps.

In the centrally planned Soviet economy, there is no market or quasi-market mechanism to determine prices, mixes of products and services, rewards, and so forth. For the most part, these factors are worked out at high levels and by a centrally controlled haggling process, although since 1965 lower-level management has been granted some degree of autonomy by gradual reforms. Quantity is stressed over quality, and production is stressed over service. Enterprises are told what to do. Failure to meet the imposed commitments can bring stiff penalties. Success is rewarded, but there is little opportunity for the high-risk, big-payoff, innovative entrepreneurial activity that is common in the U.S. computer community. The central planners do not like much activity of this sort because it is hard to control.

Business practices that have evolved in this environment are oriented toward the basic goal of fulfilling the performance indices that are given to them. They usually consist of narrowly defined quantitative quotas. Thus, for example, a computer producer's most important index may be the number of CPUs manufactured; a less important index may be the number of peripheral devices built. Lists of suppliers and customers are provided by the planners. Plant management will obviously give first priority to meeting the CPU production norm; the next priority goes to the peripherals. Although rewards are paid for meeting the basic goals and for overfulfillment, the managers do not want to overdo things, because this year's successes may become next year's quotas. Furthermore, it is clearly in their own best interest to haggle with the planners for low quotas. Since customer satisfaction is of relatively minor importance (particularly if the customer is far away or under another ministry), management is not going to divert its resources to installation and maintenance unless it absolutely has to.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is also an obvious incentive to try to retain the status quo. Once a plant operation has started to function smoothly, there is no market pressure to force innovation, improved service, new products, and so forth. These things would involve problems such as finding new suppliers, changing equipment, and retraining personnel—in other words, a serious risk; and local management cannot control prices or suppliers to balance the risk.

There are strengths in this system. Central control and the powerful expediting role of the Party allow national resources to be concentrated in high-priority areas. The differences between the Ural-10 and Ryad hardware show that much can be done on a respectably large scale once the high-level decisions have been made. Of course, the government and Party do not have the resources and cannot maintain enough pressure to exert control across the entire economy. Furthermore, it can be argued that some of the success of high-priority projects occurs precisely because these projects are really removed from the economic mainstream.

The American mainframe industry is dominated by I.B.M., which is the primary vendor for approximately two-thirds of the general-purpose installations at home and for approximately half of them worldwide. As a mainframe manufacturer, I.B.M. competes with about a half-dozen billion-dollar domestic "dwarfs" and another half-dozen companies in Western Europe and Japan. The industry is not a pseudo-competitive oligopoly. The other companies are not shy about the way they go after I.B.M. at the customer level, in copying products, in the courts, and in seeking government controls. I.B.M.'s position is not nearly as dominant in other hardware areas (minicomputers, microcomputers, peripherals, etc.); in some of these, it is not dominant at all.

The impressive record of technological innovation in computing hardware reflects the sense of competition that exists among hundreds of companies. This innovation has been widely distributed throughout the industry, and I.B.M.'s share is not anywhere near that of its percentage of installed mainframes.[41] That is not because it has not been trying—I.B.M. invests almost $1.4 billion a year in R & D, reflecting its perception of the quality of its competition and the influence of customer feedback.

The primary efforts of most American hardware vendors are in the areas of marketing, software, and customer-oriented service. Serious

[41] See, for example, Gerald W. Brock, *The U.S. Computer Industry* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 1975), 204.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concern for customer response—reflecting the business-machines origins of many of the most important companies—has, in fact, been a major stimulant to technological progress. I.B.M. does not owe its continuing large share of the mainframe market to the technical superiority of its products, but to the scope and quality of its customer services and its aggressive concern for its customers' needs.[42] Many organizations have entrusted much of their business to computerized information systems. The majority of users are afraid of their machines; they need to have their hands held and be shown how best to utilize computing capabilities. If the systems do not work right or go down for long periods, they are in trouble. So are computer vendors who do not deliver services.

The same applies to the software industry. In the United States alone, there are thousands of companies that provide professional software services for customers. They range in size from I.B.M. to one-man firms. Some build systems and then convince users to buy them. Others ascertain a customer's needs, and then arrange to satisfy him. They also offer a variety of other services. Basically, all of the companies try to make a profit by showing their customers how to make the best use of computers. To a considerable extent, the software vendors and service bureaus have created a market for themselves through aggressive selling and the competitive, customer-oriented development of general-purpose as well as tailor-made products.

Before Ryad, Soviet installations were pretty much on their own with respect to hardware service and maintenance: they had to hoard spare parts and employ their own engineers. This led to very inefficient use of resources; many places had trouble getting qualified people. Since the Ryad systems are more complex, and self-maintenance is much more difficult, some serious efforts have been made to provide for centralized hardware services along American lines, but this has not yet worked out well even for users in major metropolitan areas.[43] Repair or replacement of faulty parts that in the United States would take hours or at most days may still take a year in the Soviet Union.[44]

[42] I.B.M. itself has been realistic and frank in its assessments of the technical quality of its competition. See I.B.M., "Quarterly Assessment of the Product Line," March 16, 1971 (Telex vs. I.B.M., Plaintiff's Exhibit 224); Brock (fn. 41), 206-7.

[43] See, for example, V. Fadeyev, "Who is to Answer for Computer Servicing?" *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya,* September 4, 1977, p. 2; I. Perlov, "The ASU—Its Use and Return," *Ekonomika i zhizn'* (Tashkent; No. 6, 1977), 83-86; Yu. Taranenko, "How to Service Computers," *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya,* July 19, 1977, p. 2; *Izvestiya,* March 14, 1978, p. 2.

[44] "The First R-22 Has Been Started Up. Favorable Experiences at the ELGAV," *Szamitastechnika* (March 1977), 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The worst stories come from ordinary users who are not near major metropolitan areas. For example:

> At the Institute [Central Asian Scientific Research Institute of Agricultural Economics in the Uzbek S.S.R.] an expensive ES-1020 has been operated in an improperly prepared room for three years now. The room still does not have air conditioning and the computer goes down from overheating. The disk memory devices are not protected against dust. According to figures from the Central Statistical Association of the Uzbek S.S.R., the workload of the Institute's machinery last year was just three hours a day compared to a norm of fifteen hours. A similar situation has developed at the Institute's Bukhara division where a Minsk-32 computer has been idle since 1974.[45]

The service for software is at least as bad. Most users are pretty much on their own with respect to applications systems. American success in this area is partly due to institutional arrangements that allow a large number of companies and other organizations (e.g., professional societies, users' groups) to cut across industries and hierarchies of management to set up flexible, manageable, low-level, horizontal relationships and communications. Furthermore, American management has given computer-related personnel within their companies a great deal of flexibility and authority in dealing with these service organizations. The Soviets have no comparable arrangements; nor do they seem to be rapidly developing mechanisms that effectively provide similar results. Even maintenance of the centrally adapted and distributed Ryad operating systems appears to be poor. Simple arrangements, such as software libraries that collect programs and redistribute them among users, do not seem to work out. Most Soviet libraries with which Western observers are familiar have not been properly staffed, organized, indexed, or quality-controlled. Problems of organization and behavior severely retard almost all other forms of diffusion.

By and large, the users accept the poor service situation; their attitude is thus a major obstacle to progress.[46] Most complaints disappear into bureaucratic oblivion, and those that would get at the heart of the problem are politically unacceptable.[47] Soviet vendors ("manu-

[45] Perlov (fn. 43). V. Letov, in "Computer in the Basement," *Izvestiya*, August 22, 1975, p. 3, tells of mice eating a calculator in Kunya-Urgench.

[46] Of course, there is a hierarchy of users in the U.S.S.R. Special users, such as the military, KGB, and CPSU, are not in the habit of accepting poor service. Their peacetime consumer privileges are almost beyond comprehension in the United States.

[47] Some complaints that appear in the public press are quite outspoken (see fns. 43-45), but not effective. In theory, the Soviet legal system allows wronged parties to take their suppliers to court. In practice, however, the Party and military-industrial representatives get satisfaction for special customers (usually themselves); ordinary customers just complain in print.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

facturers" and "distributors" are really more appropriate terms in the Soviet case) accept little responsibility (or even guilt feelings) toward their customers. Ordinary Soviet users have no choice but to do the best they can with whatever they have, and to wait passively in the hope that the leadership will get around to doing something about their problems. American computer users can vent their displeasure by hiring lawyers, not paying bills, not using poor vendors again, and by saying nasty things in front of vendors' stands at exhibitions and fairs. No comparably effective mechanisms exist in the U.S.S.R. The CPSU does not have the ability to exert pressure on behalf of each of the thousands of computer installations in the U.S.S.R., nor is it apparently interested in diluting its own unique strengths by letting non-Party organizations exert such pressures.

The introduction of computers into the structure of Soviet management has been limited. Conservative applications, such as systems for scheduling, process monitoring, and personnel files seem to be the rule. Although there is some research on the utilization of computer techniques for decision analysis and for the modeling of management problems, little seems to be put into practice. Soviet managers tend to be older and more inhibited than their American counterparts. The system in which they work emphasizes straightforward production rather than innovation and marketing decisions. Soviet economic modeling and simulation activity stress the necessity of reaching a "correct socialist solution," and are not oriented toward being alert for general and unexpected possibilities in a problem situation. Furthermore, Soviet industry has learned not to trust its own statistics; much information is controlled, and unavailable to many potential users, and there may be a big difference between "official" and actual business practice. What does one do with a computer system for the "official" operational management of an enterprise when actual practice is different? Does one dare use the computer to help manage "expediter" slush funds, under-the-counter deals with other firms, etc., which could leave a substantial trail for audits?[48]

The rate at which computing services and computer use are improving in the Soviet Union would be considered intolerably slow in the United States. Moreover, progress comes more slowly and less decisively as the technology broadens its impact on the Soviet social and economic system. Changes at the level and on the scale discussed here

[48] Difficulties of this sort seem to be at the root of the problems described in I. Novikov, "Follow-Up on a Letter: They Put Their AMS Up for Sale," *Pravda*, March 13, 1978, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

take longer than the time in which the leadership changes its perceptions and commitments, or in which hardware engineers can copy American products. Integrating computing into a large national economy is not like building army tanks. Users must have the motivation to go through all the trouble that is involved in learning to apply this technology effectively. They also need a great deal of help. The kind of motivation that has driven the desire to use computers in the United States, and the help that has made it possible, do not exist in the Soviet Union to anywhere near the same extent.[49] The guidance provided by the philosophy of the scientific-technological revolution is not much of a substitute.

IV. Conclusion: Pressure for Reform?

The Soviet Union's commitment to upgrade and expand its national computing capabilities is clearly dependent on a substantial and sustained transfer of technology from the West, and particularly from the United States. Although the Soviet industry has become more dependent on Western technology, it remains physically and institutionally isolated. The U.S.S.R. has no intention of integrating itself into the U.S.-dominated industry to the extent that Japan and Western Europe have. Its primary goal is to build up its indigenous capabilities. However, the pursuit of this goal has required it to become more involved with the outside world. The most important of these new international relationships are those that it has developed with its CEMA partners. Although the U.S.S.R. still insists on a high level of independence and autarky even within this group, the CEMA countries have put together a respectable international computing community. On a much smaller scale, the Soviet Union has become both a buyer and a seller in the non-communist international market.

At the level of national policy making, the Soviets have been slow to understand the potential of computing, and even slower to appreciate the difficulties involved in the development of this technology. In spite of the readily available Western example, the industrial, political, and military leadership of the U.S.S.R. has consistently made short-

[49] Military and other high-priority users probably come closest, but we know very little about how—and how well—computers are used at such installations. It is important to emphasize that we do not have a good, detailed, overall picture of how well the Soviets are using the computing capabilities (particularly in software) that they have recently announced, or even those they are known to have had for a long time. We have had limited access to Soviet installations. Most installations described in the open literature and those that have been seen by visitors from the U.S. are clearly much better than average; but it is hard to say how they compare to high-priority installations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sighted decisions that reflect existing technical capabilities without showing any particularly deep and long-term perspective. As far as we know, the most important Soviet projects are only trying to recreate systems that have been well tested in the rest of the world. For all the high-level exhortations and the proclamation of the scientific-technological revolution that singles out the U.S.S.R. as the society that is uniquely capable of using computers, it is clear that the leadership has few innovative ideas on what to do with this technology. It appears to have little choice but to wait and see what the U.S. has done before deciding on its next step.

The problems of the leadership are reflected at the technical level. Extensive use is being made of Western products, but the Soviet industry seems satisfied with the short-term goals of re-creating selected Western systems at a rate that is slower than that at which the West built them in the first place. In spite of a great deal of technology transfer, in terms of in-depth understanding and the avoidance of repetition of mistakes in their own work, Soviet computer scientists do not seem to have profited much from foreign experience. They are making the same mistakes and suffering from the same growing pains—often exacerbated by difficulties they have created themselves.

Although the changes in high-level perceptions and technological development have been slow and not particularly impressive in comparison with what has taken place in the United States, from the Soviet point of view there has been substantial progress in both areas. They are no longer the critical, limiting factors they once were. The real problem is now more broadly and deeply systemic: the pervasive and effective integration of computing into the fiber of the national economy. Soviet society is poorly structured to support many of the practices that work well in the U.S. If the Soviets want to achieve their proclaimed goals, it will be necessary for them to solve some difficult problems themselves.

Although it is hardly feasible to speculate in detail on the variety of possible solutions to these problems, it seems appropriate to conclude this article with a few observations. A major problem, from the standpoint of the political leadership, is that development and use of computers on a national scale cannot be isolated socially like the more narrow military industries, or even like industries such as power, steel, etc., whose products are used relatively passively as compared with computers. In particular, it might not be possible to contain major reforms that would greatly improve the quality and availability of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

computing services. If changes were made to enable a Western-style service sector to exist among thousands of computer installations cutting across the domain of every ministry, then (if successful) how could there not be pressure to extend these changes beyond computing?

It would seem that the last thing the CPSU wants to do is create an environment that seriously erodes its own role in the economy; moreover, it would take decades for Soviet vendors and customers to learn how to play well by the new rules. A more realistic spectrum of possibilities exists. One conservative change, such as the consolidation of research institutes and production enterprises into corporation-like associations,[50] would seem to permit substantial improvements in computing services without greatly disturbing current practices. A more extreme, but not unlikely, development would be the gradual establishment of an unofficial trade in computer services among installations that have built up capabilities of one form or another. There are other possibilities, but all of these improvements would still appear to leave the computer development/user community of the Soviet Union short of the systemic advantages enjoyed by its American counterpart. The Soviets may be reasonably content with this. In light of what we know of their data-processing needs and capabilities, and of their political concerns, progress within these bounds is likely to be sufficient for at least another decade.

[50] Berliner (fn. 40); Alice C. Gorlin, "Industrial Reorganization: The Associations," in J. P. Hardt, ed., *The Soviet Economy in a New Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee 1976).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PATRIMONIALISM AND MILITARY RULE IN INDONESIA

By HAROLD CROUCH*

INSTABILITY has been a striking characteristic of Third-World politics. Since gaining independence, most Third-World states have experienced sudden and drastic changes in government, brought about by mass demonstrations, riots, rebellions, and coups. Relatively soft "democratic" governments have proved particularly vulnerable, but many of the more authoritarian regimes that replaced them have been equally incapable of maintaining their hold on power. However, not all Third-World states are politically unstable. Some, such as Saudi Arabia and Nepal, have managed to isolate themselves to a large extent from the modernizing process that affects most of the Third World and have preserved traditional political institutions which continue to be regarded as legitimate by most of the populace. Others, more exposed to Western penetration, underwent periods of considerable social upheaval and political instability, but have since instituted governments that were able to restore order and seem capable of maintaining stability in the future.

A prominent feature of some of the authoritarian regimes that have succeeded in maintaining political stability is the persistence of traditional features that seem to be inherited from the polities of the precolonial past. The process of modernization—economic, social, cultural, and political—has of course brought about fundamental changes in traditional societies—changes that cannot be reversed. But it is widely recognized that the modern features of developing societies have not always replaced traditional elements, and indeed, that traditional modes of thought and behavior have often continued to influence the workings of apparently modern institutions. Although no contemporary state conforms fully to the contours of the states of the past, certain key features of traditional systems seem to have persisted and now constitute central elements of the political process in some of the Third-World states that have succeeded in establishing apparently stable institutions. In seeking to explain the character and stability of these systems, some political scientists have turned to the Weberian

* This article is based on a paper presented to the Seventh Conference of the International Association of Historians of Asia, held in Bangkok in August 1977. I am grateful to Herbert Feith for his comments and suggestions.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/040571-17$00.85/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concept of "patrimonialism," and have used the term "neo-patrimonialism" to describe modern states exhibiting patrimonial characteristics.[1]

Most traditional polities had patrimonial features. In a patrimonial state, the ruler's power depended on his capacity to win and retain the loyalty of key sections of the political elite. Lacking sufficient coercive capacity to enforce acceptance of his rule, the ruler sought to win voluntary allegiance by satisfying the aspirations—especially the material interests—of his supporters through the distribution of fiefs and benefices in exchange for tribute and loyalty. The government was able to rule in the interests of the elite without taking much account of the interests of the masses because the latter were poor, socially backward, politically passive, and kept in check by the regime's military forces. Politics thus took the form of a struggle within the elite itself, among rival factions and cliques that were concerned principally with gaining influence with the ruler who determined the distribution of the rewards of office. The ruler was able to maintain his authority by preserving the balance among the competing cliques. As long as the masses remained politically quiescent, and rivalries within the elite were contained so that they did not threaten its basic unity of interest, the patrimonial system could continue indefinitely.

The environment in which patrimonial characteristics have persisted, however, has been very different from the one in which they originally appeared. Modernization has brought new challenges that threaten the capacity of governments to meet demands and maintain stability. Economic change has produced new social groupings and classes with distinctive political interests, while the political quiescence of the masses has been undermined and modern political organization has enabled leaders to mobilize support on a wide scale. On the other hand, the capacity of governments to meet demands and deal with threats to their position has also grown, in part through the increasing sophistication of the means of coercion. As the problems of containing conflict and instability become more serious, the patrimonial distribution of largesse and the balancing of rival elite interests may prove insufficient for keeping the new Third-World regimes in power.

Indonesia provides an example of a society that has undergone considerable economic, social, and political change, but still exhibits important traditional features in its political system. During the phases

[1] See Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics*, xx (January 1968), 194-206; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neo-Patrimonialism* (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of both "Guided Democracy" and "New Order," many features of the political system seemed to hark back to the patrimonial politics of earlier, precolonial Javanese empires.

The Period of Guided Democracy

The re-emergence of traditional features in the politics of Guided Democracy, which replaced the parliamentary system in 1959, has been pointed out by several scholars.[2] At the apex of the Guided Democracy system stood President Sukarno, who "assumed lifetime tenure, an impressive array of titles, and a style of life that included the entourage, regalia and rituals customarily maintained by traditional Javanese monarchs."[3] The traditional sultan's possession of the *wahyu* (divine endorsement) was demonstrated to the masses by the splendor of his palace, the lavishness of his court, and the grandeur of his ceremonies; Sukarno's ritualistic rallies, commemorations, and celebrations, together with the splendid monuments and edifices which he built in the capital, were also meant to indicate to the masses that the *wahyu* was still with him.

The struggle to influence the President that was waged by the leaders of the army, the Communist Party (PKI), and other parties and groups paralleled the factionalism and intrigue that had marked the politics of the traditional courts. As in the past, the ruler was not in a position to employ coercion on a wide scale against discontented sections of the elite; his aim therefore was to maintain balance by bestowing his favors evenly among the contending factions, particularly through the distribution of opportunities for personal profit. As a result, the President's preoccupation with balancing rival factions overshadowed activities directed toward the achievement of modern goals such as economic development and the creation of an effective administrative apparatus.

However, there were key differences between the patrimonial sultanates of the past and Sukarno's Guided Democracy. Although many of the rural masses were still traditional in outlook and politically inert, a substantial section, especially in Java, had been attracted to the PKI,

[2] See Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968); Ann Ruth Willner, "The Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia," in Lucian W. Pye, ed., *Cases in Comparative Politics: Asia* (Boston: Little, Brown 1970), 242-306; Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1972), 1-69.

[3] Willner (fn. 2), 249.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which vigorously championed the interests of the rural poor. During the 1950s, the PKI succeeded in mobilizing the support of part of the peasantry; during the 1960s, it launched a campaign of "unilateral action" in which communist-led poor peasants occupied the land of their better-off neighbors. At the same time, the PKI attracted urban supporters by sponsoring nationalist agitation and spearheading attacks on Dutch, British, and American property. By 1964, the PKI had become President Sukarno's most important source of mass support. It served as the major element with which he was able to balance the power of the army.[4]

The Indonesian army had, since its formation in 1945 at the beginning of the revolution against the Dutch, always been politically oriented. After parliamentary democracy collapsed when it proved unable to deal with an incipient rebellion in the Outer Islands in 1957, martial law was introduced—enabling the army to expand its role into the fields of politics, administration, and the economy. Army officers were appointed to the cabinet, occupied high positions in the bureaucracy, and became regional governors. The army's "territorial" organization was strengthened with the stationing of military units in cities, towns, and townships throughout the nation. As the PKI established itself as the army's main rival for the succession, the army leaders took steps to block its expansion and to meet its challenge.[5] At the same time, the growth of the PKI's strength stirred the party's civilian opponents to defend themselves; both the Muslim and nationalist parties mobilized their supporters against the PKI in the rural areas.

Like the sultans in the patrimonial states of the past, Sukarno sought to keep the courtiers jostling among themselves for his favors in order not to become overly dependent on any one of them. But, unlike the sultan's officials in the patrimonial courts, Sukarno's courtiers were backed by modern organizations whose members confronted each other throughout the nation. While Sukarno succeeded in playing off

[4] See Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Sukarno* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1974).

[5] On the development of the army's political role, see Guy J. Pauker, "The Role of the Military in Indonesia," in John J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1962), 185-230; Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXVI (Winter 1963-64), 349-64; Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," Part I, *Indonesia*, No. 11 (April 1971), 131-76, and Part II, *Indonesia*, No. 13 (April 1972), 147-81; Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Political Orientation and Political Involvement of the Indonesian Officer Corps, 1945–1966," Ph.D. diss. (Monash University 1971).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factions against each other in Jakarta, he had no way of effecting a reconciliation between the interests and organizations that they represented in the nation. In 1965, an attempted coup against the army leadership by dissident colonels who were backed by PKI leaders provided the opening for the army to move against its rival. In the massacre that followed, some half-million supporters of the PKI lost their lives. Patrimonial ritual and the distribution of fiefdoms had proved insufficient to hold together a polity that was sharply divided between competing interests organized on a national scale. As long as the system survived, it had *seemed* patrimonial; but its disintegration demonstrated that the patrimonial structure had been resting on nonpatrimonial foundations.

The Period of the New Order

Guided Democracy deviated from the stable patrimonial model in that its elite was sharply divided along ideological lines, and the masses were partially mobilized. The rise of the PKI meant that political competition could not be centered purely on a struggle over the allocation of appointments and opportunities for material benefit within the elite, but involved basically contrasting conceptions of the social and political order. The PKI's successful mobilization of mass support—especially during the latter phase of Guided Democracy—forced its rivals also to mobilize their supporters. As a result, the intra-elite struggle for power became enmeshed with political competition among the masses; conflicts between opposing sections of the elite could no longer be settled by means of political shifts, maneuvers, and compromises executed by the sultan in the capital, but involved apparently irreconcilable interests throughout the nation. The army's accession to power and repression of its opponents, however, helped to restore conditions favorable to patrimonialism. By eliminating communists, left-wing nationalists, and Sukarnoists, army leaders achieved harmony among the elite. At the same time, they rejected claims to a major role by Muslim leaders who had sided with the military in 1965. The post-coup massacres were followed by steps to emasculate the remaining political parties and depoliticize the masses.

1. Depoliticization

The first step toward depoliticization was a result of the massacres that followed the attempted coup of October 1, 1965. Some two hundred thousand PKI supporters were arrested at that time; another three

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hundred thousand were arrested during the years that followed. The elimination of the PKI not only removed the most important source of mass mobilization that had arisen before 1965, but served as a terrifying warning to those who might have been inclined to seek mass support for radical causes during the period of the New Order.

Following the dismissal of President Sukarno in 1967, the army's leaders moved against the remaining political parties, purging them of dissidents and forcing them to accept leaders whom the new government regarded as amenable. When general elections were held in 1971, the government-sponsored Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (*Golkar*) won 63 percent of the votes, while the other parties, with the exception of the conservative Muslim *Nahdatul Ulama*, suffered severe defeats. Although it lacked a party organization at the local level, the *Golkar* was backed by the government's civilian and military apparatus; many voters were subjected to blatant military pressure during the campaign.[6] After the elections, the government severely restricted the activities of the parties in the rural areas. In the 1977 elections, the *Golkar* scored another overwhelming victory; the Muslim opposition won almost 30 percent of the votes, however.

More than a decade of military domination led to a substantial depoliticization of the masses. The army's repressive measures resulted in the political parties' losing much of their potential for mobilizing mass protests against the government, although they had not been made completely prostrate. The enforced political isolation of the masses under the New Order was a factor favorable to the emergence of a new patrimonial system.

2. ELITE POLITICS

The emasculation of the political parties and depoliticization of the masses meant that patrimonial politics again largely took the form of a struggle for influence within the elite. But, unlike the ideological diversity of the elite during the period of Guided Democracy, the consolidation of the army's power produced a more or less uniform political outlook. The elite of the New Order was dominated by army officers and the Western-educated technocrats who helped them formulate economic policy. The government now gave top priority to its program of economic development based on the inflow of foreign capital in the form of both private investment and government aid.

After 1966, General Suharto gradually tightened his hold on the

[6] See Kenneth E. Ward, *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study* (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

armed forces. The expansion of his authority was backed by his growing capacity to use coercion against resisting groups; but the main means was through the distribution of patronage. In full control of the government administration, he was able to reward loyal supporters and win over dissident and potentially dissident officers with appointments to civilian posts that offered prospects of material gain. Other officers were encouraged to go into business, with a promise of help from the administration whenever they needed licenses, credit, or contracts. Control over the machinery of patronage was thus the key factor that enabled Suharto to win and maintain the support of the armed forces for his leadership.

The involvement of military men in civil administration and business was not new. In the patrimonial atmosphere of Guided Democracy, army officers—like most other officials—had used their public positions to further their private interests. Military involvement in the economy had become well established as the army leaders sought to supplement budget allocations, and strengthen their independence from the government, by raising their own operating expenses through military-sponsored businesses and the siphoning of funds from state enterprises managed by army officers. At the same time, many officers became involved in private business activities. Under the New Order, army-sponsored businesses continued to flourish as the military kept on supplementing its allocations from the government budget by means of independently raised funds. Once they were in control of the government administration, army officers increasingly used their influence to secure licenses, contracts, credit, and other amenities for enterprises with which they were privately associated; the business activities of officers' wives, brothers, and cousins expanded. Most enterprises with which military officers were associated were in fact managed by Indonesian Chinese whose commercial skills the generals usually lacked; following the inrush of foreign capital in the late 1960s, foreign investment usually took the form of joint ventures in which the Indonesian partner was a Chinese-managed enterprise backed by the military.[7]

The domination of the economy by these enterprises which were able to secure favored treatment from military officials in the administration led to accusations of corruption from some civilian quarters. But most members of the military elite regarded the use of their official powers to provide amenities for colleagues, relatives, and friends, or in exchange for commissions, as normal practice. As Anderson has pointed

[7] For documentation, see Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1978), chap. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out, in the traditional precolonial states of Java, "payment of officials (was) essentially in the form of specified benefices allotted by the ruler for the period of tenure of each particular office."[8] Like appointments in patrimonial states, the appointment of a military officer to a potentially lucrative civilian post was regarded as a reward for past loyalty; he was expected to make the most of his opportunity. The use of an official position for self-enrichment was thus not regarded as corruption, although "excessive" profiteering giving rise to disruption of the economy or public protests—like excessive exactions by patrimonial officials in the past—was to be avoided.

The complete domination of the government by the army, and the subjugation of other organizations such as the political parties, meant that the most important political competition took place within the military elite. The basic contours of the system were accepted by all groups. Although Suharto's leadership was not challenged, sharp rivalries continued between individuals and factions whose influence depended on their ability to win the confidence of the President and their fellow-generals rather than on their ability to mobilize support outside the elite. Thus, the struggle was essentially over the distribution of appointments and the accompanying opportunities for profit. Suharto rewarded his key supporters handsomely, but he was careful not to antagonize unnecessarily those who had lost in the inter-group struggles: many losers were also compensated with appointments and opportunities. In this way, Suharto presided over a system of balancing vested interests: the business opportunities enjoyed by his closest supporters were complemented by favors to former or potential dissidents, so that all had an interest in the continuation of the system. Suharto's capacity to keep the system functioning smoothly was greatly facilitated by the rapid expansion of the economy which took place under his rule. A constantly expanding resource base due to the influx of foreign capital and oil funds made it possible for him to reward and buy off a growing circle of beneficiaries, with the result that the stability of the regime was maintained.

The New Order thus bore a strong resemblance to the patrimonial model. Political competition among the elite did not involve policy, but power and the distribution of spoils. Meanwhile, the masses in the urban slums and rural areas were increasingly isolated from politics. The patrimonial distribution of perquisites within the elite and the

[8] Anderson (fn. 2), 33.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enforced depoliticization of the masses enabled the New Order to attain a level of stability never before achieved since independence.

The Future of Patrimonialism

A system that is essentially patrimonial can maintain itself only as long as two conditions are fulfilled. First, the elite must be ideologically homogeneous, so that the struggle for power centers on the allocation of private material benefits rather than on alternative political programs. But the New Order government's dependence on economic growth seems to require an administrative system based on the bureaucratic values of predictability, regularity, order, and rationality—in contrast to patrimonial favoritism and arbitrariness. As a result, basic conflicts over policy and the nature of the regime are becoming increasingly important. Second, the masses must continue to be passive and isolated from the political process. However, there are doubts as to the long-term effectiveness of the Indonesian regime's efforts to depoliticize and isolate the masses. It is therefore likely that the stability of the New Order government will be increasingly challenged, forcing it to turn much more to straightforward repression in order to deal not only with opposition from the masses, but also from within the elite.

1. The trend toward regularization

After 1966, the army's leadership was convinced that in the long run the viability of the regime would depend on an expanding pool of available resources, not only for patrimonial distribution within the elite, but also for the pre-emption of potential opposition from outside. In contrast to traditional patrimonial states, which acquired funds largely through the exploitation of the peasantry and through wholesale trade, the New Order has depended on a rapidly expanding modern economy financed by foreign aid, foreign investment, and rising oil prices. In the early stages, a patrimonial political structure need not be an obstacle to capitalist economic development. By placing themselves as clients under the protection and patronage of powerful members of the ruler's court, industrialists can acquire the security and predictability they need. But as a modern economy grows and becomes increasingly complex, industrialists require more than informal understandings with officials to assure them of the safety of their investments

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—particularly as the increase in the number of business enterprises provides opportunities and incentives for officials to play their clients off against one another.

Discussing traditional patrimonial states of the past, Max Weber argued that their very patrimonial character inhibited the development of "production-oriented capitalism":

> The patrimonial state offers the whole realm of the ruler's discretion as a hunting ground for accumulating wealth. Wherever traditional or stereotyped prescription does not impose strict limitations, patrimonialism gives free rein to the enrichment of the ruler himself, the court officials, favorites, governors, mandarins, tax collectors, influence peddlers, and the great merchants and financiers who function as tax farmers, purveyors and creditors. The ruler's favor and disfavor, grants and confiscations, continually create new wealth and destroy it again.[9]

On the other hand,

> Industrial capitalism must be able to count on the continuity, trustworthiness and objectivity of the legal order, and on the rational, predictable functioning of legal and administrative agencies. Otherwise those guarantees of predictability are absent that are indispensable for the large industrial enterprise.[10]

According to Weber, the confidence of industrial investors can best be assured through the consistent application of rules rather than through private arrangements with particular officials. Trade, which is not so dependent on long-term predictability, quite often flourishes in patrimonial states under the sponsorship of rulers and officials.

The predictability that Weber believed to be necessary for modern economic development was almost entirely lacking during the period of Guided Democracy. Political struggles within the elite prevented the formulation and implementation of rational and coherent economic policies; resources were diverted to the President's "prestige projects" and to military campaigns against the Dutch in West Irian and the British in Malaysia. Dutch, British, and American enterprises were taken over by nationalist and communist agitators and placed formally under government control; in effect, they were in the hands of military and other officials who managed them as private fiefdoms. Inflation turned into hyperinflation, and budgetary controls over government expenditure lost their meaning as budget *deficits* alone exceeded total revenues. Meanwhile, administrative efficiency declined

[9] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, III, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press 1968), 1099.
[10] *Ibid.*, 1095.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as competing government agencies claimed jurisdiction in overlapping fields; real salaries of civil servants fell, forcing officials to indulge in corruption or to seek extra incomes. As the PKI grew in strength, it was not surprising that investment in industry almost halted, since neither foreign nor domestic businessmen were willing to risk capital in projects that did not bear immediate fruit.[11] On the other hand, huge profits were to be made in trade by those with political connections. A circle of "palace millionaires" arose whose business success was largely due to the patronage of the President and the ministers with responsibility for economic affairs.

Although in the early years of the New Order the political struggle of the period of Guided Democracy had been settled in the army's favor, rational economic policy making was still obstructed, and important obstacles to technocratic management of the economy remained. Powerful vested interests stood to lose much from the vigorous enforcement of strict priorities through orderly administrative procedures.

The army leadership, however, realized that the loyalty of the army as well as the support of the middle class could be retained only if the government succeeded in promoting rapid economic growth. Since these officers were largely ignorant of the technicalities of economic policy making, they turned to a group of Western-educated economists —the "technocrats"—to formulate policies to control inflation, restore balance in foreign trade, and create conditions favorable for foreign and domestic investment. The efforts of the technocrats to restore order and regularity in the economy, however, met with strong opposition from many senior military officers whose power and private incomes depended on their ability to bypass formal rules and regulations. Thus, the oil corporation, *Pertamina*, lay outside the purview of the technocrats; their influence on the operations of the state's rice trading agency, *Bulog*, was also very limited. Although the technocrats had formal authority to examine foreign investment proposals, many investments took the form of joint ventures in which the Indonesian partner was an influential military figure. As a result, technocratic criteria were often ignored. Nevertheless, there were signs that the influence of the technocrats was growing during the 1970s, as the modern sector of the economy expanded and foreign investors demanded more stable and predictable conditions. The growth of the technocrats' power was further aided by the spectacular failures of several military-dominated

[11] See J.A.C. Mackie, *Problems of the Indonesian Inflation* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agencies, most notably *Bulog* in 1973 and *Pertamina* in 1975. However, the technocrats are still far from exercising control over the economy.[12]

In Europe, the main pressure toward regularization and bureaucratization had come from the rising class of capitalist entrepreneurs. But in Indonesia this class is still weak, and the main impetus comes from sections of the army that are concerned about the long-term legitimacy of military rule. Not all officers became millionaires, and many field officers were worried that open and excessive profiteering by members of the military elite in association with foreigners and domestic-Chinese businessmen would not only hinder economic development, but bring the regime into public disrepute. It would thus increase the problems faced by the officers who were directly responsible for the maintenance of order and stability. Officers of a more "professional" orientation usually did not in principle disapprove of the involvement of military personnel in business activities, but were anxious to strengthen the regime's legitimacy by restraining excessive profiteering and the blatant use of public authority to further private interests. Rivalry within the army came to a head following signs of rising civilian discontent in the latter part of 1973. A serious riot in Bandung was followed by agitation by students and Muslims, and culminated in another, much bigger, riot in Jakarta during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in January 1974. Reform-minded officers and other dissidents apparently sought to exploit public discontent in order to force the President to dismiss some of his closest colleagues and replace them with more bureaucratically oriented "professional" officers. Although this move failed, many of the reform-minded officers continued to exert influence. Their increasing strength was a major factor leading to the dismissal of the head of *Pertamina*, General Ibnu Sutowo, in 1976, and to the tension in Jakarta during the months preceding the re-election of President Suharto in March 1978.

It seems likely that the trend toward regularization will continue. The growing size and complexity of the modern sector of the economy can be expected to require greater bureaucratization of economic management in order to guarantee stable and predictable conditions on which investors can base their calculations. At the same time, the restraint of blatantly excessive profiteering and corruption would strengthen the regime's legitimacy, especially in the eyes of the growing urban middle class. Moreover, within the army itself, the older generation of officers who took part in the guerilla war against the

[12] For a detailed discussion of the relations between the military and the technocrats, see Crouch (fn. 7), 318-30.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dutch is gradually being replaced by academy-trained officers recruited since independence; this change will also tend to strengthen the hand of the military "technocrats." The professional and technocratic elements in the army do not seek a drastic overhaul of the regime; they want to preserve it through regularization.

These pressures, however, are not strong enough to lead to the establishment of a Weberian legal-rational order in the immediate future. Regularization and bureaucratization will run counter to the interests of many powerful military figures. Still, the regime is dependent on economic development for the resources it needs to preempt both military and civilian opposition. Greater emphasis on technocratic policies is therefore imperative. But this trend is likely to give rise to increasing political conflict within the military elite.

2. THE PASSIVITY OF THE MASSES?

A key condition for patrimonial stability is the political passivity of the non-elite. Under the New Order, considerable progress has been made toward depoliticizing the masses, but the taste for politics is not dead. The depoliticization program has been imposed on a people who, during the twenty years after the end of World War II, experienced the revolution against the Dutch, intense political competition under parliamentary democracy, mass mobilization under Guided Democracy, and the rise and decimation of a powerful Communist Party. While many, no doubt, welcomed the opportunity provided by the New Order to escape from the ubiquitous political struggle of the recent past, there are now signs of growing resentment which could conceivably give rise to renewed political activity in the future.

The urban middle class has been the major non-elite beneficiary of the New Order's economic policies. During the period of Guided Democracy, this class suffered from hyperinflation, the unavailability of imported consumer goods, declining real salaries for civil servants, and lack of employment opportunities in the private sector. However, the rapid economic expansion promoted by the Suharto government has resulted in a transformation of living standards for the middle class. Inflation has been brought under control; consumer goods are being imported; civil-service salaries have risen sharply during the 1970s; and numerous well-paid employment opportunities with foreign firms have opened up. Despite their lack of political influence, many in the professional and white-collar strata have found the New Order to be a material improvement over the old.

However, there are several groups within the middle class that have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shown signs of disappointment and frustration. One group that has not benefited much from the New Order is the small class of indigenous entrepreneurs who in the past looked to the political parties to protect their interests, and who lack military patrons and access to Chinese capital. Indigenous businesses have generally suffered in the face of competition from modern, capital-intensive plants established by foreign companies in association with military partners. Many of the former, especially in the textile industry, have been forced to close down. Another middle-class group that is disillusioned with the regime consists of intellectuals, journalists, former party activists, and students who have been alienated by the military elite's monopoly of power, corruption, identification with foreign business interests, and—in some circles at least—its failure to improve the conditions of the poor. Dissident members of the middle class represent an important danger to the regime because they have the potential to mobilize the urban masses against the government. That the urban poor are susceptible to anti-government appeals was demonstrated most forcefully in the Bandung and Jakarta riots of 1973 and 1974, and the drop, to less than 40 percent, in the *Golkar*'s vote in Jakarta in the 1977 elections.

Indeed, the elections of 1971 and 1977 showed that, despite the victories won by the government-sponsored *Golkar*, significantly large numbers of citizens were prepared to risk incurring the government's wrath by voting for other parties. In particular, the strong performance of the Muslim party in 1977 proved that politically, Islam was still a force to be reckoned with. In the long run, the success of the depoliticization drive will depend on the reaction of the urban and rural masses to the government's apparent inability to bring about an improvement in their condition. In rural areas, the better-off class of peasants has benefited from the "Green Revolution," improved irrigation and rural roads, and better marketing facilities. But the prospect for the majority of the peasantry is bleak—especially in Java, where at least two-thirds of rural families do not have access to enough land to meet their daily needs. The population of Java is expected to rise from 76 million in 1971 to 146 million in the year 2000; according to the calculations of the Minister for Research, Professor Sumitro, the population density throughout the island will then reach 1,105 per square kilometer—a density greater than that of any West European city today.[13] With the work force expanding by 1.4 million annually, land-

[13] Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, *Indonesia Dalam Perkembangan Dunia* [Indonesia in World Development] (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial 1976), 163.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lessness will obviously increase, while the government has little chance of providing sufficient employment in the non-agricultural sector. At the beginning of the 1970s, only 850,000, or 2.2 percent of the work force, were employed in medium- and large-scale manufacturing; the huge influx of foreign capital since 1967 had provided employment for only an additional 175,000 by 1976.[14] Even if the government's programs for family planning and transmigration from Java to the Outer Islands meet with more success than they have hitherto, their impact on the overall situation is likely to be marginal.

Increasingly severe poverty, of course, does not necessarily lead to outbreaks of political activity by the masses. Indeed, the opposite is often true as the poor are forced to devote all their attention to meeting their daily needs, and become more dependent on better-off patrons for work and for aid in emergencies. However, in rural Java there have been signs that the traditional bonds holding society together have weakened as agriculture has become more commercialized. The Green Revolution and the rehabilitation of the rural infrastructure have benefited primarily the better-off peasants. New crop varieties have led to the use of less labor-intensive harvesting methods; many landowners are finding it more profitable to hire outside contractors for harvesting rather than to continue traditional labor-sharing practices in the village.[15] In a society which in the past was not marked by an extremely wide gap between rich and poor, the prospect of growing class conflict cannot be dismissed as economic development gives rise to sharp polarization. Still, it remains an open question whether such disaffection can be effectively mobilized and channelled by political forces organized against the government.

3. INCREASING REPRESSION

The trend toward greater regularization of bureaucratic procedures in the interest of promoting economic development implies increasing conflict within the military leadership and decreasing scope for the government to consolidate its position through the patrimonial distribution of material benefits within the elite. At the same time, increased restiveness and resistance by the non-elite are likely to create conditions favorable for periodic challenges to the regime. Under these circumstances, the patrimonial purchasing of political support within

[14] Peter McCawley and Christopher Manning, "Survey of Recent Developments," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, XII (November 1976), 37.

[15] See William L. Collier, Gunawan Wiradi, and Soentoro, "Recent Changes in Rice Harvesting Methods," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, IX (July 1973), 36-45.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the elite may be increasingly accompanied by much more direct repression in order to maintain political stability.

During the period of Guided Democracy, the repressive apparatus of the state was used relatively sparingly as a means of maintaining the authority of the regime. President Sukarno, playing not only the role of charismatic leader but also that of patrimonial sultan, sought to keep rival segments of the elite in balance by allocating power, resources, and prestige among them. Although the President and the army each had their own internal security apparatus, neither was strong enough to take severely repressive measures against the other's supporters. In the early years of Guided Democracy, several dozen opponents of the President, together with participants in various regional rebellions, were detained; in the later phase, a communist and leftist campaign against right-wing politicians and officials resulted in a few arrests and dismissals and the banning of several organizations. Under the protection of the army, most critics of the President and the PKI not only escaped arrest, but kept their official positions. On the other hand, several moves by army officers against the PKI were foiled by the President, since his own power depended in large part on communist support.

The New Order government has been more repressive than its predecessor. The old balance of power was upset in the wake of the coup attempt of 1965, which left the army, as the dominant political force, free to use coercion against its enemies. Following the massacre, several hundred thousand supporters of the PKI were imprisoned, tens of thousands for more than a decade; a smaller number of non-communist dissidents was detained at various times for shorter periods. Nevertheless, while the persecution of PKI supporters was carried out in a thoroughgoing manner, the repression of non-communist opponents of the regime was often erratic, partly because many of them enjoyed the covert encouragement and protection of dissatisfied groups of army officers. The patrimonial struggle for power within the military elite thus gave relatively wide scope to civilian dissidents. Further, especially at the local level, the operations of military security bodies—like the administration of justice in patrimonial states—depended much on the personal disposition of individual officers. Some prisoners with influential family connections were released quickly; others sometimes got out of jail after the payment of bribes.

It seems likely, however, that the New Order government will turn more to direct repression—not only to deal with mass discontent, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

also in response to increasing conflict within the elite. Whereas patrimonial-style rivalry over the spoils of office can usually be kept within bounds through the distribution of "consolation prizes" to defeated contenders, the emerging conflict within the Indonesian armed forces has ideological overtones involving contrasting perceptions of the goals of the government. As a consequence, compromise becomes more difficult to achieve, and direct repression will seem necessary in order to deal with the defeated factions. In particular, the growing influence of the academy-trained, professional generation of officers at the expense of the older, revolutionary generation seems likely to lead to new attitudes on the part of the military leadership. Apart from their orientation toward regularization and bureaucratization in the administration of the economy, the younger officers may be more disposed toward a disciplined and consistent approach to issues of security, including the repression of political dissent.

Conclusion

The short-term stability of both the Guided Democracy and the New Order regimes in Indonesia can be explained partly in terms of the persistence of strong patrimonial characteristics that existed alongside the nonpatrimonial features arising from modernization. In the case of the Guided Democracy system, sharp ideological and organizational divisions in the elite, together with substantial political mass-mobilization, eventually undermined the stability that had been created partly through patrimonial means. During the early period of the New Order, ideological and organizational conflict within the elite all but disappeared, and the masses were increasingly isolated from politics; but the dependence of the regime on economic development resulted in increasing emphasis on greater regularity, bureaucratization, and rationality, eventually bringing reform-minded officers into conflict with generals holding patrimonial-style fiefdoms. In the long run, the regime—whether still essentially patrimonial or already partially bureaucratic—may well be faced with large-scale outbreaks of mass opposition which would almost certainly become linked with intra-elite conflict. Such circumstances would force the government to give greater emphasis to straightforward repression and less to the patrimonial buying-off of dissidents in its efforts to maintain stability. It seems, therefore, that Indonesia's apparently patrimonial political structures have been built on nonpatrimonial foundations, with the result that patrimonial-style stability is not likely to endure.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review Articles

RECAPTURING THE JUST WAR FOR POLITICAL THEORY

By HEDLEY BULL

Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*. New York: Basic Books, 1977, 361 pp., $15.00.

THE wars of our own times have not generated much profound discussion about the distinction between those wars that are, in a moral sense, just, and those that are unjust. Of course, there is no lack of assertion of opinion about the morality of wars: we are told that a particular war that is fought in self-defense or to liberate a subject-nation has a just end, or that a war that does not inflict unnecessary suffering on the innocent is fought by just means. There still exists a tradition of positive international law—regarded with something approaching contempt by students of international politics, and not intrinsically of interest to students of international morality—in which existing treaties and customary rules are scrutinized to determine whether, for example, the use of nuclear weapons, or pre-emptive attack, or resort to force by non-state groups, or misconduct under the plea of superior orders, is "legal."[1] Chiefly in relation to the conflict between the superpowers, a suggestive if largely speculative literature has arisen about "rules of the game" or "operational rules" in war and diplomacy—rules for which, however, no moral standing is claimed.[2] There has been a certain interest in what may be called the historical sociology of subjectively just war, in the roles played in international society at present and in the past by belief in or deference to the conception of just war—an interest, however, that does not seem to depend on whether or not we think that there actually are any morally just wars.[3]

Again, a great deal of thought has been devoted in the West to the

[1] See, for example, Ian Brownlie, *International Law and the Use of Force by States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1963).

[2] The seminal work in this field is that of Thomas Schelling. See, for example, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1960).

[3] See, for example, Martin Wight's discussion of just war and holy war in *Systems of States* (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1977).

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/040588-12$00.60/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

question of how wars can be contained, or limited.[4] But that is a practical question, a question of "social engineering"; and although the search for ways of limiting war may be in part a response to the feeling that wars that are limited are morally preferable to wars that are not, that search is not necessarily connected with any such feeling, and derives as much or more from the fear of unlimited war and the desire to limit war so that it can serve as an instrument of policy. It might be said that in the present generation there has been a revival of interest in pacifism, and in exploration of the techniques of nonviolent resistance, especially because of the example of Gandhi. But pacifism, too—the resolve to abstain from war—is sometimes a practical rather than a moral creed, resting on the belief that war does not produce its intended results, rather than on the belief that it is inherently morally wrong. And where pacifism is a moral creed, it is one that tends to deny, or to treat as of secondary importance, the moral distinctions that can be drawn between one war and another. It is striking that contemporary philosophers have had nothing to say about the distinction between just and unjust war: at all events, I can think of no work by any philosopher in the English-speaking world, writing from a secular point of view, that is of importance.

It is worth asking what the reasons are for this neglect. No doubt, serious discussion of the morality of war has been impeded by the influence of the school of "power politics," which tends to deny both the validity and the effectiveness of moral rules restricting behavior between states. No doubt also, this kind of inquiry is discouraged by ideological fanaticisms of the left and right, which proclaim the morality or immorality of particular kinds of war, but in dogmatic terms that do not admit of the possibility of inquiring into the bases of these assertions. Yet the discussion of international affairs in the Western world is not wholly in the grip of the doctrine of power politics or of ideological fanaticism: in everyday discussion we recognize readily enough that moral claims are valid in world politics, and that debate about these claims is possible and desirable. What deters us from embarking upon serious inquiry into these matters (or, at all events, what deters us from attempting to write books about them) is the feeling that there are no authorities to guide us in this field, that arguments about the morality of war—by contrast with arguments about what causes it, what limits it, what policies it serves or what positive legal rules regulate it—are a matter of mere opinion.

[4] For example, Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper 1957).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is no accident that the few serious attempts that have been made to explore the contemporary meaning of the doctrine of morally just war have been written from the point of view of Christian (mainly Catholic) theology.[5] The great debates about just war that took place in Europe in medieval and early modern times occurred against the background of common moral authorities: divine law as revealed in the scriptures, and natural law as evident in the light of reason. Arguments about such matters as whether war could justly be waged to spread the faith, whether it could be objectively just on both sides or on one side only, and whether an individual soldier had an obligation to fight in a subjectively unjust war, proceeded on the assumption that disagreement on these matters could in principle be settled by reference to common authorities. Today, we cannot make that assumption: neither the old basic premises of moral argument, nor any new ones, command comparable acceptance. We can advance our opinions about the morality of war, addressing ourselves to those who are not disposed to challenge their philosophical or ethical foundations. Or we can enter upon the philosophical or ethical debate itself, and seek to provide foundations for our position. But we cannot set out a moral position confident that it has philosophical or ethical foundations that are unlikely to be challenged in practice.

Michael Walzer, in his fine and rightly praised book, *Just and Unjust Wars*, appears not to be much troubled by this lack of secure philosophical or ethical foundations for his opinions about the morality of war. He tells us that what he wants to do is to "recapture the just war for political and moral theory" (p. xiv). It is clearly the morally just war that he wants to recapture: not for him the "paper world" of the positive international lawyers, or the policy prescriptions of the world order theorists. Nor does he seek to provide us with another history of the concept of just war. The book is subtitled *A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, and the historical material is often new and always to the point, but the underlying preoccupations are with war as a contemporary moral issue. Nor is the volume the ranting, self-righteous, dissenting tract that it might appear to be at first glance: although it originated in the years of "angry controversy" about Vietnam, Walzer tells us that here he seeks "to set out the moral argument

[5] See, for example, Walter Stein, ed., *Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience* (London: Merlin Press 1963); Paul Ramsey, *War and the Christian Conscience: How Shall Modern War Be Justly Conducted?* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press 1961), and Ramsey, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility* (New York: Scribner 1968); E.B.F. Midgley, *The Natural Law Tradition and the Theory of International Relations* (London: P. Elek 1975).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about war in a quiet and reflective way" (p. xii). The spirit of this work is one of genuine inquiry rather than of censoriousness or self-justification. It is a work, moreover, that carries the mark of intellectual honesty: there is no attempt to disguise the loose ends, the unresolved dilemmas, that the argument contains. I also find it wholly admirable that the book is not one of those exercises in the philosophy of politics that lose themselves in explorations of logical structures and of the meanings of words; it is founded in reflection about substantive political and moral issues, and is "political theory" in the best sense.

Walzer states, however, that he is "not going to expound morality from the ground up" (p. xv). Not only is he afraid that, if he begins with foundations, he may never get beyond them; he is "by no means sure what the foundations are" (p. xv). Whatever the bases of the ethical world, we have to live in the superstructure, and this is "a book of practical morality." The author does tell us that his is "a human rights position" but there is no attempt to set out and defend any doctrine about human rights. Walzer, indeed, is quite explicitly addressing himself to those he assumes to share a common morality with him, those to whom he does not have to defend his basic moral premises. He even identifies this group as those who understood the moral condemnation of the Vietnam War, whether or not they agreed with it. This disdain of foundations is the cardinal—and, it appears to me, the most vulnerable—feature of Walzer's position, and I shall return to it. But first, let me summarize his argument.

He begins by seeking to establish "the moral reality of war." That moral reality is denied by those who adopt the so-called realist position: the Athenians, in Thucydides' reconstruction of their debate with the Melians, held not only that they had no alternative to utterly destroying Melos if it did not surrender, but also (and more seriously) that moral argument about the issue was devoid of meaning. War, Walzer argues, is never without a moral dimension. There is always the possibility of morally questioning an act of war: if, as the Athenians are supposed to have told the Melians, the subjugation of Melos was necessary to the preservation of the Athenian empire, it was still possible to ask how important the preservation of that empire was, and how certain it was that that was what was at stake. There is never a situation in which moral argument about war is without meaning: the Athenians in fact shared a moral vocabulary with the Melians, and indeed they share it with us also. Moral standards in relation to war differ with time and place, but that does not mean that there are no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

common standards: we can still read accounts of Henry V's order to kill French prisoners at Agincourt, and recognize the moral issues at stake. War takes place within a moral world; our language about war reflects this moral world; and "our understanding of the moral vocabulary is sufficiently common and stable" (p. 20).

The "moral reality" of war has two parts: on the one hand, the ends for which it is fought—the province of *jus ad bellum*; on the other hand, the means by which it is conducted—the sphere of *jus in bello*. Walzer focuses his discussion of the just ends of war on "the theory of aggression": the idea that aggressive war is a crime, and that wars fought in self-defense against aggression, to enforce the law against aggression, or to punish the aggressor, are justifiable. He formulates a simplified version of "the theory of aggression," which he calls "the legalist paradigm": that is "our baseline, our model, the fundamental structure for the moral comprehension of war" (p. 61). He expounds his view of just ends in war by suggesting revisions or refinements of the paradigm.

Thus, a revision is necessary to allow the right of legitimate anticipation of an intended act of aggression: such a right, he thinks, is not conferred by a mere fear of an adverse change in the distribution of power (such as is maintained in the classic argument for "preventive war"), but is conferred by a situation in which failure to strike first would seriously put a state's territorial integrity and political independence at risk—the situation in which Israel found itself in June 1967. It can be right to use force to intervene on behalf of a war of secession or "national liberation"—as it might have been right (although it would not have been prudent) to intervene on behalf of Hungary's struggle against Austria in 1848–49, or its struggle against Russia in 1956. It can be right to intervene forcibly in a civil war when what is at stake is counter-intervention against the prior intervention of other powers—although it is difficult to justify the American intervention in Vietnam on this principle. (The Saigon government was the creature of the United States, whereas counter-intervention is morally possible only on behalf of a government engaged in genuine self-help; moreover, the scale of the American intervention went beyond what was necessary to restore the integrity of a local struggle.) There is a right of humanitarian intervention against acts that "shock the conscience of mankind," such as India perhaps exercised in East Pakistan in 1971. Finally, the right to resist aggressors does not extend to a right to capture and punish them, as was asserted by some in justification of the conquest of North Korea: states are not individuals but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

collections of individuals, and the domestic conventions of the capture and punishment of criminals cannot be extended to international society.

When he comes to deal with *jus in bello*, Walzer provides us with a very sympathetic view of "the war convention." War is an activity governed by rules. These rules imply that soldiers are licensed to kill, and also that they are morally bound to "fight well"—and especially bound to respect the rights of noncombatants. The rules of war apply equally to those whose cause is just and to those whose cause is unjust: soldiers fighting for an aggressor-state are not criminals, and soldiers fighting against an aggressor-state have no license to become criminals. The rights of noncombatants have to be upheld as much against the just as against the unjust.

The first principle of the war convention, Walzer tells us, is that soldiers—unless they are wounded or have been captured—are subject to attack at any time. For this principle to work, a soldier has to be perceived as a soldier and not simply as a human being. Walzer provides some fascinating instances in which a soldier has been reluctant to kill an enemy counterpart he has fixed in his gun sights when—because the latter is taking a bath, or smoking a cigarette, or holding up his trousers—the stereotype does not fit. The second principle is that noncombatants shall not be attacked at any time. Of course, that principle appears to have gone down the drain in the 20th century, as noncombatant soldiers, munitions workers, workers helping to feed and clothe soldiers, and finally whole populations, have been incorporated in the class of combatants. Nevertheless, it is this principle, perhaps above all, that Walzer is concerned to defend: the rights of noncombatants, of the so-called innocent, not to be attacked.

Thus, he seeks to reformulate the doctrine of "double effect," according to which an act of war that causes injury to civilian bystanders is justifiable if this effect is not directly intended. It is not enough that the evil effect of the act of war is not an end nor a means to an end; there must also be attempts to minimize the evil brought about. Accordingly, it is wrong to assume—as when submarines are ordered not to pick up survivors of ships that have been torpedoed, or when whole villages are destroyed so that a battalion of infantry can advance with a minimum of casualties—that it is permissible to kill or injure civilian bystanders if this is necessary in order to spare the lives of combatants: "if saving civilian lives means risking soldiers' lives, the risk must be accepted" (p. 156).

A siege, "the oldest form of total war," cannot be justified by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

doctrine of double effect, because it is a directly intended onslaught on the civilian population: unless the attackers allow the civilians within a besieged city to leave, a siege is not morally possible. Guerillas—who wear peasant clothes and hide among the civilian population—challenge the whole distinction on which the war convention rests, between those who are soldiers and those who are not. The counter-guerilla forces are not thereby absolved of the duty to respect the rights of non-combatants; moreover, if—as guerillas are wont to claim—a whole people is at war against a tyrannical or alien regime, the struggle against the guerillas is inherently unjust both in its ends and in its means: in such a war, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* come together. Terrorism, if it is the random killing of innocent people, taking no account of the distinction between official agents of a government who bear some responsibility for its policies and ordinary civilians who do not, is inherently wrong. Reprisals, in the sense of violations of the war convention in response to a prior violation by the other side, are likewise ruled out.

Having expounded his main position on just ends and just means, Walzer goes on to consider certain "dilemmas of war." How do we both win and "fight well," in the sense of scrupulously observing the war convention? We must reject, Walzer says, the doctrine of Mao that the ethics of the Duke of Sung (for whom fighting well was more important than winning) are "asinine ethics." At least until the very last minute, when the heavens are about to fall, we must resolve to fight by the rules. How do we reconcile the right of states to be neutral with the need to combat aggression? Once again, we must respect the rights of neutrals even if our cause is just (as Britain's was when it violated Norway's neutrality in 1940). But once again, there is a loophole: in a supreme emergency, Walzer will allow us to "hack our way through." Can it be right to override the rights of innocent people in the event of an imminent danger to the life of a whole political community? Yes, it can—and Britain was right to begin the terror bombing of Germany when it faced such a danger in 1940–41; but such an argument cannot justify the continuation of the terror bombing after the imminent danger had passed, nor can it justify the atomic bombing of Japan to enforce unconditional surrender.

Policies of nuclear deterrence rely on the threat of deliberate mass slaughter of the innocent. If our threat of nuclear retaliation means that in certain circumstances we intend actually to carry it out, then the threat is wicked. According to Walzer, there is no escape by the route Paul Ramsey suggests—of resolving to engage only in counterforce

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear retaliation, and relying upon the fear of "collateral damage" to provide the element of deterrence, thus "making the just war possible."[6] If collateral damage is central to our threats, it is not collateral. "Nuclear weapons," Walzer writes, "explode the theory of just war . . . our familiar notions of *jus in bello* require us to condemn even the threat to use them" (p. 14). And yet, he acknowledges that "deterrence itself, for all its criminality, falls or may fall under the standard of necessity" (p. 283).

Finally, Walzer insists upon individual responsibility for unjust wars and acts of war. "There can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women" (p. 288). The acts of state with which aggressive wars begin are acts committed by persons, and the Nuremberg trials rightly upheld the notion that statesmen can be held responsible for them. So also can citizens be held morally responsible, to the extent that they are free to act: members of the American foreign policy elite, especially Chomsky's "new mandarins," "were morally complicit in our Vietnam aggression" (p. 302). The case of "war crimes" is similar: neither the heat of battle, nor superior orders, nor self-preservation can excuse individual soldiers and officers from being held responsible for violations of the moral rules of war. If here, too, there are times when necessity provides a loophole, and crimes are committed because they have to be, then we should not forget that it *is* crimes that have been committed. Collective survival sometimes requires the violation of human rights, and political leaders must opt for the former. But they are not free of guilt when they do so: "A moral theory that made their life easier, or that concealed their dilemma from the rest of us, might achieve greater coherence, but it would miss or it would repress the reality of war" (p. 326).

Allowing for the fact that this bald summary does not do justice to the richness and subtlety of Walzer's argument, we may ask how far he has succeeded in his attempt "to recapture the just war for political and moral theory." We must accept, I think, his assertions concerning what he calls "the moral reality of war." The distinction between moral rules and rules that are better described as procedural or customary is not always easy to draw, but war is as a matter of fact an inherently normative phenomenon; it is unimaginable apart from rules by which human beings recognize what behavior is appropriate to it and define their attitudes toward it. War is not simply a clash of forces; it is a clash between the agents of political groups who are able to recognize

[6] See Ramsey, *The Just War* (fn. 5).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one another as such and to direct their force at one another only because of the rules that they understand and apply. Above and beyond this, because human beings do have moral feelings and make moral choices, they have these feelings and make these choices when they are at war; and we, who have moral feelings and are accustomed to making moral judgments, are as entitled to have these feelings and make these judgments about war as about anything else. If the Hobbesian or realist position is a denial of this thesis (on some readings it is not, but rather asserts that war is the domain of a particular kind of moral rule), then Walzer is right to begin by setting it aside.

Walzer is right also in his dismissal of relativist arguments for not taking discussion of the morality of war seriously. Despite the immense variety of perspectives of time and place, there is—as he says—a certain stability about the discussion of just war through the ages, a certain common structure to the debate: the same questions recur, and a finite number of answers to them may be given. In insisting, in relation to just war, that "our understanding of the moral vocabulary is sufficiently common and stable," Walzer is at one with some recent attempts to revive the tradition of natural law, although other aspects of his position are opposed to it.[7] In his willingness, particularly in the section on "dilemmas of war," to contemplate ambiguities and contradictions within the moral law, to recognize that it may not be possible to expound a fully coherent position in relation to justice in war, he is very far from the spirit of the doctrine of natural law. But here again, I think he is correct.

Walzer is most impressive in his tenaciousness, his unwillingness to let go of the possibility of discriminating morally between one outcome and another, even where—as in the choice between capitulation and nuclear deterrence, between saving soldiers' lives and sparing civilians', or between allowing tyrants to commit atrocities and resorting to military aggression—our instincts tell us that moral principles can offer no guidance.

However, I hope I shall not seem unappreciative of Walzer's work if I go on to say that recapturing the just war for political theory will require studies of a more fundamental kind than he provides here. First, we must note what I would call the subjectivity of his position. At almost every point, he adopts stands that could and would be disputed by others embarking upon a similar inquiry; I do not wish to

[7] See esp. Midgley (fn. 5); Michael Donelan, ed., *The Reason of States* (Winchester, England: Allen & Unwin 1978), chap. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suggest that there is anything objectionable or surprising about this feature of his book, but merely want to draw attention to it. There are angles he has not considered—ways in which his position is vulnerable, and against which he does not provide a defense. Let me give some examples, without pursuing them.

His basic proposition that—as against General Sherman's doctrine that "war is hell"—the distinction between just and unjust war is of cardinal importance, would be disputed by absolute pacificists, with whose position he makes no attempt to come to grips (although he does make some incisive comments about "civilian defense"). The very strong emphasis he places upon the obligation to respect the rules of war, by comparison with the obligation to fight for a just cause, would be disputed by those more sympathetic than he is to the revolutionary causes of our time: if one really believes in the obligation to wage a holy war against capitalism or imperialism or white supremacism, the ethics of the Duke of Sung do indeed seem asinine. Moreover, Walzer's acceptance of "the legalist paradigm" as the framework of his approach to the discussion of just ends in war weights the whole argument against the position of the revolutionary. If the primary obligation one recognizes is not to defend the rights of one's state under the existing system, but to fight for the establishment of a better system, then one might begin by adopting a basically favorable attitude toward certain forms of "aggression." If one takes seriously the doctrine of class struggle, one may also be led to question the assumption of Walzer's discussion of "the legalist paradigm"—that the discussion of just ends in war is confined within the universe of the rights and duties of sovereign states, and of the individuals who are their agents.

Basic to Walzer's position is his Western, liberal view according to which questions about the morality of war are ultimately questions about the rights and duties of individual human beings. This view, for example, underlies his strong defense of the rights of noncombatants, which derives from what he calls his "human rights position"; it also underlies his insistence upon individual responsibility for wars of aggression and war crimes. How, then, do Walzer's arguments relate to those that begin with the assumption that the ultimate test concerns the rights and duties not of the individual, but of the kinship group, the nation, or the party?

Even though Walzer adopts what might appear to be a strong moral line about beginning wars and fighting them, he is very far from being a moral absolutist. Rather than let the heavens fall, he is prepared

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the last resort to endorse policies of pre-emptive war, military intervention, terror bombing, violation of the rights of neutral countries, and nuclear deterrence. Some would see his willingness to subordinate fidelity to moral principles to the demands of "necessity" as a selling of the pass. How does Walzer come to grips with those who really believe that moral imperatives are to be obeyed unconditionally? Political leaders, he tells us, will always choose survival in preference to human rights, but what if—as a religious moralist once put it—"the level on which a Christian political philosophy has to be worked out is ultimately that, not of the White House and Downing Street, but of the catacombs"?[8]

All this is merely to say that Walzer's position may be disputed from various perspectives. What makes him vulnerable, however, is that he does not provide us with the foundations of his own position, and thus does not have anything to say as to why we should listen to him rather than to someone whose outlook is fundamentally different. As we have seen, his decision not "to expound morality from the ground up" was a deliberate one, and one can see why he was led to it. It is true that his book is about the morality of war, not about the nature of morality; a study of alternative moral criteria or major premises might have led him far afield. It is true also that it would be absurd to contend that every moral statement has to be preceded by a philosophical defense of the moral criteria employed. That is not how we proceed in everyday moral discussion, and there seems to be no reason why we should have to proceed in this way in an academic investigation of the sort upon which Walzer is embarked. There are plenty of people who are glad to read what Walzer has to say about just wars without also having to read a disquisition about moral philosophy, and no doubt there are many who are grateful that they do not have to do so. There can be rational discussion of a particular area of moral discourse such as that concerning war, in which the premises behind the judgments we make are identified and debated and are shown to derive from more general premises, and in which moral disagreements are clarified and sometimes resolved, without any attempt to debate ultimate moral criteria or starting points. It is true also that if Walzer had elaborated the ethical foundations of his view of just war, it would not have rendered his position any less vulnerable to attack, because today we are as divided about the ethical foundations of our everyday moral judgments as we are about these judgments themselves. When contemporary writers do set out the ethical foundations of their judgments

[8] See Wight (fn. 3), 12.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about just war, the effect is sometimes to widen the gap between themselves and others: there are cases in which we are close in the opinions we hold about a particular moral issue, but wide apart in the premises that have led us to these opinions.

Still, the lack of ethical foundations in this study is more of a shortcoming than its author recognizes. He states that he is engaged in a work of "practical morality"; but "practice" and "theory" do not exist in separate worlds, and it is only at the level of debate about foundations that the most important disagreements about the everyday morality of war can be resolved, or at least clarified. The effect of Walzer's self-denying ordinance about foundations is that his message is actually addressed only to the limited circle of those who share his outlook. The basic premises behind his judgments are not defended or even fully set out, and his book does not help us carry the debate to the deepest level.

In other areas of "practical morality" today—most notably in relation to issues of economic and social justice and equality—there has been a remarkable and fruitful confluence of high ethical theory and practical concern. On the one hand, moral philosophy in the English-speaking countries has broken out of its private world to illuminate once again great issues of public policy, and it has done so without lowering its standards of technical excellence. On the other hand, in the discussion of mundane issues of economic and social policy, there has been a new willingness to grapple with fundamental issues at a high level of abstraction, and works of moral philosophy have become required reading in circles where the subject until recently was virtually unknown. As a result, there has been a more profound and intellectually more muscular debate about the concepts of economic and social justice, not least about the bearing of these concepts on international relations.

The debate about just war at the present time has not yet been strengthened by any comparable union of high theory with practical concern. Some of the issues that call for examination are those that lurk beneath the surface of Walzer's argument: between a revolutionist and a legalistic conception of just war; between an individualist and a collectivist approach to obligation in world politics; between just war theory and pacifist theory; and between an absolutist and a relativist conception of morality in war. Walzer has provided us with his opinions about just and unjust wars. He has done it elegantly, sometimes movingly, and with a measure of theoretical and historical depth. But if the discussion of just war is to be more than simply an exchange of opinions, some foundations must first be established.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND THE PHYSICAL HABITAT

Focus of Continuing Controversy

By HAROLD SPROUT and MARGARET SPROUT

Joseph A. Pechman, ed., and others, *Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget*. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978, 399 pp., $12.95; $5.95 paper.

William Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity*. San Francisco: W. R. Freeman and Co., 1977, 303 pp., $6.95 paper.

John Quarles, *Cleaning Up America: An Insider's View of the Environmental Protection Agency*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976, 255 pp., $8.95.

David W. Orr and Marvin S. Soroos, eds., and others, *The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979, 358 pp., $19.00; $9.00 paper.

IN 1972 we compared for this journal a selection of books that dealt with American national priorities, chiefly as reflected in federal budgets.[1] The books discussed in the present critique re-examine some of those earlier impressions in the light of more recent events. These four works reflect several fairly representative current positions toward the continuing controversies over the repair and protection of our physical habitat.

The volume edited by Joseph Pechman suggests a sense of minimal concern. This symposium deals with the federal budget-in-the-making for fiscal 1979; and although the Brookings-sponsored commentary is unofficial, we assume that it reflects at least some of the trends of thinking within the Carter Administration rather closely.[2] At the opposite pole, Ophuls radiates a sense of urgency for prompt major changes in national priorities in order to arrest a drift toward irreversible ruin of our planetary habitat. Quarles also exhibits a strong sense of urgency, but doubts that abrupt major changes are in the offing.

Like the commentary on the federal budget, the fourth book is a collaborative work. The co-editors, David Orr and Marvin Soroos, are political scientists; they give coherence to the symposium, and themselves contribute several original chapters. Most of the other dozen-plus

[1] "National Priorities: Demands, Resources, Dilemmas," *World Politics*, XXIV (January 1972), 293-317.

[2] The volume carries the standard formula that affirms the author's or authors' sole responsibility for interpretive opinions expressed.

© 1979 by Princeton University Press
World Politics 0043-8871/79/040600-15$00.75/1
For copying information, see contributor page

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contributors are also professional students of government. Their professional perspective gives the book an additional dimension which is often marginal, or missing altogether, in the rhetoric of natural scientists, economists, and other specialists who may be less politically oriented.

Before proceeding further, we must inject a brief note on the term "environment" and its adjectival and adverbial counterparts. All definitions have a common core: some organism or population is encompassed by some aggregate of conditions judged to be significant for that organism or population. However, usage varies considerably in different contexts. Our choice here is to conform to the nontechnical usage of everyday speech which also prevails in the natural sciences: that is, to exclude strictly human phenomena from the idea of environment—especially intangible human relationships. Yet popular usage generally includes many conditions to which human activities contribute, such as depletion of fossil fuels, pollutions of air, water, and land, and other man-made changes in nonhuman Nature. We shall insert a qualifying adjective, such as physical or social, when the literary context seems unclear. We shall also use the expression "physical habitat," or simply "habitat," as roughly equivalent to the above usage of environment.

I

The Pechman volume is the ninth in a series of unofficial annual commentaries sponsored by the Brookings Institution, which are based on the assumption that the federal budget is a fairly reliable indicator of national priorities as envisaged by the administration currently in office. These annual volumes have served several useful purposes. For instance, they help to make the complexities of federal finance more comprehensible to people who are non-experts in this statistical quagmire. They provide descriptions and critical analyses and commentary on the recommendations prepared by the administration for submission to Congress—the executive budget that reflects decisions by the President and his White House staff as to how the disposable revenues should be allocated among a multiplicity of claimants.

As previously stated, these budgetary commentaries, though not official documents, are prepared chiefly by economists, most of whom utilize modes of analysis that prevail widely both within and outside the incumbent federal administration. Hence it seems reasonable to infer that they are fairly reliable indicators of the national priorities of the President and his economic advisors. Also, each volume presum-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ably deals with categories that appear to command primary attention in the Presidential budget of the year under consideration.

Earlier volumes in this series gave considerable attention to environmental pollutions. In 1976, energy costs emerged as a budgetary category. In the same year, a ten-year speculative forecast devoted two chapters to a broad spectrum of environmental damage and hazards. The present volume pays practically no attention to these topics. Instead, it reflects an upsurge of priority to military demands and a great deal of concern regarding the increasing costs of ongoing social programs. The foreword states explicitly that coverage is limited to issues to which the Carter Administration assigns high priority: "education, employment and income security, taxation, urban policy, agriculture, and defense" (p. vii). Actually, several additional budgetary categories do get some marginal attention. But environmental depletions, pollutions, and ecological disruptions get short shrift. Except for a few paragraphs on attempts to formulate a rational energy policy, there is a loud silence concerning support of our acceleratively deteriorating physical habitat; and there is not very much on the urgency of safer work places and numerous other imperatives of the social environment. One can deduce that the present administration places support for the military departments and the other objectives noted above far ahead of support for the physical habitat upon which our national society depends for vitality and durability.

Turning to some specifics, Pechman and his associates offer nothing on the monetary implications of big versus small projects, and "hard" versus "soft" technologies;[3] nothing on the ever-rising energy cost of producing more and more energy to expand economic growth; nothing on the costs of abating the pollutions that everywhere have accompanied industrialization; nothing on the escalating costs of subsidized research and development on fission and fusion; nothing on the costs of maintaining adequate stockpiles of imported natural materials as insurance in our unstable world order; nothing on the costs of significantly reducing the hazards of mining, agri-business, materials processing, end-product manufacturing, and internal civic security against hazards from diverse proliferating sources; and nothing on the costs of coping with pollutions of air, water, land, and food, or on the burden thereby imposed on generations yet unborn. Nor is there any reference to the harmful effects, in a world critically short of food, of annually covering additional millions of fertile acres with concrete and asphalt,

[3] On this issue, see the forceful argument by physicist Amory Lovins, "Energy Strategy: The Road Not Taken?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55 (October 1976), 65-96.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or to the hazards and costs of guarding rapidly accumulating spent fuels and other residues of military and civilian reactors that will remain lethally radioactive for tens of thousands of years.

All of these omitted or only marginally noted environmental impacts exact a price.[4] In every instance, it has to be paid—either in tax dollars and inflated commodity prices, or in such forms as ill health, shortened life spans, and other effects to which everyone is exposed.

Neglect of environmental repair and protection in the current federal budget suggests that, whatever the President and his spokesmen may say, either they assign low priority to the rising costs of maintaining a decently livable habitat; or else they accept at face value the hubristic speculators who boast that technological "fixes" can sustain the current type of economic growth indefinitely. Apparently they expect thereby to escape the dilemma of scarcity and ecological disruption without seriously curtailing the amenities of the affluent, and without making major changes in the economic system and the life styles of its beneficiaries.

In fairness to Pechman and his associates, we should recognize that, within their narrowly restricted coverage, they make some telling points. Among these is the attention they direct to the adverse impact of the inflated military budget on social promises and ongoing programs. For example, given the federal government's long-term financial commitments—for social security, other income supports, superhighways, sorties into outer space, as well as for additional late-model military hardware and much else—only a small fraction of federal revenues remains legally available for new programs or increased support of underfinanced ongoing projects. However, any assumption that advance commitments of federal revenues are inviolable is probably simplistic. Within vague, and recurrently shifting, self-imposed criteria, the federal government (like all governments known to us) is capable of violating its promises, and even of repudiating its contracts, in response to changing conditions or high-level notions of political expediency.

Within their chosen frame of analysis, Pechman and his co-authors present a plausible case for the conclusion stated in the book's final sentence: ". . . limiting the [federal] budget to the lower end of the [probable] range [of about 20-22 percent of the GNP] would rule out higher defense budgets [as well as] long promised social programs . . . *or any other major new initiative*" (p. 299; emphasis added).

[4] See Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1974).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The authors may contend that our bracketed explanatory insertions do less than justice to their position. Nevertheless, in the light of their self-imposed framework of analysis and of the topics covered, the bracketed inserts simply emphasize the message that comes through to us; namely, that the authors (perhaps reluctantly) concur with the high priority assigned to military and military-related claims and the much lower priority to social programs; and that they allocate scarcely any priority at all to repair and protection of our acceleratively deteriorating physical habitat. In sum, the book left us with the impression that it reflects an empathetic rationale of the semi-war economy that has been a fact of life in the United States practically since the early 1940s. This semi-war economy siphons away a large fraction of the scientific and other intellectual, as well as the material, resources that are urgently needed for the protection of our social and physical environments.[5]

Before ending the discussion of this volume, we should mention that it has no index. This omission imposes a handicap on those who use the book for reference, compelling them to leaf through dozens or even scores of pages to locate data that a good index would have made readily available.

As previously noted, William Ophuls's *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity* is at the opposite end of the spectrum from *Setting National Priorities*. Reading the two books in succession leaves one wondering how comparably competent analysts, dealing with the common denominator of insufficient disposable resources to cover a multitude of competing claims, could possibly reach such contradictory conclusions regarding what should receive higher priority, and why.

These contradictions may be attributable, at least in part, to different presuppositions as well as to different landscapes of inquiry. Pechman and his associates conform rather closely to the doctrines of conventional marketplace economics; Ophuls to those of ecological science. To quote a metaphor that others have suggested, ecology engulfs economics by taking into account salient features of the finite earth that are excluded from the less broadly conceived framework of marketplace theory.

Ophuls takes off from the widely publicized thesis of bio-ecologist Garrett Hardin. In his essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons,"[6] Har-

[5] On this and related issues, we suggest Duane Lockard, *The Perverted Priorities of American Politics* (New York: Macmillan 1971).

[6] Originally published in *Science*, Vol. 162 (December 13, 1968), 1243-48; reproduced in numerous anthologies and collections of textbook readings.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

din adapts an old English land-use practice, sanctified by the common law; he argues that individuals tend to put their own short-term material wants ahead of concern for the community of which they are members; hence, free individual choices in an uncontrolled market will erode and may in the end destroy the community.[7]

From this springboard, Ophuls attacks conventional economic theory and practices. He denies that the public interest is served by the "invisible hand" of unrestricted individual choices and minimally regulated competition among suppliers. Ophuls contends that this so-called invisible hand stimulates overexploitation of our finite habitat, and thereby acceleratively depletes fossil fuels and other natural resources; harmfully pollutes air, water, and land; and disrupts systems, both in Nature and in human society, that are vital to the well-being of the earth's inhabitants, and perhaps ultimately to their survival.

Ophuls argues that in these and other ways industrialism to date has progressively denuded and degraded the human habitat and debased the quality of life attainable therein. He exhibits skepticism toward egalitarian democracy's capacity to arrest this process. However, like economist Marshall Goldman and others, he finds no help in Marxist theory and practice.[8] The source of the trouble, Goldman contends, is not ideology but the process of industrialization itself.[9] In a concluding chapter, Ophuls opts for a steady-state political economy along the lines envisioned by dissenting economist Herman Daley.[10] Ophuls leaves for a promised future sequel a description of how he envisions such a radical transition (pp. ix-x). In the present volume, he only reveals hints regarding the trend of his thinking. He doubts that it is realistic to expect much from voluntary adjustment that would curtail the wasteful use-and-throw-away style of American living. He exhibits scant faith in pleas for voluntary conservation of energy, for voluntary reduction of pollutions, or for ecological protection in general. What he seems to regard as an essential requisite is a

[7] Another bio-ecologist illustrates the same point by likening humankind to a parasite that destroys its host by overexploitation. Eugene P. Odum, *Ecology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1963), 109.

[8] Goldman, "The Convergence of Environmental Disruption," *Science*, Vol. 170 (October 2, 1970), 37-42; see also Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle* (New York: Knopf 1971), 278.

[9] For a detailed exploration of the difficulties of preserving pre-industrial structures and values in industrializing society, see two books by Marion J. Levy, Jr.: *The Structure of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1952), 108 and passim; and *Modernization and the Structure of Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1966), 537 and passim.

[10] Daley and others, eds., *Toward a Steady-State Economy* (San Francisco: Freeman 1973).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

radical change in posture toward Nature, especially at the upper income levels. He favors public re-education, but clearly envisages much tighter restrictions imposed and enforced by public authority. In short, the apparent thrust of Ophuls's argument is toward more governmental regulation (hopefully intelligent, beneficent, and prudent) of what is produced, by what means, how it is used, and what is done with residual, potentially dangerous wastes.

The book is future-oriented, but Ophuls leans heavily upon the past for guidance. He quotes extensively from Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Burke, and from numerous oriental and other nonwestern classics. Most of those quoted reject democracy in favor of rule by hypothetically wise and benevolent aristocrats. From these and more modern sources, he buttresses his argument that "we must learn ecological self-restraint before it is forced on us by a potentially monolithic and totalitarian regime or by the brute forces of nature" (p. 236). Having dismissed voluntarism as presumptively insufficient, and having invoked classical philosophies for guidance, he invites the question, what can one infer about the kind of rule he does contemplate for contemporary societies?

Although manifestly not a typical college text, Ophuls's book has found its way into reading lists and classrooms. Some teachers might query whether it is within the grasp of many undergraduates. Be that as it may, the book is a rich source of challenging hypotheses as well as relevant description that (in our judgment) should be included in the intellectual baggage of advanced students and of all teachers of environmental politics and related subjects.

The book is designed in a format typical of W. H. Freeman & Co.: explanatory boxes are inserted into the text, and there is an abundance of statistical tables, analytic figures, and graphs. Many readers will welcome these features; others may find them confusing. But everyone should welcome the excellent index.

In John Quarles's *Cleaning Up America*, one finds agreement with Ophuls on one major issue: the centrality of public authority in setting and enforcing higher standards, which is implicit in nearly every environmental problem. However, on another major issue these authors collide head-on. Ophuls rejects a gradualist incremental strategy that he regards simply as muddling along under the umbrellas of environmentally disruptive industrialism and wasteful life-styles that pervade American society. (We can imagine him likening such

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a strategy to an attempt to contain a flooding river with a teacup.) Quarles, on the other hand, while recognizing the need for environmental repair and protection just as clearly as Ophuls does, appreciates the obstacles and risks of trying to do too much too quickly. Hence, his preference leans toward an incremental strategy within the existing framework of American institutions and practices.

This choice reflects the author's practical experience: he was an official of the Environmental Protection Agency from its creation in 1970, and served as its deputy administrator (under Russell Train) from 1973 until 1976.

In addition to providing dramatic accounts of several landmark cases, Quarles illuminates the *difficulties of getting anything done* in our amorphous federal conglomeration of politicians and appointed officials, all of whom are under pressure from lobbyists of other governmental agencies, from business managements, labor unions, social activists, environmentalists, and from various other interests. He repeatedly emphasizes his faith in the ground swell of unorganized public sentiment, to which, he insists, most politicians and bureaucrats are more responsive than is generally recognized.

The salient question, according to Quarles, is "whether we try to plan and control our future or allow unlimited industrial expansion to use up available resources" (p. 240). From our perspective that is an important part—but only a part—of a larger issue that includes how much damage by pollutions of air and water, and how much misuse of land and disruption of non-human Nature is tolerable.

According to Quarles, government must play a large role if we are to maintain a decently livable environment. "There is no other vehicle by which the public can carry out policies required to meet this public need." By its very nature, "competitive industry cannot establish safeguards against running out of supplies" (p. 241). Again, we would add that there is no promising alternative to governmental authority for enacting and enforcing higher standards of quality for air, water, and use of land. This addendum is implicit in Quarles's own words, "the only real alternative to waiting for a crisis to hit is a nationwide citizen leadership with enough foresight and political force to demand that these problems be faced before troubles arrive" (pp. 243-44). He returns repeatedly to the theme of leadership by "environmentalists and from other concerned groups. . . . Only if this citizen leadership comes forward shall we have any hope of meeting these challenges effectively" (p. 244).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, the author explicitly backs away from abrupt major changes *imposed* by public authority. He also reminds his audience that, short of revolutionary violence, adjustments to less wasteful and less polluting modes of production and personal living will take time—probably a lot of time. We would, though, enter a *caveat* against his fear that, even after higher standards are enacted, we must expect that "years and years will still go by before governmental action produces significant results" (p. 244).

An undercurrent that runs throughout Quarles's book is his widely shared impression that Americans respond better *after* than *before* the occurrence of an acute crisis. That is not a new idea. Many students of government have emphasized the obstacles (except in extreme emergency) to major changes of direction in our huge and diverse national polity. Nevertheless, Quarles reiterates his confidence that Americans, if given time and persistent prodding, can arrest the drift toward environmental ruin, *provided* there is a strong, organized leadership inside and outside of government, buttressed by conscious, concerned, and reasonably widespread awareness of the damage already incurred and the hazards to which all are exposed.

Quarles's book would make an effective opening assignment in a course on the harsh realities of American environmental politics.

The three volumes considered thus far have concentrated mainly on the American scene—Ophuls perhaps less than the other two. American attitudes, conditions, and responses are unquestionably relevant to any comprehension of environmental politics; but these factors are only part of a larger picture. The "global predicament" (title of the Orr/Soroos symposium) is beyond the capacity of any one national polity to cope with alone. American public or corporate authorities cannot unilaterally sustain recent trends in the transnational flow of fossil fuels, reduce the lengthening list of natural materials in current or imminent short supply, eradicate the diverse poisonous pollutions of air and water that circulate globally in the atmosphere and in seawater, or arrest the misuse of land and erosion of soil throughout the world.

Thousands of years before European industrial pioneers began staking out claims overseas, human communities were taking more from the earth than they returned, contaminating air and water, and otherwise degrading their earthly habitat. However, it was Europeans—mainly early British industrializers—who led the way toward accelerat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing this degradive trend. British theoreticians provided much of the rationale for the increasingly exploitive industrialism. During the past few decades, the linkage of pure to applied science, carried further in North America, has enormously accelerated the worldwide environmental degradation that gives salience to the expression "global predicament."

For this reason we have included the Orr/Soroos symposium in our comparative commentary. The book's subtitle is *Ecological Perspectives on World Order*. Its broad coverage and Richard Falk's percipient foreword provide explicit reminders that spoliation of the earth is a worldwide phenomenon. True, Americans may stand at, or close to the top of, the long and still lengthening roster of culprits: as a nation we are prodigal wasters of imported fuels, and tolerant of poisonous contaminations that not only harm ourselves but inflict damage far beyond our geographic space. But Americans, we repeat, are not the only desecrators of the global environment. The activities of countless millions long deceased, and of other millions of living people in scores of countries, have not only impaired their environment, but are also preparing a progressively degraded legacy for future generations.

In focusing on this global reality, the editors, as well as most of the contributors to the volume, repeatedly issue reminders that worldwide plundering of the earth affects Americans adversely and perhaps irreversibly; and, conversely, that American practices, attitudes, and public policies have condoned, and continue to condone, the worldwide disruptive conditions and trends to which this collection of essays is addressed.

The book opens with a lucid presentation of the essentials of ecological science and a forceful description of the worldwide facts and consequences of progressive ecological disruptions. Early chapters include comparisons of the older industrialized economies with the later starters along the road to ecologically disruptive industrialism. The next three essays focus on the interrelationships of a continually increasing population and the physical limits of producing food upon the impoverished soil of our depleted earth. These chapters are followed by several on the politics of resource-scarcity. Subsequent essays deal with progress in international environmental dialogues and with the beginnings of international monitoring. Obstacles to, as well as the urgency of, greater and more diversified international progress are covered in half a dozen chapters.

A concluding essay sums up the unresolved problems and conse-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quences of inaction and procrastination, and also some of the ethical-moral issues inherent in any course of action in our politically fragmented, culturally diverse, and tribalistic international order.

The numerous contributors differ in perspectives and in styles of thinking. However, considering the complexity of the global predicament, the editors have achieved noteworthy coherence and readability. They have produced a volume that should command a large and varied audience. The book should be especially attractive to teachers of college and university courses addressed to the manifold refractory tasks involved in arresting the insidious worldwide drift toward ruination of our earthly habitat.

II

Comparing the above books has evoked some fresh insights as well as re-affirmed previous conclusions. One of the latter is our sense of wonderment at the tardiness of elected politicians, appointed administrators, business executives, academicians and numerous other specialists, and our fellow-citizens in general, in recognizing everyone's stake in a reasonably healthful and otherwise decently livable habitat. It is equally remarkable how long it took to recognize the hazards implicit in largely uncontrolled industrialization. Another conviction reinforced by reading these books is that environmental repair and protection are public interests comparable to a credible military presence, and are more urgent than sorties into outer space, proliferation of superhighways, nuclear-fission power plants, and much else that has received higher budgetary priority.

It is likewise noteworthy that professional students of government (with a few exceptions) have taken so long to recognize the centrality of their discipline in this sector of public affairs. The *public* interest in a decently livable habitat was evident to a few percipient observers at least a century ago. But only within the last decade or so have a significant number of political scientists given priority to environmental repair and protection in their research and teaching. It required Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, the vicious public attacks on her competence, the strontium-90 milk scandal, a succession of disastrous oil spills, and other shockers to create the ground swell of concern that was expressed in the news media, in teaching and research, in interpersonal conversation, and *grudgingly* in somewhat larger allocations of disposable resources.

Moreover, events to date suggest that private initiatives alone cannot

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

do the job. The salient considerations are these: only government has the legal authority, necessary resources, access to the electorate, and (in the final reckoning) legitimate police power to enforce adequate environmental standards. Even the so-called private incentives that are advocated by many economists require public authority for enforcement. Reluctance to recognize and accept the centrality of public authority is especially evident whenever environmental standards cut into or threaten business profits, or curtail amenities enjoyed by the affluent and by the millions who yearn to become so.

Most college and university administrations and their faculties have been notably backward in recognizing the political centrality of environmental teaching and research. More specifically, relatively few top-level educators have yet to recognize that environmental protection is ultimately a political—not merely a technical and economic—cluster of problems. Many in the United States and elsewhere still look to geographers, weather scientists, biologists, medical scientists, technological designers, and other essentially nonpolitical specialists for guidance concerning problems that are pre-eminently political. Relatively few grasp the reality that policy decisions should take precedence over the pretensions and claims of nonpolitical experts whenever such decisions entail—as they nearly always do—conflict and accommodation of values within and between national communities.

Admittedly, the expertise of nonpolitical specialists is indispensable to the formulation of effective environmental policies. But the contributions of such specialists are preliminaries, not ends. In the United States, at least, nonpolitical expertise does not *ipso facto* carry a presumption of *legal* or *moral* competence to determine what and how much *shall be undertaken*. Such competence is invested explicitly or implicitly in public authorities who are legally responsible to the electorate—such as the President, Congress, public administrative agencies, the judiciary, and state and local governments.

Recognition of this salient constitutional principle may at times be obscured by, for example, historic American attitudes toward government, current credibility gaps between public authorities and populace, and so forth. Credibility is notoriously undermined not only by lying but also by verbal gobbledygook, the latter frequently exemplified by legal and bureaucratic rhetoric. Distrust of politicians is reflected in electoral apathy and civic alienation, among other conditions.

Unfortunately, one finds a comparable propensity to dispute or discount somber warnings by eminent ecologists and other scientists in relevant fields: How many of our fellow citizens comprehend the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

worldwide gulf between the numbers to be fed and production of enough food to feed them adequately? Skepticism pervades many facets of the global ecological predicament to which the Orr/Soroos symposium is addressed. Credibility gaps, ecological ignorance, and an apparently spreading anomie as well as unrealizable expectations are evident in many countries, not least in the United States.

Skepticism is abetted by the lying, greed, and corruption too often exhibited by politicians, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and other civic figures. Reluctance on the part of government and business to publicize bad news and somber prospects only intensifies this skepticism. It has been said that most people do not want to hear news that threatens bright expectations. Even if this were not true, it would still be difficult to break the apparent semi-conspiracies of silence concerning the extent of interrelatedness in a complex society. For instance, there has been very little attempt to convince the public that the supply and cost of energy (coal, oil, gas, electricity, etc.) affect the prices of food, clothing, housing, health services, personal security, transportation, quality of air and water, and virtually everything else; and to explain that these prices may be inflated not only by genuine shortages, but also by arbitrary pricing on the part of huge corporations and/or illicit agreements among competitors—not to mention governmental price supports for special interests.

It is implicit throughout Ophuls and Orr/Soroos, and argued specifically by Quarles, that, until a great many more people recognize the extent of interrelatedness (especially the relation of energy costs to consumer prices and to pollutions of air, water, and land, and the fragile systems of nonhuman Nature), it seems likely that public and official ignorance and skeptism—not to mention greed—will continue to delay many urgent protective undertakings.

Skepticism is buttressed to some extent by conventional economic doctrine—in particular the dogma that technological innovations can surmount the physical limits of the earth. This tenet contradicts the ecological principle that the finite earth imposes limits on endless economic growth. The economic doctrine is manifestly more attractive, but its tenability is increasingly being questioned. The editors of *The Global Predicament* dismiss it in a single sentence: "Economists have developed theories of the economic process as if it were independent of physical constraint and of itself magically conjured up the wealth produced by economic activity" (p. 9). The continued vitality of this dogma is still very evident, for instance, in some of the ill-tempered

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attacks on *The Limits to Growth* and on other exploratory exercises in futuristic speculation.[11]

Still another obstacle to more rapid and substantial progress in "cleaning up America" is the persistent bias against governmental interference with profitable business—a bias, be it noted, that fades whenever private enterprise runs into trouble, either from its own internal deficiencies, or from domestic or foreign competition. Assertions by Ophuls and Quarles that conservation of energy and other natural resources, reduction of harmful pollutions, and generally tighter standards for permissible exploitation of the earth will require a great deal more governmental intervention, have evoked protests and denials. Many in our midst dispute or discount warnings that only government (as argued above) commands the legal authority, financial resources, and supportive police power to enforce compliance with enacted standards, or to compel compromises between those who put their own short-term profits ahead of public benefits such as longer life, better health, safer workplaces, less wasteful consumption of energy, less poison in the air we breathe and the water we drink, safer disposal of wastes, and still other requisites of a more decently livable habitat for everyone.

All four books have strengthened our conviction that no national polity—not even the Soviet Union or the United States—can sustain indefinitely the rising costs of competitive militarism without grossly neglecting its "senior citizens," and even more grossly its poor, destitute, and handicapped of all ages. In order to comprehend the magnitude of social and environmental neglect, it is necessary to look beyond the mere statistics of taxation and expenditure, to the high proportion of scientific and material resources that military inflation and waste deny to the civilian society and its physical environment.

Commentaries on the federal budget formerly treated military and related claims more or less as untouchables to which other claims had to be accommodated. Vestiges of this presumption are still discernible today. There is a propensity to scrutinize the claims of the military less critically than those pertaining to the physical habitat; and the effort to reduce cost overruns and sheer waste in the military is decidedly less pronounced than in the civilian branches of the federal government.

[11] See, in particular, Carl Kaysen, "The Computer that Printed out W*O*L*F," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 55 (July 1972), 660-68; for additional references to similar effect see Sprout and Sprout, *The Context of Environmental Politics* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky 1978), 76-80, and notes on p. 196.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We have taken special notice of the contrasting strategies advocated by Ophuls and Quarles: the choice between a forced-draft transition to a no-growth type of economy and the slower but less disruptive incremental, or piecemeal, progress within the existing political economy. Events may confirm that Ophuls is the more percipient calculator. Environmental damage and hazards may already have reached a point where only major surgery will arrest the malaise. Whether social chaos, despotism, or terminal catastrophe are the only probable outcomes of current trends is today unknowable.

In any case, Quarles speaks from high-level official experience as well as from devotion to ecological and democratic principles. His enumeration of positive accomplishments since the creation of the E.P.A. in 1970 is impressive (pp. 216-33). Likewise impressive is his belief that further major objectives can be achieved without turning our society upside down and further damaging what remains of civil liberties in the process. Excluding natural catastrophes and irreversible human follies (thermonuclear war among others), there are credible grounds for viewing the present period as a reprieve. How this reprieve will be used in the United States and elsewhere is today as indeterminable as predictions of terminal doom just around the corner are unconfirmable.

If the present reprieve is largely wasted by disputation, procrastination, and continued competitive militarism, Americans along with the rest of humankind may indeed drift into the grim choice between doom and despotism. In such a contingency—which might come suddenly, but more likely insidiously over a period of time—one should recognize the possibility that many, perhaps most, in our midst would opt for harsher control without realizing that such a choice might be no more than plastering over the cracks in a crumbling edifice.

This possibility evokes an important question that occurred to us repeatedly as we read Ophuls's book. The question is whether his apparent confidence in the wisdom of classical philosophies—most of which were inspired by and written in the context of pre-industrial, half-slave, largely illiterate societies—offers promising guidelines for dealing with environmental damage and hazards that have accompanied the transition to urban industrialism. We can discover no potentially wise and benevolent "philosopher kings" waiting in the wings—only greedy, hubristic technocrats and potential despots.

Incremental progress toward a cleaner, safer, more healthful habitat is likely to be about all that one can expect in the United States during

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the rest of this century. Moreover, it is at least arguable that such a strategy may provide a better chance to achieve a more decently livable habitat than may be expected from any technocratic autocracy. However, we are not so naive as to anticipate that piecemeal policies can arrest the glacier-like drift toward ruin unless another requisite is also present: namely, sustained and expanding leadership both by sophisticated organizations and by dedicated individuals.

Incremental progress will most likely suffer recurrent setbacks. But we consider it preferable to a technocracy dominated by avant-garde scientists, venturesome engineers, conventional economists, conservative tycoons, and others from whom it would seem unreasonable to expect much tolerance of dissent and (with some exceptions) sophisticated comprehension of what is involved in maintaining a stable and decently livable habitat within the limits of tolerably democratic governance.

Finally, the books reviewed offer little encouragement to those who clamor for less government and lower taxes. It seems unrealistic to anticipate any significant downturn of the costs of maintaining even a minimally stable polity and a minimum of personal security from multiple vulnerabilities. The latter are hazards that invariably seem to accompany progression to higher levels of human density and greater reliance on technological innovations and their fallible human operators. As both ecologists and economists have emphasized repeatedly, "there is no free lunch." We doubt that supporters of Proposition 13 and similar schemes will be able to repeal this "law" of ecology and economics in the context of environmental repair and protection.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FROM THE

Center of International Studies

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

SUPPORT FOR REGIMES: THEORIES AND TESTS

By Harry Eckstein

The author argues that political explanations must proceed either from "cultural" or "rationalist" postulates, and that explanations of political support (legitimacy) based on these premises lead logically to his own congruence theory and Rogowski's theory of rational constitutional choice. A test of the theories in societies (Sweden and Italy) and groups "crucial" for them is devised. The test involves a large number of predicted, as yet unknown, findings that are logically entailed by the theories. The essay is both a basis for intended research and a summary of the present state of the author's long concern with the problem of legitimacy.

Research Monograph No. 44 $5.00

Order from the

Center of International Studies
Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540

FULL AND FAST REFERENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE ?

TRULY INTERNATIONAL COVERAGE ?

IPSA TRIES HARD !

Do you have easy access to the hundreds of journals which publish articles in political science, public administration and international relations all over the world? At a time when many libraries must take a close look at their budgets, can you and your students dispense with the ever fuller and faster services provided by *INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS?*

A non-commercial journal published by the International Political Science Association itself, the *Abstracts* provides summaries of articles in both specialized and non-specialized journals, including major yearbooks. Articles in English are abstracted in English; articles in other languages (approximately 30 %) are abstracted in French. From 1,450 abstracts in 1968 the progress has been to 5,039 abstracts in 1976. Each issue carries a detailed subject index and a list of the 600 periodicals examined; the final issue of each annual volume contains a cumulative subject index and an author index. *Back volumes are again available (from vol. 1, 1951).*

Your own Library should have a full set of the *Abstracts.* The institutional subscription for 1977 costs French Francs 350 (approximately $ 70, £ st. 39). Individuals may subscribe at a reduced rate of F.F. 100 (approximately $ 20, £ st. 12).

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS
27, RUE SAINT-GUILLAUME, 75007 PARIS, FRANCE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968

Anatomy of a Decision

Jiri Valenta

"I can forsee this book becoming a hallmark on the subject, a definitive study of Soviet decisionmaking to be studied in other cases and contexts as well." — Jan Triska, Stanford University

When Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, who made the decision to act and why? Was it the unilateral decision of Secretary General Brezhnev or the Soviet Politburo? Or was it the result of a more complex political process? This study, much of it based on source material unavailable until now, offers a rare look at the workings of Soviet bureaucracy and crisis management in the Warsaw Pact. **$12.95**

Women under Communism

Barbara Wolfe Jancar

"A clear-eyed and skeptical assessment of the discrepancy between ideology and reality....Her book should be required reading."—*Commentary*

Communism claims to have emancipated woman and given her an equal place in society. But as this comparative, interdisciplinary study reveals, sexual stereotyping and all its consequences exist in the Communist nations of Central and Eastern Europe, in China, and in Cuba. **$16.00**

Now in paperback

China-Watch

Sino-American Reconciliation

Robert G. Sutter

foreword by Allen S. Whiting

Anyone interested in the roots of China's new rapport with the United States — and its recent moves in Asia — must read Robert Sutter's behind-the-scenes chronicle of twists and turns in Sino-American relations from the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek to Nixon's historic visit.

"[Sutter] effectively tracks the zigzags of the Communist Chinese as they juggled the United States and the Soviet Union, and he stresses a point that is highly relevant to the triangular relationship today...that the foreign policy of the Chinese has been based on their balancing the powers in their own interests."—*New York Times Book Review* **$3.95** paperback; **$10.95** hardcover

Johns Hopkins

The Johns Hopkins University Press
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Official Publication of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY

INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL

An Interdisciplinary Journal on Military Institutions, Civil-Military Relations, Arms Control and Peacekeeping, and Conflict Management

Board of Editors

Raymond Aron, *University of Paris*
S. E. Finer, *Oxford University*
Morris Janowitz, *University of Chicago*
Jacques Van Doorn, *Erasmus University, Rotterdam*

Ellen Stern, *Associate Editor*

During the first year of its publication, *Armed Forces and Society* has established an international reputation as a journal by which teachers, researchers, students of public affairs, political analysts, and policy makers can keep abreast of the most important intellectual developments in war and peace studies. *Armed Forces and Society* combines a strong historical emphasis with a contemporary perspective in the social and behavioral sciences. The journal analyzes the most controversial problems with detachment and clarity, attesting its dedication both to technical advancement in the social sciences and to high literary standards. The journal is published quarterly and is sponsored by the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

Subscription Rates:

	one year	*two year*	*three year*
Institutional	$16.00	$31.00	$45.00
Individual	12.00	23.00	33.00
Student	9.00	18.00	27.00

To enter a subscription or request an examination copy, write:

Inter-University Seminar
Box 46, Social Science Building
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637

or

British Inter-University Seminar
The University of Hull
195 Cottingham Road
HULL HU5 2EQ Great Britain

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISSN 0043-8871

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD

KLAUS KNORR, *Chairman*

CYRIL E. BLACK — JANET KELLY
HEDLEY BULL — STEPHEN D. KRASNER
LOWELL DITTMER — ERNEST R. MAY
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE — JAMES N. ROSENAU
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN — KENNETH N. WALTZ

Editors: KLAUS KNORR, CYRIL E. BLACK, GERALD GARVEY
HENRY S. BIENEN (*Review Articles*)
Associate Editors: WILLEM H. BUITER (Spring Term), STEPHEN F. COHEN, JAMES D. DENARDO, LEON GORDENKER, JEFFREY A. HART, CHARLES ISSAWI, PAUL E. SIGMUND, ROBERT L. TIGNOR (Fall Term), LYNN T. WHITE, III
Executive Editor: ELSBETH G. LEWIN

The editors invite the submission of articles bearing upon problems in international relations. Editorial communications and manuscripts should be addressed to WORLD POLITICS, Corwin Hall, Princeton, N.J. 08540. Manuscripts should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in duplicate, together with an abstract of approximately 150 words. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively, typed double-spaced, and placed at the end of the manuscript.

Authors may expect to be notified of the editors' decision within three months from date of submission. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of editors' and readers' reports. Editorial policy does not provide for informing authors of readers' evaluations or suggestions for improvement of rejected manuscripts.

Statements of fact and opinion appearing in WORLD POLITICS are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publishers. WORLD POLITICS does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere (even in somewhat different form), or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal.

Reprint permission: Permission to reproduce or translate material from WORLD POLITICS should be sought from Permissions Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

U.S. and Canada—Individual subscribers: $10.00 per year; $17.50 for two years; $25.00 for three years. Institutional subscribers: $20.00 per year; $37.00 for two years; $49.00 for three years. Back issues: $5.25.

Foreign—Individual subscribers: $12.50 per year; $22.00 for two years; $31.25 for three years. Institutional subscribers: $25.00 per year; $46.25 for two years; $61.25 for three years. (Please add $2.00 additional per year for foreign postage and handling.) Back issues: $6.50.

Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from Johnson Associates, P.O. Box 1017, Greenwich, Conn. 06830. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Advertising: Advertising Department, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI*, *Book Review Index*, *Combined Retrospective Index Sets* (CRIS), *Public Affairs Information Service*, *Social Sciences Index*, and *Monthly Periodical Index*; it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents*. Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest*, *Historical Abstracts*, *and International Political Science Abstracts*.

Copyright © 1978, 1979 by Princeton University Press

WORLD POLITICS. Published quarterly by Princeton University Press. Vol. XXXI, October 1978-July 1979. Second Class postage paid at Princeton, N.J. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Organization

a quarterly journal of world politics and political economy, with emphasis on roles of international organizations

---

Topics of recent articles have included:
Multinational Corporations and the Third World; the Theory of Regional Integration; Transgovernmental Relations and "Domestic" Bureaucracy; the "New International Economic Order"; Venezuela and the Andean Common Market; Prospects for Integration in Eastern Europe; Changing Configurations of Power in North-South Relations; and International Assistance Policy.

Contributors to recent issues include: Hayward Alker, C. Fred Bergsten, Tom J. Farer, Ernst B. Haas, Fred Hirsch, Raymond Hopkins, Paul Marer, and Franklin B. Weinstein.

Forthcoming special issues of *International Organization* will examine:
The Oceans
Foreign Economic Policy
Food Policy and International Organizations
Dependency

International Organization is sponsored by the World Peace Foundation, published at the University of Wisconsin Press and edited at Stanford University by Robert O. Keohane.

Subscribe yourself, and recommend a subscription to your librarian.

Subscription rates:
Institutions: $25/year
Individuals (must prepay):
$12.50/year; $22/2 years;
$30/3 years
Foreign subscribers add $2/year postage; airmail subscriptions $12.50 additional.

Send subscriptions to:
Journals Department
University of Wisconsin Press
Box 1379
Madison, Wisconsin 53701 USA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ORDER FORM

The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations

4 issues per volume

SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Institution	U.S. $25
Individual	U.S. $15

To:
The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations
Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc. (for subscriptions outside Israel)*
101 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10003
U.S.A.

Please register me as a subscriber to:

THE JERUSALEM JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

at the _____ rate.

Name _____

Address _____

_____

Signature _____ Date _____

*In Israel, subscriptions should be sent to The Hebrew University, Givat Ram, Jerusalem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY SOCIOLOGY

A SAMPLE OF ARTICLES ALREADY PUBLISHED

Legitimacy of Social Protest Actions in the U.S. and Sweden *by Marvin E. Olsen and Mary A. Baden*

Convergence, Isomorphism, and Interdependence at the Civil-Military Interface *by David R. Segal, J. Blair, F. Newport, and S. Stephens*

Military Professionalism and Civil Control: A Comparative Analysis of Two Interpretations *by Arthur Larson*

Occupational Mobility and Political Behavior: Some Unresolved Issues *by Joseph Lopreato, Frank D. Bean, and Sally Cook Lopreato*

The Present State and Development of Sociology of the Military *by George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz*

Mobilizing People for Collective Political Action *by Kenneth Wilson and Tony Orum*

African Armies in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, The Search for Connection *by Rene Lemarchand*

Legitimacy and Government Control of the Production of Academic Knowledge *by Michael Useem*

Military Organization and Distributional Inequality: An Examination of Andreski's Thesis *by Maurice A. Garnier and Lawrence Hazelrigg*

Black Political Participation: A Reconsideration *by Wen Kuo*

Influence Linkages Between Interest Organizations and the Government in Sweden *by Marvin Olsen*

Legislatures Under Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Mexico *by Alejandro Portes*

From Dependency to Determinism: The New Structure of Latin American Militarism *by Irving Louis Horowitz*

Imperial "Reach": U.S. Policy and the CIA in Chile *by Morris Morley and Steven Smith*

Subscription Rates: $8.50 Institution, $7.50 Individual, $6.50 Student per year. All subscribers outside the U.S. should add $.50 for mailing costs. If air mail delivery is desired, please add $3.50. Subscriptions and/or manuscripts (in triplicate) should be sent to JOURNAL OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY SOCIOLOGY, George A. Kourvetaris, Editor; c/o Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois 60115 USA.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A MATTER OF TWO CHINAS

$6.00 Paperbound

The China-Taiwan Issue in U.S. Foreign Policy



by William R. Kintner & John F. Copper

On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced a new policy: diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China and de-recognition of the Republic of China. By linking recognition with America's abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty, the authors argue, the United States committed a serious error, violating the first rule of diplomacy—don't give something away without getting something in return. In this deft analysis of America's China policy, Professors Kintner and Copper discuss the political and moral implications of the new policy and show how the United States can still salvage some credibility and reassure its allies.

ORDER FORM

Foreign Policy Research Institute
3508 Market Street, Suite 350
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Please send me _____ copies of *A Matter of Two Chinas.*

☐ Payment enclosed $_____
☐ Please bill me.

Outside U.S.A., add $0.50.

NAME (please print)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE ZIP

COUNTRY

E

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Entering its 17th volume in 1978: from January 1978 published by
SAGE Publications, London and Beverly Hills

social science **INFORMATION** sur les sciences sociales

under the auspices of the
International Social Science Council
with the assistance of Unesco, the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, and the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris

social science **INFORMATION** sur les sciences sociales

an international, cross-disciplinary forum for the documentation, analysis and debate of new developments in social science methodology, research and teaching, regularly featuring the following specialized sections:

- *Biology and Social Life*
- *Computers and the Social Sciences*
- *Human Societies and Ecosystems*
- *Man and His Environment*
- *Sociology of Education*
- *Sociology of Organizations*
- *Theory and Methods*
- *Trends and Developments*

Recent Contributors include

R Andorka
J H Barkow
Robert M Berdahl
Philippa Bevan
Gernot Böhme
Pierre Bourdieu
Manuel Castells
James D Coleman
Philip E Converse
Jon Elster
Pyotr Fedoseev
J H Goldthorpe
Albert O Hirschman
K D Knorr
S M Lipset
Stein Rokkan
Richard Rose
Immanuel Wallerstein

social science **INFORMATION** sur les sciences sociales

Published six times a year in February May, June, August/October (double issue) and December
Annual subscriptions: Individuals £14.00
Institutions £24.00

SAGE Publications
28 Banner Street, London EC1Y 8QE
275 South Beverly Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90212

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME XXXI

Actors, actual and rational, *see* Axelrod
Administration of Integrated Rural Development Policy: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries, by Dennis A. Rondinelli, III:389
agrarian reform, *see* Rondinelli
Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable, by Richard K. Betts, I:61
arms control, strategic, *see* Garthoff
Authority and Power in Bureaucratic Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy, by Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, II:195
Axelrod, Robert, The Rational Timing of Surprise, II:228

Baldwin, David A., Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies, II:161
Barrows, Walter, *Grassroots Politics in an African State: Integration and Development in Sierra Leone*, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the "Gang of Four," by Lowell Dittmer, I:26
Bates, Robert H., People in Villages: Micro-level Studies in Political Economy, I:127
Beard, Edmund, *Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics*, reviewed by Robert C. Gray, III:457
Beckman, Björn, *Organizing the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana*, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
Bender, Edward R., *An Introduction to Mathematical Modeling*, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
Betts, Richard K., Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable, I:61
Britain, aircraft industry, policy making, state and society, *see* Grieco
Bull, Hedley, Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory, IV:588
bureaucracy, *see* Rudolph; in Indonesia, *see* Crouch
bureaucratic politics, *see* Gray

capital flight, *see* Hirschman
China, politics, *see* Dittmer
Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War, by Peter R. Moody, Jr., III:417
Cleaning Up America: An Insider's View of the Environmental Protection Agency, by John Quarles, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
coercion, economic, *see* Olson
computer technology, U.S.S.R., *see* Goodman
Concorde SST and Change in the British Polity, by Joseph M. Grieco, IV:518
consociationalism, *see* Lustick; and cultural pluralism, *see* Kasfir
Consumer's Guide to Mathematical Modeling, by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
control, political, in divided societies, *see* Lustick
Crouch, Harold, Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia, IV:571

deception, *see* Axelrod
decision making, *see* Betts; and deterrence, *see* Jervis
Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo, by John Dunn and A. F. Robertson, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
dependency, *see* Olson; theory, *see* Smith
deterrence, and compellence, *see* Baldwin; and decision making, *see* Jervis
Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, by Alexander George and Richard Smoke, reviewed by Robert Jervis, II:289
Deterrence Theory Revisited, by Robert Jervis, II:289
developing countries, *see* Olson; agrarian reform, *see* Rondinelli; rural areas, *see* Bates
Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics, by Edmund Beard, reviewed by Robert C. Gray, III:457
development literature, *see* Smith
diplomacy and military strength, *see* Husband
Discrete Mathematical Models, by Fred S. Roberts, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
Dittmer, Lowell, Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the "Gang of Four," I:26
divided societies, *see* Lustick
Dunn, John, and A. F. Robertson, *Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo*, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity, by William Ophuls, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
Economic Coercion in World Politics: With a Focus on North-South Relations, by Richard Stuart Olson, IV:471
Economics, Inflation, and the Role of the State: Political Implications of the McCracken Report, by Robert O. Keohane, I:108
emigration, *see* Hirschman
environmental policy, *see* Sprout
ethnicity, and language, *see* Weinstein; and nationalism, *see* Stokes; and participation, *see* Kasfir
Exit, Voice, and the State, by Albert O. Hirschman, I:90
Explaining Ethnic Political Participation, by Nelson Kasfir, III:365

Finucane, James R., *Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania: The Case of Mwanza Region*, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127

Garthoff, Raymond L., SALT I: An Evaluation, I:1
George, Alexander, and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, reviewed by Robert Jervis, II:289
Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order, by David W. Orr and Marvin S. Soroos (eds.), and others, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
Goodman, Seymour E., Soviet Computing and Technology Transfer: An Overview, IV:539
Graphs, Models and Finite Mathematics, by Joseph Malkevitch and Walter Meyer, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
Grassroots Politics in an African State: Integration and Development in Sierra Leone, by Walter Barrows, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
Gray, Robert C., Learning from History: Case Studies of the Weapons Acquisition Process, III:457
Greenwood, Ted, *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making*, reviewed by Robert C. Gray, III:457
Grieco, Joseph M., The Concorde SST and Change in the British Polity, IV:518

Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and the State, I:90
Husband, William B., Soviet Perceptions of U.S. "Positions-of-Strength" Diplomacy in the 1970s, IV:495

Indonesia, *see* Crouch
inflation, *see* Keohane
instability, political, *see* Olson
intelligence, strategic, failures of, *see* Betts
interdependence, *see* Baldwin
Introduction to Mathematical Modeling, by Edward R. Bender, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
Introduction to Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences, by Michael Olinick, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences, by Charles A. Lave and James G. March, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434

Jervis, Robert, Deterrence Theory Revisited, II:289
Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, by Michael Walzer, reviewed by Hedley Bull, IV:588

Kasfir, Nelson, Explaining Ethnic Political Participation, III:365
Keohane, Robert O., Economics, Inflation, and the Role of the State: Political Implications of the McCracken Report, I:108

Language Strategists: Redefining Political Frontiers on the Basis of Linguistic Choices, by Brian Weinstein, III:345
Lave, Charles A., and James G. March, *An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences*, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
Learning from History: Case Studies of the Weapons Acquisition Process, by Robert C. Gray, III:457
literature, and nationalism, *see* Weinstein
Lustick, Ian, Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control, III:325

Making the MIRV: A Study in Defense Decision Making, by Ted Greenwood, reviewed by Robert C. Gray, III:457
Malkevitch, Joseph, and Walter Meyer, *Graphs, Models and Finite Mathematics*, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
March, James G., and Charles A. Lave, *Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences*, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mathematical modeling, *see* Zinnes
McCracken, Paul, and others, *Towards Full Employment and Price Stability*, reviewed by Robert O. Keohane, I:108
Meyer, Walter, and Joseph Malkevitch, *Graphs, Models and Finite Mathematics*, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
military elites and stability, in Indonesia, *see* Crouch
military power, *see* Baldwin; strength, U.S., *see* Husband
modernization, and nationalism, *see* Stokes
Moody, Peter R., Jr., Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War, III:417
Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia, by James C. Scott, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127

nationalism, and sanctions, *see* Olson; and language, *see* Weinstein; theory, ethnicity, modernization, *see* Stokes
National Priorities and the Physical Habitat: Focus of Continuing Controversy, by Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
negotiations, SALT I, *see* Garthoff
North-South relations, *see* Smith

O'Brien, Donal B. Cruise, *Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society*, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
Olinick, Michael, *An Introduction to Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences*, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
Olson, Richard Stuart, Economic Coercion in World Politics: With a Focus on North-South Relations, IV:471
Ophuls, William, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
Organizing the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana, by Björn Beckman, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
Orr, David W., and Marvin S. Soroos (eds.), and others, *The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
Owusu, Maxwell, *Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana*, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127

participation, political, *see* Kasfir
patrimonialism, *see* Rudolph; in Indonesia, *see* Crouch
Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia, by Harold Crouch, IV:571
peasant behavior, *see* Bates
Pechman, Joseph A. (ed.), and others, *Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
People in Villages: Micro-level Studies in Political Economy, by Robert H. Bates, I:197
Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government, by Harvey M. Sapolsky, reviewed by Robert C. Gray, III:417
policy making, Britain, *see* Grieco; U.S., *see* Gray
political stability, Indonesia, *see* Crouch; Britain, *see* Grieco
political theory, and just war, *see* Bull
Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies, by David A. Baldwin, II:161
power, and authority, *see* Rudolph; China, *see* Dittmer; potential vs. actual, *see* Baldwin

Quarles, John, *Cleaning Up America: An Insider's View of the Environmental Protection Agency*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600

Rational Timing of Surprise, by Robert Axelrod, II:228
Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory, by Hedley Bull, IV:588
Roberts, Fred S., *Discrete Mathematical Models*, reviewed by Dina A. Zinnes, III:434
Robertson, A. F. and John Dunn, *Dependence and Opportunity: Political Change in Ahafo*, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
Rondinelli, Dennis A., Administration of Integrated Rural Development Policy: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries, III:389
Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy, II:195
Rural Development and Bureaucracy in Tanzania: The Case of Mwanza Region, by James R. Finucane, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
rural development, *see* Bates; Rondinelli

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Saints and Politicians: Essays in the Organization of a Senegalese Peasant Society, by Donal B. Cruise O'Brien, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
SALT I: An Evaluation, by Raymond L. Garthoff, I:1
sanctions, economic, *see* Olson; negative and positive, *see* Baldwin
Sapolsky, Harvey M., *The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government*, reviewed by Robert C. Gray, III:457
Scott, James C., *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127
Setting National Priorities: The 1979 Budget, by Joseph A. Pechman (ed.), and others, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
Smith, Anthony D., *Theories of Nationalism*, reviewed by Gale Stokes, I:150
Smith, Tony, The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory, II:247
Smoke, Richard, and Alexander George, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, reviewed by Robert Jervis, II:289
Soroos, Marvin S., and David W. Orr (eds.), and others, *The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order*, reviewed by Harold and Margaret Sprout, IV:600
Soviet Computing and Technology Transfer: An Overview, by Seymour E. Goodman, IV:539
Soviet Perceptions of U.S. "Positions-of-Strength" Diplomacy in the 1970s, by William B. Husband, IV:495
Soviet Union, computer technology, *see* Goodman; perceptions of U.S. in scholarly journals, *see* Husband
Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout, National Priorities and the Physical Habitat: Focus of Continuing Controversy, IV:600
Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control, by Ian Lustick, III:325
Stokes, Gale, The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism, I:150
strategic weapons, acquisition, *see* Gray; negotiations, *see* Garthoff
surprise, risk of revelation, *see* Axelrod

technology transfer, *see* Goodman
Theories of Nationalism, by Anthony D. Smith, reviewed by Gale Stokes, I:150
Third World, political stability, *see* Crouch; rural communities, *see* Bates; rural development, *see* Rondinelli
Towards Full Employment and Price Stability, by Paul McCracken and others, reviewed by Robert O. Keohane, I:108

Uganda, Nubians, *see* Kasfir
Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory, by Tony Smith, II:247
Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism, by Gale Stokes, I:150
United States, diplomacy and military strength, *see* Husband; environmental policy, *see* Sprout; policy making, *see* Gray; SALT negotiations, *see* Garthoff
Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana, by Maxwell Owusu, reviewed by Robert H. Bates, I:127

Walzer, Michael, *Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, reviewed by Hedley Bull, IV:588
warfare and policy, *see* Moody
Weber, Max, and patrimonialism, *see* Crouch; and bureaucratic administration, *see* Rudolph
Weinstein, Brian, Language Strategists: Redefining Political Frontiers on the Basis of Linguistic Choices, III:345

zero-sum model of politics, *see* Baldwin
Zinnes, Dina A., A Consumer's Guide to Texts on Mathematical Modeling, III:434

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume XXXI
October 1978—July 1979

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New from St. Martin's Press

South Africa's Options

Strategies for Sharing Power

Frederik van Zyl Slabbert & David Welsh

Repudiating the racial discrimination inherent in the official policy of separate development, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert and David Welsh look to the experience of other democratically-governed, ethnically divided societies, and drawing from their conclusions about the common problems of such societies, propose a new framework for the democratic resolution of political and economic conflict in Southern Africa.

Just published ISBN 0-312-74696-2
170 pages $17.95

Dictators Never Die

Nicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty

Eduardo Crawley

Eduardo Crawley's **Dictators Never Die,** the fullest account of Nicaraguan politics yet published, supplies both the history and the up-to-date eyewitness reports necessary to an understanding of the country's civil war. The book examines Nicaragua's chaotic present against a historical background of revolution and plunder, incorporating extensive and penetrating interviews with both the figures who designed the network that supports the Somoza dynasty and those committed to its destruction.

Just published ISBN 0-312-20007-2
220 pages $14.50

Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt

Karen Dawisha

Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt is the first book to combine rigorous empirical research into Russian and Arabic sources with a theoretical approach to the analysis of Soviet foreign policy. Dr. Dawisha provides a close analysis of the development of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship since 1955, and its weakening in the 1970s, as well as a detailed investigation of the influences on and making of the USSR's Egyptian policy during the entire period 1955 to 1978.

Just published ISBN 0-312-74837-X
276 pages $25.00

Strategies of Survival

The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States

Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke

Strategies of Survival is a timely account of Southeast Asian foreign policy developments in a period of transition. The authors examine policy-making in the two Koreas, Vietnam (and the former South Vietnam), Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, providing a survey of each country's historical background as well as close analyses of contemporary problems.

Just published ISBN 0-312-76453-7
346 pages $27.50

Principles of Foreign Policy

The Civil State in its World Setting

Roy E. Jones

In a radical departure from prevailing orthodoxy in foreign policy study, Roy E. Jones develops a new and strikingly perceptive model for the analysis of interstate relations. Dr. Jones' provocative discussion of notions of the state and his compelling arguments in defense of a traditional liberal faith in constitutional government provide the basis for a thoughtful, prescriptive approach to contemporary international relations, in which very different types of states must work together to preserve peace and avoid nuclear holocaust.

Just published ISBN 0-312-64561-9
300 pages $25.00

State and Society in Contemporary Europe

Jack Hayward and R. N. Berki, *editors*

Fourteen senior European scholars examine—in depth and on a genuinely comparative basis—the types and functions of political, administrative and interest group relationships obtaining in both Eastern and Western European countries. **State and Society in Contemporary Europe** provides the first full-scale analysis of European political structure in the late twentieth century.

Just published ISBN 0-312-75604-6
288 pages $22.50

Order today at 20% discount from:

St. Martin's Press • P. O. Box 5352 • New York, NY 10017

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS

No. 1—October 1978

SALT I: An Evaluation — *Raymond L. Garthoff* — 1

Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the "Gang of Four" — *Lowell Dittmer* — 26

Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable — *Richard K. Betts* — 61

Exit, Voice, and the State — *Albert O. Hirschman* — 90

Review Articles

Economics, Inflation, and the Role of the State: Political Implications of the McCracken Report — *Robert O. Keohane* — 108

People in Villages: Micro-level Studies in Political Economy — *Robert H. Bates* — 129

The Undeveloped Theory of Nationalism — *Gale Stokes* — 150

No. 2—January 1979

Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies — *David A. Baldwin* — 161

Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A Revisionist Interpretation of Weber on Bureaucracy — *Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph* — 195

The Rational Timing of Surprise — *Robert Axelrod* — 228

The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory — *Tony Smith* — 247

Review Article

Deterrence Theory Revisited — *Robert Jervis* — 289

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No. 3—April 1979

Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control — *Ian Lustick* 325

Language Strategists: Redefining Political Frontiers on the Basis of Linguistic Choices — *Brian Weinstein* 345

Explaining Ethnic Political Participation — *Nelson Kasfir* 365

Administration of Integrated Rural Development Policy: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Developing Countries — *Dennis A. Rondinelli* 389

Clausewitz and the Fading Dialectic of War — *Peter R. Moody, Jr.* 417

Review Articles

A Consumer's Guide to Texts on Mathematical Modeling — *Dina A. Zinnes* 434

Learning from History: Case Studies of the Weapons Acquisition Process — *Robert C. Gray* 457

No. 4—July 1979

Economic Coercion in World Politics: With a Focus on North-South Relations — *Richard Stuart Olson* 471

Soviet Perceptions of U.S. "Positions-of-Strength" Diplomacy in the 1970s — *William B. Husband* 495

The Concorde SST and Change in the British Polity — *Joseph M. Grieco* 518

Soviet Computing and Technology Transfer: An Overview — *Seymour E. Goodman* 539

Patrimonialism and Military Rule in Indonesia — *Harold Crouch* 571

Review Articles

Recapturing the Just War for Political Theory — *Hedley Bull* 588

National Priorities and the Physical Habitat: Focus of Continuing Controversy — *Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout* 600

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq
A Study of Iraq's Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers
HANNA BATATU
1234 pages. Illus.
ISBN 05241-7. $75.00

"This will be the most important contribution to the study of Middle Eastern politics in the last decade and a major contribution to communist studies. It is by far the most detailed study of Iraqi politics ever published. It is based on amazing new material, including the files of British and Iraqi intelligence since 1917. Its interpretation of Iraqi politics and communism is new and stimulating." — *William E. Griffith, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

India's Political Economy, 1947-1977
FRANCINE R. FRANKEL
600 pages.
Cloth: ISBN 03120-7. $35.00
Limited Paperback Edition:
ISBN 10072-1. $12.50

"Ms. Frankel's book, eloquently written and well documented, has established her as a refreshingly incisive, and yet authoritative, critic of Indian development, and, by extension, of the worn-out economic growth models still being peddled by some international development institutions."
— *Ho Kwon Ping, Far Eastern Economic Review*

Sons of the Soil
Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India
MYRON WEINER
[illegible] pages.
ISBN 09379-2. $22.50

"A very carefully argued and well-researched work."
— *Library Journal*

"Another authoritative volume by Weiner. . . . This well-produced book is a must for professional and research libraries, graduate schools, and all those interested in the study of the Indian subcontinent." — *Choice*

Write for our Political Science Catalog.

Princeton University Press
Princeton, NJ 08540

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED